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ABSTRACT 
 
      The interest in the use and development of intelligence from information by law 
enforcement has escalated since the events of 9/11. This dissertation investigates the 
contemporary phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and 
explores the critical factors of the Intelligence-led policing model through an assessment 
of how these factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago 
Police Department’s Organized Crime Division. This is a case study which will use 
inductive qualitative analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured 
interviews and observations of police supervisors who are involved in decision-making 
tasks that require the use of intelligence products.  
 The extant literature on the use of information in policing and the design of the 
Intelligence-led policing model is extensive. However, there is little research devoted to 
any interpretive study which seeks to understand the phenomenon of intelligence in 
police work through the meaning that practitioners, i.e., police, assign to them. This study 
presents the basis for further research on the relationship of the critical factors involved in 
the intelligence-led policing model and how those factors are perceived in a real-life 
context. The research presents a unique view of comparative factors focused on the 
complexity of human sense-making as situations emerge and will be developed during 
the course of this study, which can be of value to future researchers.   
x 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the summer of 2001 had faded, American law enforcement was forced into the 
position of dealing with some unpleasant realities. Despite the perception that the 
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) model of the early nineties worked as an effective tool 
to strengthen ties between citizens and the police by combining scarce resources to 
combat a common crime problem, overall, the failure of the criminal justice system 
continued (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). The POP model is a police response strategy 
intended to address the causes of specific social and crime disorder problems through the 
use of analysis, assessment, and feedback in conjunction with the engagement of public 
and private community groups to resolve common issues. To compound these problems, 
the dreadful attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the subsequent anthrax scare 
exposed the country to unanticipated vulnerabilities in a free society which caught law 
enforcement unprepared. 
The purpose of this case study is to explore a new strategic approach, intelligence-led 
policing, and examine the relationship between this new approach and police efficiency. 
Specifically, the study will determine if the intelligence-led policing model contributes to 
the organizational goals, i.e., crime reduction and investigative efficiencies, over and 
above that accounted for by existing practices of the Chicago Police Department’s 
Organized Crime Division. 
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The specific research questions addressed are: 
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police 
efficiency in addition to that accounted for or perceived through current 
practices in the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department? 
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the 
organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that accounted 
for or perceived by current practices of the Department?  
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing 
police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?  
      Intelligence-led policing may be defined as an approach which emphasizes 
information gathering, from a variety of sources, and information sharing and 
collaboration among authorized agencies to establish strategic solutions to combat crime 
(Ratcliffe, 2008). This concept involves arrangements of joint participation among law 
enforcement agencies to solve problems ‘that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by 
single organizations’ (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001 p.296). Beyond the ways in which 
information is shared and used to develop intelligence, Intelligence-led policing is a 
managerial tool used by decision-makers to plan and implement focused strategies.  
Rather than reacting to an incident driven agenda, e.g., calls-for-service, intelligence-led 
policing proactively focuses on known criminals and their activities with the intention of 
anticipating and defeating the opportunity for criminal activity before it happens.  
      The interest in intelligence-led policing (ILP) has escalated dramatically among the 
members of the American law enforcement community since the events of 9/11. The 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
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stressed that significant failures to share information between law enforcement agencies 
charged with national security tasks contributed to the country’s vulnerability (The 9/11 
Commission Report, 2004). A year later, the inability of law enforcement agencies to 
coordinate information contributed to the terror perpetrated by the ‘Beltway sniper.’ In 
both instances, information relative to on-going investigations which might have 
contributed to the aversion or avoidance of catastrophe was available to various law 
enforcement agencies but because the mechanism for a coordinated sharing plan for use 
in directing and sharing resources was lacking, that information was not used efficiently 
and the consequences proved dire. The development of intelligence related to a particular 
person or circumstance is the first casualty when information is not shared. 
      The extant literature on information management, the development of intelligence 
from information, and knowledge management is extensive and multi-tiered. Information 
is the basis on which groups organize their components, connect them, mobilize them, 
and leverage them in a collective setting toward common objectives (Churchman, 1971, 
Ackoff, 1981). While the private sector has been the main beneficiary of this body of 
work, challenges to the way the public sector manages scarce resources has compelled 
them to investigate new options in the ways information may be used and transformed to 
intelligence for leveraging and maximizing those resources. Intelligence-led policing 
provides one of these options.    
      Existing models of policing demonstrate reactive and investigative approaches to 
crime rather than a preventative approach (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Under this 
arrangement, police are driven by ‘calls for service’ or the occasional response to an on-
view crime which serves the perception, though not the actual practice, of an increased 
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police presence. Routine follow-up investigations contribute to the myth of a ubiquitous, 
efficient police presence as, for example, when the news media present scenes of scores 
of police converged at the scene of a crime following a major criminal incident. Although 
it may be reassuring to see a police presence on the scene in response to crime, the 
question of what might have been done to prevent the crime must always be considered.  
      In conventional police work, the use of ‘intelligence’ is traditionally restricted to use 
on a case-by-case basis for the purpose gathering information and supporting 
prosecutions under an arrangement which is better defined as investigative-led 
intelligence (Cope, 2004). This practice contributes to the misunderstanding of the 
meaning of intelligence so that practitioners often use the terms ‘information’ and 
‘intelligence’ interchangeably so that an investigator may assume she is ‘collecting 
intelligence’ when in fact she is gathering information.  
      Simply put, intelligence is information which has been subjected to meaningful 
analysis (USDOJ/BJA 2006). Analysis is the process of reducing complex information to 
a simpler form. Products of analysis may become intelligence. Intelligence forms the 
basis for actionable knowledge, i.e., activities in support of a directed mission. Currently, 
literature related to the process and products of intelligence as they relate to the public 
sector is scant (Wise, 2002, 2006). 
      Under former police Superintendent O.W. Wilson, the Chicago Police Department 
was transformed, in the late sixties, to an agency in which ‘progressive, preventive patrol’ 
served as the mantra that drove all preliminary police activities (Chu, 2001). Wilson 
believed that a police presence, in and of itself, was the greatest deterrent to criminal 
activity. George Kelling, who co-authored the 1982 Atlantic article ‘Broken Windows’ 
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and contributed significantly to the advent of community policing, provided research 
from a Kansas City study which concluded that random patrol had little effect on crime 
prevention (Kelling, 1972).  Others go further and maintain that the inference of police 
having a substantial, broad, and independent impact on crime is a myth, regardless of 
strategies or tactics used (Eck & Maguire, 2000). 
      Over the past decade, technology has provided our society the means to join 
previously dissociated groups for the purpose of coordinating activities that advance 
productivity; not all of the opportunities available are lawful ((NJSP, 2006). Agencies in 
law enforcement are aware they must engage in the effort to keep pace with the changing 
communications environment in which the criminal element is more agile and quick to 
respond. The use of the Internet, disposable cell phones, and counter-intelligence tactics, 
such as providing misinformation to distract police, give criminals a distinct advantage 
over the police who, as an organization, are slow to adapt to changes in the environment. 
A current practice among gang members is to post pictures of themselves, weapons, and 
narcotic paraphernalia on open source Websites like U-Tube and MySpace. The Gang 
Investigations Unit of the Chicago Police Department was unable to access these sites 
from police computers because of restricted use policies until 2008.  Intelligence-led 
policing, as a strategy, focuses on the involvement of decision-makers to provide the 
tools necessary to obtain source information by establishing exceptional policy.  
      In February of 2008, the newly appointed Superintendent of the Chicago Police 
Department, Jody Weis, stated that the Department would seek new ways and methods to 
increase police efficiency. Among the methods he cited was ‘Intelligence-driven 
policing.’ The research in this project will be based on interviews, both structured and in 
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depth, with command staff personnel and supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s 
Organized Crime Division (OCD) which oversees the activities of the Department’s 
Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and Intelligence Sections. The interviews will focus on the 
respondent’s perspective of the meaning and use of intelligence as it is used within the 
Chicago Police Department, their experience in the use of intelligence, and their position 
on which features of existing practices are, or may prove to be, most salient in the use of 
intelligence in police work.    
The results of this study will be of interest to law enforcement practitioners, students 
of criminal justice, and academic researchers.  Both local law enforcement and state 
intelligence agencies have an interest in this research because it has implications on the 
efficient use of resources as well as on whether the model presented can contribute to the 
effectiveness of existing strategies. How information is used is directly related to how, or 
if, it is relayed; information which is relayed and not used is useless (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1947). Students of criminal justice must be made aware that the needs of law 
enforcement is changing and future of the criminal justice system requires skills 
involving knowledge management, analysis, and an ability to demonstrate critical 
thinking skills. Because Intelligence-led policing is a relatively new strategy, researchers 
have the opportunity to expand on the knowledge base related to the concept and to 
further test its validity. Overall the research presented is intended to contribute to current 
law enforcement practices by examining the relationship and purpose of information 
collected, the type and extent of analysis conducted, and whether organizational benefits 
may be derived from Intelligence-led policing. Conclusions from this research are 
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expected to be applicable to the use of Intelligence-led policing throughout the 
Department. 
Limitations 
   Data used in this research will be collected from interviews. The sample size is 
representative of the population of supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s 
Organized Crime Division (OCD), who are charged with tasks involving the use of 
intelligence processes and products. The OCD is comprised of three sections; Gangs, 
Narcotics, and Intelligence.  
 A pilot case study will be conducted prior to administering formal interviews. This is 
a formative step intended to refine the relevant questions used in later data collection. Yin 
(2009) maintains Pilot studies can be useful for the purpose of concept clarification prior 
seeking IRB approval. The selection of participants in the pilot case study will be from 
OCD supervisory personnel who will not be included in the actual research and will 
address basic methodological issues related to the logistics of the proposed field inquiry. 
Additionally, responses to the pilot case study will be compared to a continuing review of 
relevant literature on intelligence-led policing. This approach supports the notion that the 
subsequent study will reflect on contemporary theoretical issues as well as issues which 
are case specific.  
 Interviews related to this research will be administered following the introduction of 
the interviewer and an explanation the purpose for interviews by the Chief of OCD. 
Personnel to be interviewed are assigned to different ‘watches’ (schedules) covering three 
shifts each day with rotating day-off groups. When possible, interviews will be conducted 
at the interviewee’s principle place of business.  
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   The sample size used in this research is derived from the population of supervisors 
within the Organized Crime Division’s (OCD) Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and 
Intelligence Sections. At the highest level, the Chief of the unit represents the fourth 
highest ranking officer on the Department followed by the Deputy Chief and three 
Section Commanders. Additionally, fifteen lieutenants assigned to OCD will be 
interviewed.  
Definition of Terms 
Analysis: the ability to reduce complex information to a simpler form for examination on 
solutions intended to resolve more complex problems in support of possible decisions.   
Collaboration: the work of two or more agencies that provide resources and expertise 
with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, respond, or defeat threatening, 
criminal or terrorist activities. 
Data: a general abstract descriptor which is initially unbiased.    
Intelligence-led policing: a management philosophy in support of optimal resource 
allocation based on the understanding of the operating environment.  
Intelligence Process:  a method for managing the flow of data across the horizontal and 
vertical levels of government in order to integrate information and analysis, develop 
intelligence, and provide decision-makers with the options required to develop actionable 
knowledge.  
Information: data that has been synthesized and is biased.  
Intelligence: information to which value has been added through analysis. 
Intelligence Community:  Fourteen (14) U.S. agencies responsible for intelligence 
activities necessary for national security, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence. 
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State and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: Fifty (50) state and two hundred (200) 
tribal Indian law enforcement agencies which function below the federal level and above 
local law enforcement level.  
Local Law Enforcement: any of the estimated 800,000 sworn officers representing 
agencies below the state level.   
Fusion Centers: state agencies charged with developing and managing intelligence based 
on information received from federal, tribal, and local law enforcement partners.         
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
      This chapter provides a review of the literature related to the concept of intelligence-
led policing and its effect on police management, operations, effectiveness, and 
efficiency.  The goals of this review are not to be exhaustive but rather to point out 
seminal themes under study by scholars of intelligence-led policing and its use in law 
enforcement. In the extant police literature, intelligence-led policing, as a phenomenon, 
has not been fully explored or theoretically developed (Hale, Heaton, Uglow 2004; 
Oakensen, Mockford, and Pascoe, 2002). The practitioner literature, however, represents 
an extensive and growing collection of articles that detail various aspects on the interest 
and use of intelligence-led policing as a strategic tool in police work. Cooper (1984) 
suggests that a literature review should be used as a means to an end, and not as an end in 
itself. The literature review addresses questions about the topic that needs to be studied. 
Given this purpose in literature reviews, the research objectives of this study are: (1) to 
explore the definitions and use of information and intelligence currently existing within 
the context of existing police models and (2) to uncover critical factors employed by the 
newest model of intelligence-led policing which may serve to enhance the Chicago Police 
Organized Crime Division in attaining goals related to crime detection and prevention. 
Each of these issues is important from scholarly and practical perspectives. 
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 Existing studies on the use of intelligence in law enforcement fall into two general  
categories. The first involves definitions of intelligence in policing and how, as a 
resource, intelligence products are managed by organizations. The second examines 
intelligence as a process and is concerned with the development of source information 
and whether it contributes to organizational objectives.  
     In the first instance, the management of intelligence, studies consider the product 
environment related to intelligence including resources, ownership, exchanges, and the 
impact or feasibility for action based on intelligence (IACP, 2002; White, 2004; GIWC, 
2005; Osbourne, 2006 ). Two major concerns regarding the use of intelligence in law 
enforcement involve sharing of the products which result from intelligence work and 
issues of civil rights. The protection of citizen’s rights in gathering and sharing 
information by law enforcement is strictly outlined by the guidelines in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (28 CFR 23) which provides the basis for police policy. The tenets 
of 28 CFR 23 preclude gathering information on individuals who are not the subject of a 
criminal investigation. Gundhus (2005) addressed obstacles to sharing information 
between agencies and observed that no standard practices exist. Sheptycki (2004) 
described a list of ‘organizational pathologies’ that were problematic to the internal and 
external flow of intelligence requiring managerial intervention to correct. Research by 
Jaranpaa and Staples (2001) found positive associations between individual beliefs 
regarding information/intelligence ownership and the ability to exchange products of 
intelligence between and among organization members. These issues will be addressed 
later in this research. 
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      In the second instance, the process of intelligence creation is examined from a 
perspective on data collection, the analysis and development of information, the 
relevance and meaning of information in the context of crime, the synthesis and creation 
of intelligence which is appropriate to criminal activity, and the dissemination of the 
intelligence products to decision makers in order to generate action (Osborne, 2006; 
IACP, 2002; Clark and Eck, 2005; Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005; Brodeur and Dupont, 
2006; de Lint, O’Connor, and Cotter, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008). In its simplest form, 
intelligence is recognized as information to which analysis has been applied (Carter, 
2004; NJSP, 2005). The distinction in the types of analysis used in intelligence-led 
policing and other police models will be discussed throughout this research. Analysts are 
the ‘knowledge workers’ within an organization. Drucker (1959) first postulated the use 
of ‘knowledge workers’ within organizations as those individuals who work primarily 
with information to develop and uses knowledge in the workplace. Nicholl (2004) 
emphasized the need for a strong analyst-client relationship if the information under 
analysis is expected to be converted to intelligence and subsequently, actionable 
knowledge. Actionable knowledge represents intelligence products on which policy 
makers determine strategic plans and the allocation of resources necessary to implement 
the strategy. This notion is crucial to the intelligent-led policing model which emphasizes 
the requirement that the intelligence conveyed must fit within the boundaries of the 
resource limitations and capabilities (Simon, 1983) of the organizational client (Ratcliffe, 
2008).     
     The purpose of this study is to assess the perception of police supervisors on the 
critical factors employed by the model of intelligence-led policing.  Additionally, current 
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practices in the use of intelligence by the Chicago Police Department’s Organized 
Crime Division will be examined.  
      The research questions which will be addressed in this study are:  
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police 
efficiency in addition to that accounted for existing practices? 
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to 
organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that 
accounted for by existing practices? 
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from those of 
existing police practices? 
The Policing Paradigms 
     The traditional paradigm of local law enforcement fosters reactions to information 
provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trial governed by rules of evidence, 
and protects the rights of citizens as part of a tactical approach (Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow, 
1998, p.82). The importance of this statement emphasizes that (1) police response to 
crime is reactionary; a crime must have occurred before it is investigated and (2) 
information used by police is provided voluntarily from sources other than the police, for 
example, from witnesses, victims, or from offenders. In this instance, the apprehension of 
the offender, i.e., the arrest is the primary goal of investigative methods. This approach, 
and the scope of local law enforcement, changed dramatically following the events of 
September 11th.     
     The extant literature on law enforcement indicates there is a new trend in policing 
which fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering with the intention of anticipating 
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threats in advance of any criminal activity by planning preventative actions against 
suspect targets as part of a strategic approach which encourages the development and 
allocation of resources as part of policy planning. Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow (1998) 
suggest this approach is similar to methods used by federal intelligence agencies. The 
principle distinction between traditional policing and the new model is the strategic focus 
on the use of intelligence to drive police strategies through risk assessment. Risk 
assessment takes into account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences posed by the risk 
in anticipation of actions. It is important to note that this risk assessment strategy does not 
replace tactical investigative techniques; rather it complements them.  
      The development of intelligence for use in the police environment is complex and 
subject to a variety of interpretations as supported in the literature (Gill, 2000; O’Shea 
and Nicholls 2003; Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008). As a concept, intelligence-led policing 
was originally articulated in the U.K. as an operation strategy to reduce crime based on 
the crime trends developed through the use of information generated from a variety of 
sources (Ratcliffe, 2008). It has evolved as a business model in which the analysis of 
crime information results in the development of intelligence products to serve decision 
makers as the foundation to determine priorities, resource allocation, and subsequent 
actions by law enforcement i.e., intelligence-led policing drives police strategies. As a 
police strategy, intelligence-led policing builds on, and indeed borrows from, the tenets 
established a decade ago under the philosophies of Community Oriented Policing (COP) 
and Problem Oriented Policing (POP) (Skogan, 2006; BJS, 2006). The rational for 
exploring and later implementing these alternatives to traditional police methods arose 
for two reasons which were not directly related to intelligence. First, until the late ‘60s, 
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there was the societal perception that the police represented order and served a real 
purpose by legitimizing the barrier between the legal standard and crime (Wood and 
Shearing, 2007). This perception eroded during the political and civil upheavals which 
carried into the ‘70’s during which police activities were often interpreted in terms of a 
fascist-like reaction of suppression in response to individuals or groups who sought, 
sometimes violently, to express their Constitutional guarantees. Secondly, traditional 
police methods which centered on reactive or investigative responses to crime seemed 
incapable of containing or impacting a rising crime rates (Ratcliffe, 2008). The 
combination of these factors contributed to a revaluation of police procedures, including 
alternative programs, on how best to (1) reconnect with citizen-stakeholders and (2) 
contribute more effectively to strategies for crime reduction through the use of 
information and the development, through the analysis of information, of intelligence.  
The Relation Between Intelligence-led and Other Policing Strategies 
      Conventional policing strategies operate on the assumption that greater detection 
leads to more arrests which, in turn, serves as a deterrent to crime. Assuming there were 
realistic measurements to establish equilibrium, such a strategy might function but, in 
reality, criminal activity outpaces the criminal justice system’s ability to keep it in check. 
The criminal justice system entails all processes related to crime from detection, arrest, 
prosecution, and conviction; the ‘crime funnel.’ Ratcliffe (2008) notes for every 1,000 
crimes committed, less than 8 percent are detected and less than 1 percent result in prison 
sentencing. For the purpose of this research, we focus on the detection phase and how 
information leading to intelligence is instrumental in contributing to the criminal justice 
system’s process. 
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      For police, the detection of crime is accomplished in two ways; it is reported by a 
victim or witness source or, it is viewed ‘on scene’ (in progress) by law enforcement. The 
former represents the majority of crimes detected.  As part of the paperwork involved, 
crimes are indexed and cataloged in the United States, by two principle methods. The 
first is Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system which was initiated in the late ‘20’s and 
taken over by the FBI in the early 30’s (Foster, 2004). The second, the National Incident 
Based Reporting System (NIBRS), involves an extension of the UCR method and 
includes greater detail   
      Twenty-eight years after the introduction of the UCR program, the FBI produced its 
first national aggregate of crime totals (Pattavina, 2005). The system relies on local law 
enforcement to self report criminal activity which is then categorized by a UCR 
classification number and archived. UCR numbers indicate the type of crime committed, 
for example, 0110 is a homicide, 041A is a battery committed with a firearm, and 0430 is 
a battery committed with another dangerous weapon. UCR classifications are also applied 
to the location in which the crime took place so that 304 will indicate a crime took place 
in the street while 290 would indicate the crime took place in a residence. The UCR 
classification system is the most widely used method employed by law enforcement 
today and crime data gathered from 93% of the nation’s population is represented in the 
annual report entitled Crime in the United States (Maltz, 1999).  
      The main function of the UCR classification method is to ‘count incidents of crime’ 
and store them in order to monitor crime trends, a task for which the system is limited 
(Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Maltz, 1999). For example, the UCR system includes a 
hierarchy mechanism which requires the reporting of only the most serious crime in 
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instances were multiple crimes are committed. A Loyola study in Chicago (Block and 
Block, 1992) demonstrated that homicides were often the end result of other crimes, such 
as robberies which went unreported under the hierarchy rules. UCR numbers are self 
reported by local law enforcement and therefore subject to under-reporting. Under 
reporting occurs for two reasons; first, crimes occur without ever being reported and 
second, there are times when reported crimes are reclassified through the discretionary 
police practice known as  ‘killing crime’ in order to downplay the severity of a crime 
problem.  For example, a burglary which is a Part I Index crime against property may be 
reclassified as a theft, a ‘lesser crime’ not part of the Part I index. The motivation for 
killing crime varies but when it is employed, it serves to distort the overall crime picture 
and, in some situations, make an area appear to have fewer types of crimes than are 
actually occurring. Without scrutiny, such activity serves to defeat the purpose of 
information and subsequently intelligence. 
      The UCR system was intended as a ‘summary based’ method for collecting data on 
reported crimes. The system did not allow for information related to dates or victim 
demographics thereby limiting its value in use for in depth analysis or efficient policy 
making decisions. By the late to mid-eighties, The FBI addressed these concerns and 
introduced the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to correct some of the 
deficiencies inherent in the UCR system (Pattavina, 2004; Foster, 2005). The NIBRS 
system is more eclectic in its approach to the criminal incident which is defined as an 
offense or offenses as committed by and offender or offenders acting in concert at the 
same time and place (FBI 1998). Additionally, information related to victims, multiple 
offenders, property classifications, and categories which included crimes against society, 
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e.g., narcotics trafficking, in addition to crimes against people or property. Because 
NIBRS functions as part of a standardized Records Management System (RMS) which is 
provided with data from local jurisdictions, there are strict compliance standards for users 
who must adhere to design requirements. As a result of the NIBRS program, local 
jurisdictions are able to perform analysis of information on criminal activity and police 
response that contributes to a broader perspective which is helpful in two principle areas. 
First, crime data may be examined on a larger scale than would be available at just the 
local level. Research by Faggiani and McLaughlin (1991) and Faggiani, Bibel, and 
Brensilber (2001) tied incidents of narcotics trafficking across multijurisdictional areas 
which demonstrated a previously undetected regional problem that impacted non-
contiguous localities. Second, effective analysis prepares policy makers to make more 
informed decisions. The work of Faggiani et al (2001) led to memorandums of 
understanding between cooperating agencies to better address regional drug problems. 
Similarly, tracking the police response domestic violence incidents in which arrests were, 
or were not made led to policy changes in procedures and subsequent legislation 
involving domestic violence (Pattavina, 2004). NIBRS demonstrated that for the first 
time, local law enforcement could use advances in technology that enhanced the ability to 
collate large amounts of data for analysis related to criminal activity and transform it to 
useful information upon which actionable intelligence could be used effectively to 
proactively address crime issues.  
      Analysis of situational data from the NIBRS system relied on reported incidents of 
crime. Kelling and Wilson (1982) and Kelling and Cole (1996) argued that because other 
factors, many affecting ‘quality of life issues,’ contribute to information on the conditions 
   
19 
that result in crime, law enforcement should strengthen ties with the community to 
expand their sources of information. Government support of this notion led to various 
models which collectively became known community policing.     
      Under the Clinton Administration, a number of initiatives were begun at the federal 
level to bolster the criminal justice system including the Community Policing 
Competitive grant program (COPS Program) to put 100,000 police officers on the streets 
in community policing programs (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994). Nationally, local law enforcement agencies competed for billions in federal 
funding in order to subsidize hiring provided they subscribed to policing strategies which 
involved community input and the use of defined problem solving models. Problem 
solving requires the identification of a community concern and an exchange of 
information related to the concern. As with conventional policing, community problems 
were incident driven but are more generalized, e.g., a focus on abandoned buildings that 
provided the venue for illegal activities such as prostitution or narcotics use. In addition 
to arrest and service data that was available to law enforcement, police would work with 
the community and other agencies to access additional types of information such as 
property ownership records, utility information, and other demographics in order to 
analyze conditions surrounding criminal activity and access alternative solutions to a 
problem beyond arrests.    
      Both Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and Community Oriented Policing (COP) rely 
on gathering information, often from local community groups or Beat Officers, in order 
to expose and correct underlying or endemic causes which contribute to disorder 
problems, including any conditions that support crime. Both POP and COP were 
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promoted and advanced as policing strategies but in practice were more tactical and 
focused on specific problems. As such, the use of information or intelligence used in the 
practice of these strategies, when successful, served to address specific problems which 
Tilley (2003) believes served to satisfice communities, i.e., provide the best solution, or 
one that was ‘good enough’ (Simon, 1996), without resolving the problem. Under 
conditions of ‘satisficing,’ for example, conditions of crime might be eliminated in one 
area simply because it relocated in another area. Information or ‘intelligence’ in this 
instance is restricted to situational data for tactical crime support which differs from the 
broader sense of intelligence analysis used in intelligence-led policing.       
Community Oriented Policing 
      In practice, community oriented policing is difficult to define as it is based on the 
intention that police must confer and consult with public stakeholders regarding 
operational matters in order to be effective (Bennett, 1994). Mastrofski, (2006) suggests 
that because community objectives are so varied and fluid, community policing can not 
be evaluated effectively because of its all-things-to-all-people character. Harcourt (2004) 
studied Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), a variation of community 
policing, and argued that no quantifiable results were ever produced by the program. This 
is likely related to the that fact that goals of community policing were most often 
‘measured’ in terms of  community satisfaction and a perception that police were actively 
participating in activities that addressed community-driven concerns (Tilley, 2003). In 
some ways, the effects of community oriented policing may be compared to the effects 
on behavior during the Hawthorn experiments at the Westinghouse facility in Chicago 
(Mayo, 1949).  There, the response in participant behavior to a change in the environment 
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related more to the attention given the participants rather than as a result of the 
change itself (Landsberger, 1959). From the information and intelligence perspective, 
COP-like programs provided sources of data which had previously not been used. 
Because of the ties established through community-police relations, associative data 
related to problem analysis was used as a foundation for intelligence based action and 
policy. This provided a new way in which police were required to consider available, 
though previously unused, information sources for situational analysis.  
Problem Oriented Policing 
      Like COP, POP involves the identification and analysis of specific crime and disorder 
problems, in order to develop an effective response. Unlike COP, POP places the police, 
rather than the community, in the position of deciding which problems should be 
addresses. Oliver and Bartgis (1998) concluded that the practices of Problem Oriented 
Policing are actually an integral part of Community Policing. This observation serves to 
blur the distinction between the two programs (Scott, 2000). However, programs such as 
these indicate the implied necessity on the part of the police to seek non-traditional 
methods for doing their jobs and represent a beginning in seeking alternative solutions to 
conventional policing methods. Problem-identification and problem-solving however, 
represent different ends of the same spectrum; while it is easy to identify a concern, it is 
another matter to resolve the concern.  
    Bynam (2001) contends that police are better at identifying problems than solving 
them, a simple but important observation. Problem Oriented Policing represents a first 
step towards intelligence-led policing as it employees an analytical lens through which 
conditions or participants in crime are specifically viewed and research and assessment 
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are emphasized as part of a continuing problem solving process. This point provides 
the main distinction between Community Oriented and Problem Oriented Policing as 
while it is a common practice for police agencies to store volumes of data there was never 
direct attention given to use of the data for analysis beyond its evidentiary, case-by-case 
use. 
      Problem Oriented Policing introduced a simple problem solving method which was 
developed in conjunction with the pioneering research that created POP as a model 
(Goldstein, 1979, 1990). Eck and Spellman (1987) suggested an analytical approach to 
problem solving that was applied to identifiable police problems which were then 
examined through four steps; scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA). For 
the first time in policing, solutions and assets were regarded as part of a process in the 
comprehensive analysis on a problem in which feedback and assessment were vital.   
      Traditional policing strategies and tactics involve mobilizing resources and 
operations, without question, in response to achieving a goal and outcomes were 
measured in terms of immediate results or ‘performance indexes,’ such as arrests, 
citations issued, or contacts initiated (Smith, 1995; Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004). Without a 
mechanism for assessment, these conditions present a numbers-game that resulted in an 
interesting paradox. Because police are tabulating or ‘counting’ results rather than 
assessing the impact of their actions based on situational analysis, the conditions creating 
the problem simply relocate as opposed to being resolved (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003; 
Foster, 2002); this is known as ‘moving crime.’  Additionally, a reliance on ‘performance 
indicators’ requires decision makers to focus on internal performance rather than external 
problems (Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004; Ratcliffe 2008). If a problem area is saturated for 
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enforcement for any period of time, supervisors become concerned by the fact that 
numbers fall off as an operation progresses without regard to the changing conditions 
brought on by an increased police presence.  Bichler and Gaines, (2005) maintain that 
such ‘single phase’ solutions to crime problems tend to involve increased police presence 
for complex problems affecting areas and crime prevention for specific sites facing 
single-crime problems. Social problems involving police solutions are complex and in 
addition to reaction, may involve analysis, further study, and feedback. A key feature of 
organizational learning suggests the variables under investigation should be scrutinized, 
assessed, and evaluated in order to transform large problems into smaller, attainable 
objectives (Argyris and Schön, 1974).  
    Research on the use of analysis in police work indicates that police managers 
preferred their analysts to focus on tactical outcomes or in support of the investigative 
process (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003). Under such arrangements, analysis is intended to 
maximize the impact of enforcement and is directly tied to offender identification and 
apprehension on a case-by-case-basis (Cope, 2004). This is understandable. Under 
existing practices Police supervisors and managers are tied to the current and existing 
condition of crime which they are expected to immediately address through standards of 
traditional and acceptable practices. While analysis would help to focus, possibly drive, 
police initiatives, it is the consequences of existing managerial decisions that have a 
direct impact on the analytical processes used in policing (Gill, 2000). 
      With a rise in the use of technology during the late ‘90s, both POP and COP began 
applying tools like Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to data. GIS systems use 
mapping programs to spatially render data. Spatial rendering is the visual representation 
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of data used in graphs, computer assisted diagrams (CAD), or maps (Foster, 2005; 
Pattavina, 2007). Advances in computer technologies allowed desktop computer users to 
integrate data and mapping through the technique of geocoding, a process that transforms 
latitudes and longitudes into points on a map. This feature proved useful to problem 
solving and analysis since it allows the user to ‘layer’ information (data of interest) 
related to areas of concern onto maps. The ability to layer information on maps meant 
that a variety of variables e.g., crime data, proximity data related to other social 
problems, business data, or building data, could be viewed at one time although the data 
may come from different sources.  Previous theories on crime, notably rationale choice 
theory (Clark, 1997; Clark and Eck 2003) and routine activity theory (Felson, 1998; 
Felson and Clark, 1998) could be examined spatially in greater detail. Rationale choice 
theory maintains criminal acts occur when specific conditions, e.g., lack of a police 
presence, exist. Routine activity theory holds that victims are often the habit of routine 
which an offender may study and use to his advantage. Both theories focus on the 
conditions which contribute to the opportunity for crime and may be analyzed in order to 
rationalize the ‘why’ as well as ‘where’ crime occurs or develop as trends. It should be 
noted that in the nineties a combination of practices and hybrid programs using elements 
from previous problem solving models were employed by many law enforcement 
jurisdictions.  
      In Chicago, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was implemented 
citywide among twenty-five police Districts in 1994 and was based on the premise that 
police alone lacked the resources to solve the city’s crime problems but might serve as a 
conduit between the community and other city agencies in an effort to resolve quality of 
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life issues which contribute to crime. The CAPS model differs slightly from the 
COPS approach to problem solving in that it incorporates an element of a strong 
organizational buy-in which includes the condition of accountability on the part of 
District Commanders. These notions were similar in concept to the CompStat approach 
which was developed by the New York Police Department and will be discussed later in 
this section.  
      Following the provisions of a pamphlet entitled ‘Together We Can” police Districts 
developed Beat Teams and Beat Team Meetings under police supervisors. All Districts 
are divided into nine to twelve Beats (depending on the District size). Beat Team 
meetings are held once a month at which time citizens are encouraged to attend and 
present concerns to the police Beat Team. Concerns generally centered on quality of life 
issues including matters related to neighborhood maintenance such as street lighting, 
clean up, graffiti removal, or tree trimming.  Beat Teams acted as conduits to other City 
agencies to address such concerns. The Beat Team Meeting agenda and the procedures 
for holding the meetings are under the exclusive control of the police. A commercially 
available GIS application, MapInfo© was employed to a limited extent for mapping 
problem concerns. The application some experience with database management although 
the CAPS program provided no training in the use of databases. CAPS identified 
‘computerized crime-analysis’ as one of the program’s objectives though training beyond 
fundamental problem identification was never achieved. 
      While the COPS program measured success in terms of community satisfaction with 
the job done through police driven initiatives, CAPS emphasized centralized oversight by 
the Department in order to audit practices and to review the participation of District rank 
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and file. CAPS required a Departmental reorganization and a call for decentralized 
prioritizing of problems at the District level, but a ten year review of the CAPS program 
by Northwestern University maintained the program suffered from too little training, a 
lack of analytic capacity, and a lack of organizational commitment (Skogan, 2004). Such 
limitations were reflected in the solutions provided through the CAPS program and 
CAPS successes were often reported in terms of community satisfaction with a police 
presence to a crime issue affecting a neighborhood. For example, the installation of ATM 
machines within police Districts was seen as a CAPS success because it was presumed 
citizens would be safer making cash withdrawals while in a police facility. Although this 
type of activity centers on methods to deflect crime, once implemented, there are no 
provisions for feed back or follow up on information as to whether the steps taken 
significantly impacted crime.  
      At the same time COP-like programs were being initiated, William Bratton, 
Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (1994-1996), is credited with 
taking the analytical approach to crime reduction a step further by integrating police 
practices with a management style that stressed supervisory accountability as policy. The 
process he designed required supervisors to aggressively use statistical data on crime as a 
means to pinpoint ‘hot spots’ of criminal activity in order to develop tactics and counter- 
active measures to fight crime. This process has become known as Compstat.   
Compstat 
      The literature devoted to the origins and development of Compstat is considerable 
(Kelling and Coles, 1996; Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999; McDonald, Greenberg, and 
Bratton, 2001).  Compstat is intended to be an internal managerial tool in which middle 
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management i.e., commanders, would be held accountable for the ‘management of 
crime’ within their respective areas of influence (Ratcliffe, 2008). In New York, the 
Police Commissioner William Bratton (1994-1996), restructured his Department’s 
organization so that tactical requisites, including the flow of intelligence and resources, 
would be made available to specifically address issues of crime. Ratcliffe (2008) notes 
that data provided to commanders is more properly defined as ‘information’ rather than 
‘intelligence’ and this distinction will be addressed in depth in the ensuing section. The 
seminal difference that distinguishes the Compstat model from other police problem 
solving approaches is that it successfully combined managerial and technical resources 
through a process of organizational change (Moore, 2003; Silverman, 2006); the issue of 
managerial buy-in was not an option, it was an imperative.  
      In support of his commanders, Bratton mandated the timely delivery of crime related 
data and instituted twice-a-week meetings to review tactics and progress his commanders 
were experiencing on specific crime problems or issues involving ‘hot spots,’ the 
geographic areas of concern. Based largely the decline in the homicide rate, Bratton’s 
Compstat model was heralded as an effective deterrent to crime and adopted, in various 
forms, by other law enforcement agencies country wide (Silverman 1996; Remnick, 
1997; Gurwitt, 1998; Mass, 1998; McDonald, 1998). A key component of Compstat 
involved the spatial representations of crime in specific areas. This required the 
conversion of data to points on a map which so that changes could be plotted for specific 
date ranges and displayed visually during Compstat meetings. Levitt (2004) maintains 
there were other factors at work which may have contributed to the perceived and actual 
reduction in crime that New York experienced under Bratton’s plan and is skeptical that 
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Compstat alone was responsible. During the same time period, and without a program 
like Compstat, Los Angeles and Washington D.C., experienced crime reduction on par 
with New York when the size of the respective departments is factored in (Thompson, 
1997). In addition to a new police strategy, for example, stricter gun laws, additional 
police officers, the strong economy of the 90’s and changing demographics may have 
contributed to a decline in the crime rate in New York, as well as in the Nation (Moore, 
2003; Levitt, 2004). While it is widely accepted that a variety of conditions can 
contribute to conditions of crime, Compstat represented a ‘strategic control system’ 
intended to gather and disseminate information on crime as well as to track police efforts 
to impact crime (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, and Willis, 2004). It is unlikely that 
Compstat alone was responsible for all reported drops in crime but it is also unfair to look 
at broad societal changes which may have contributed to crime reduction in order to 
detract from what Compstat established. The Compstat model was founded as a strategic 
management tool that determined how data and information is managed through crime 
analysis of specific crime data in order to develop intelligence on crimes and to influence 
policy maker decisions related to resource allocation within police precincts. The idea of 
executive buy-in to a strategy supported from the top by Mayor Giuliani and coupled 
with the use of analytical tools to develop an efficient intelligence system is an important 
precedent to intelligence-led policing.    
Chicago Police Community Oriented Police Initiative 
      As discussed earlier, the Chicago CAPS program was strictly modeled after the 
federal COPS program for developing a community-police bond. Concurrently, Chicago 
also employed Compstat-like methods in which information on crime was used to 
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develop intelligence that could be used in support of police operations. The Chicago 
Police Department implemented the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) in 2003, a 
unit charged with generating intelligence obtained through analysis of violent crime 
reports from throughout the City which was then dispersed among the city’s twenty five 
police Districts. The DOC efforts were aided by the development of the Illinois Citizen 
and Law Enforcement Analysis system (I-CLEAR), an interactive database system which 
allowed officers to mine data from all police records through District terminals. As with 
Compstat, regular DOC meetings were conducted at headquarters to review operational 
progress on citywide violent crime. In 2007, the Department instituted the Crime 
Prevention Information Center (CPIC) to specifically address violent crime reduction and 
homeland security terrorist threat assessments (CPD 2007 Annual Report). The CPIC 
provides continuous assessment of data received from the field including data received 
from stationary cameras deployed throughout the city.  
      In 2008 the DOC meeting was modified slightly in order to focus on specific Districts 
during a weekly designated Crime Analysis Review (CAR) accountability meetings. 
During DOC and CAR meetings the only crimes addressed involved homicides and 
incidents of aggravated batteries in which victims were wounded or killed by handguns. 
This rationale was based on an intention to develop strategies to drive down gun related 
violence. 
      At these meetings the unit commanders of the focus Districts are required to explain 
and defend activities initiated to curb street level violence. Despite the restructuring and 
technology employed by the Department, both violent crime and homicides in 2008 have 
increased in Chicago when compared to the previous year’s numbers. This may indicate 
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that Compstat-like programs, while useful as a concept, fails as a construct as most of 
the literature dealing with Compstat relates only to program implementation and not to 
the results of the program (Moore, 1995). In reviewing the literature related to crime 
strategies, two common themes recur but are overlooked; (1) while crime analysis, to 
some degree takes place, analysts themselves actually assume the role of technicians who 
retrieve data produce maps that pinpoint hotspots (Osborne, 2006) and (2) the focus of 
each strategy is on an event or location, not the persons involved in the criminal act.  
     As part of the original COPS initiative, prosecutors were asked to "focus on the 
offender, not simply the specific offense, and impose individualized sanctions [such as] 
conflict resolution, treatment, counseling, and recreation programs" (Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Analysis in the use of Compstat in three 
cities suggested that some data is ‘invisible’ as Compstat focused on locations, not 
people, and included no mechanism for tracking individuals involved in crimes, such as 
domestic violence, who were likely to become repeat offenders (Willis, Mastrofski, 
Weisburd; 2003).  In practice, ‘pointer systems’ such as the Drug Enforcement Agency’s 
(DEA) National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) have proven useful as a tool that identifies 
offenders who may be the subject of multiagency investigations since 1997 (Foster, 
2005). Such indicators are often important to law enforcement to avoid embarrassing 
conflicts which can arise when two agencies, one federal and one local, for example, are 
investigating the same target. McDonald and Boland (2003) conducted a John Hopkins 
study which concluded the practices of the best police executives consistently used data 
for strategic decisions and integrated aspects from each of the existing strategies (COP, 
POP, Compstat) without regard to labeling successes under one enforcement approach. 
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Pattavina (2005) contends that through experimentation, the most effective policing 
results from integrating the strategies of COP, POP, and Compstat systematically and 
scientifically. It was the integration of best practices among the three strategies combined 
with the notion that a "focus on the offender, not simply the specific offense” might 
provide a better solutions which remained unanswered under existing strategies that led 
to the concept of intelligence-led policing.   
Intelligence-led Policing 
      One COPS office report first referenced “intelligence-led strategy” as a method that 
allowed decision makers to place resources where they would have the most impact on 
crime in 1994 (Gest, 2005, 2007). Since then, there has been considerable debate as to 
whether the notion of intelligence-led policing is actually an extension of existing 
problem oriented policing strategies. Several authors interpret Compstat, for example, as 
a tool that evolved from community policing because the methods used in each of the 
models were non-traditional (Daniels and Smith, 2001; Carter, 2004; Clarke, 2006). A 
similar argument considers intelligence-led policing to be grounded in the Compstat 
approach and, by association, to the earlier models of POP and COP which are 
considered to be proactive in that they seek to discover and inspect elements which may 
contribute to conditions in support of crime rather than relying on conventional police 
response to, and subsequent investigation of, a crime after the fact (Dannels and Smith, 
2001).  
      Ratcliffe (2007) believes intelligence-led policing (ILP) resembles a hybrid model 
which includes elements of problem oriented policing and Compstat as intelligence-led 
policing involves the some of the analytical features of the former and the executive buy-
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in of the later. Unlike either of the earlier models, ILP intentionally focuses on how 
key individuals are related to intelligence products which may have been derived from 
key incident analysis and requires intelligence analysis as a whole rather than specific 
crime analysis related to events. Earlier models devoted to crime prevention are restricted 
as they depend on limited data available from available sources. The ILP task requires 
that agencies be linked to other authorized law enforcement groups for additional 
information resources.   
      The element that connects each of the precursors to intelligence-led policing is the 
various use of analysis on many data sources to derive a better understanding of the 
circumstances surrounding criminality and to apply analysis to prolific offenders. An 
over reliance on law enforcement as the dominant sources of information related to 
incidents presents real limitations to effective intelligence analysis. Each step in the 
evolution of policing has required a better understanding of why all-source information 
and the development of intelligence related to crime incidents is important. All-source 
information is based on the collection of data from as many sources as possible in order 
to compensate for deficiencies related to single sources while benefitting from combined 
information as a whole (Lowenthal, 2006). All-source information includes information 
provided from confidential informants or from surveillance. Clark and Eck (2004) point 
out that an important step in intelligence-led policing is to emphasize the distinction 
between crime analysis (crime data) and intelligence analysis (all-source data).  
      At its current stage, intelligence-led policing is considered to be a managerial model 
for policing intended to disrupt, reduce, and prevent offender activity by combining 
criminal intelligence and crime analysis in order to direct resource decisions which are 
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focused on serious repeat offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008). This moves the focus and use of 
intelligence work from the realm of ad hoc case work to a larger field involving strategic 
planning and resource allocation.  
Table 1. Generalized characteristics of five policing models (Ratcliffe 2008 ppg 72-23) 
         The resources devoted to intelligence-led policing are focused on prolific offenders 
and their criminal associations including affiliations, assets, and equipment employed in 
criminal enterprises. The central precept of intelligence-led policing is to focus on and 
incapacitate ‘criminal leaders’ who are initially identified by the fact that they have 
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extensive criminal records or occupy seats of authority in the hierarchy of gang 
structures (Flood, 2004).  
The Relation Between Intelligence and Information in Policing 
      The research involving the meaning and use of intelligence is considerable and is 
growing (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Lowenthal, 2006, Masse, O’Neil, and 
Rollins 2008; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008). Since the events of 9/11, interest in developing an 
understanding of the benefits of reliable intelligence has escalated. The goal of this 
review is not to be exhaustive, but rather to point out critical themes studied scholars in 
the context of intelligence and specifically intelligence-led policing. 
    The notion of ‘intelligence’ has always been within the police lexicon. The challenge 
to today’s law enforcement environment is that the concept and use of intelligence in 
policing has remained relatively unchanged since the inception of modern policing in 
early 19th century London when the Scotland Yard constabulary were charged with the 
primary responsibility of preventing crime (Mayne, 1829; Ratcliffe, 2008).  
      Existing practices regard intelligence in policing as a tactical instrument rather than 
either a process or product. Intelligence as a concept is an abstract idea and is generally 
defined by terms of usage, leading to predictable confusion as meaning is literally 
transformed by an activity which allows for several interpretations. For example, too 
often the word ‘intelligence’ is used interchangeably, and incorrectly, with the word 
‘information.’ Information obtained from surveillance is commonly referred to as 
‘intelligence’ because it is germane to an on-going investigation. Without the benefit of 
analysis, it is difficult to determine if such information is relevant to other investigations. 
It is possible, for example, that analysis of surveillance might reveal, as often happens, 
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that other law enforcement agencies are involved in the same investigation without 
any of the parties being aware of the other’s presence. Intelligence represents a special 
case of information and knowledge that has been analytically refined into a product that 
is operationally actionable in relation to an organization’s interests (Desouza and 
Vanapalli, 2005). Table 2 provides examples of data derived from police records to 
distinguish between information and intelligence. Erikson and Haggerty (2001) maintain 
the police obsession for reporting data, as with information listed below, does little more 
than drive internal audits and create redundancy, leaving little time for analysis.  
Table 2. Carter, David L., (2004), Law Enforcement Intelligence, US Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Policing, p.11 
 
      In order to develop information into intelligence analysis is always required. Methods 
of analysis vary and the desired product, i.e., intelligence derived from analysis must be 
defined before analysis begins. As Table 2 indicates, intelligence is obtained after the 
analysis of information has been accomplished for a specific purpose. Predictive analysis, 
for example, is accomplished through the process of linear regression to provide 
Information (related to an incident) Intelligence 
• Criminal history or driving record 
• Case Reports 
• Informant statements 
• Vehicle registration information 
• Behavioral observations by an 
investigator or surveillance team 
• Financial transaction records 
• Travel records 
• Analyst report with conclusions 
based on the diverse information 
subjected to research methods 
which can be articulated  
• Analysis of trends with 
conclusions based on variables 
subjected to statistical methods 
• Predictive analysis based on the 
assessment of  information using 
regression on the elements of past 
experience  
• Estimates on income from a 
criminal enterprise based on 
market and trafficking analysis of 
illegal commodities 
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intelligence that will infer the likelihood of future events based on past experience. 
This technique is useful in the analysis of crime related to burglaries patterns in specific 
areas. Intelligence products used in policing include tactical and strategic intelligence. 
      Today’s technology has made it easier to gather and organize data which may be 
synthesized into information. This step is necessary as data, per se, should always be 
regarded as unbiased while information, to qualify as information, must be biased. 
Information represents data which has been synthesized, manipulated, processed or 
organized so as to present and contribute to specific, situational knowledge (Desouza and 
Hensgen, 2004).  Information is then collected as the currency that produces intelligence 
(Carter, 2004). 
      The Chicago Police Department has effectively demonstrated the ability to collect 
data which is then disseminated through a variety of channels. From an operational 
perspective, some of this data is converted to information and presented by the 
Deployment Operations Center (DOC) through Deployment Intelligence Bulletins (DIBs) 
which recount calls for service or from the Detective Division’s Analysis Section as 
Detective Alerts that focus on possibly related crime patterns. In its present state, each of 
these products demonstrates that the dominant crime analytic activity is more a technique 
involving counting crime and providing unfiltered offender information to field 
operations personnel (Carter, 2004). This underscores a fundamental weakness in local 
law enforcement when crime analysts are required to continue to "count” crime far more 
often than they "analyze" it (O’Shea, 2003). Such practices represent the distinction 
between the ‘push-pull’ strategies commonly referred to in business literature.  Push 
models are dependent on organizations getting the right resources to the right place at the 
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right time while pull models provide access to appropriate resources as needed 
(Hagel, 2005). In practice, law enforcement’s push-approach does not work well in 
practice in part because officers are required to act on communicated information, rather 
than intelligence, in response to dynamic or changing incidents (Higgins, 2004).     
The Relation Between Analysis and Intelligence in Policing 
      The existing literature provides a number of ‘intelligence-cycle’ models intended to 
outline the relation of information and intelligence which leads to policy decisions and 
actionable knowledge (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008; Desouza 
and Hensgen, 2004; Masse, O’Neil, Rollins, 2008). Intelligence-cycle models are 
intended to demonstrate how empirical data received from a variety of sources is 
qualitatively channeled to information. It is information that is then analyzed through the 
lens of semantic (interpretive) and semiotic (contextual understanding) phases to 
determine its value as intelligence.  
      Intelligence-led policing subscribes to a 3i concept model which focused on three 
conditions and is intended to provide analysts and policy makers with an understanding 
of the relation between the sectors of the criminal environment, crime intelligence 
analyst, and the decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2008). The three conditions contributing to 
the ILP model reflect on the importance to holistically interpret, influence, and impact all 
sectors of the model in order to be successful. The New Jersey State Police adopted this 
model as an integral part of its intelligence-led policing initiative started in 2006 
(NJSP2006). The model’s sectors are intentionally non-specific in order to avoid 
confusion as to the roles represented as they often vary. It is not uncommon for 
investigations to conclude at one phase while being continued at another at which time 
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the roles of the decision makers, analysts, or targets may change. The model 
emphasizes the activities within intelligence-led policing must be in concert; the 
elimination of impact (through action) despite interpretation through analysis or influence 
on decision makers to devote resources as the result of intelligence defeats the intent of 
intelligence-led policing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 1. The 3i model of ILP (Ratcliffe 2008 p 110) 
   
      Intelligence models, regardless of their format, are used to process data to 
information, information to intelligence, intelligence to knowledge, and knowledge to 
action. The heavy work related to the products of intelligence rest with the analyst who is 
required to sort through data in search of information of use by a specific audience. An 
analyst may be called on to provide incident specific intelligence for use in a tactical 
mission, to prioritize concerns within a region for an operational mission, or to provide 
intelligence assessments related to risks and resources requirements for large strategic 
missions (Scott, 2003).  Police analysts are traditionally called upon to provide “criminal 
intelligence,” a product predicated on known data or information maintained in police 
files and related to activities which have been recorded in incident reports or arrests.       
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      Crime analysis may use the products of police intelligence but requires data from 
multiple agencies, often outside local or regional jurisdictions, in order to be effective 
(Boba, 2005).  Efficient crime analysis requires practitioners to have a wide range of 
skills that include technical and theoretical expertise, be self-directed, have an 
understanding of criminology and public administration, and insight into police 
operations (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003; Osborne, 2005; IICA, 2005). Because the 
requirements for an efficient analyst are often found among personnel outside of law 
enforcement, the most important skill for an analyst to manage is the understanding the 
relationship between themselves and the decision makers (Nicholls, 2004).  
The Chicago Police Organized Crime Division Perception of Intelligence 
      The Organized Crime Division (OCD) of the Chicago Police Department is 
comprised of three sections Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement.  In 2009 the Gang 
Enforcement section was created as the main tactical planning and operational arm of the 
OCD while the Gang and Narcotic sections operate with teams assigned to specific areas 
of the city. As such, Gang Enforcement oversees the activities of the three hundred 
personnel that make up the OCD. Additionally, Gang Enforcement co-ordinates, with 
local commanders, tactical operations involving an additional three hundred personnel 
assigned to the five Area Gang Teams located throughout the city.  Teams are comprised 
of a set number of officers who are involved with incident investigations. For the Gangs 
section, incident investigations entail activities surrounding street level violence e.g., 
recent shootings or homicides, in which known gang members are involved. Narcotics 
section personnel focus on investigations involving street level narcotics trafficking. Both 
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sections rely on evidentiary materials obtained from surveillance techniques that are 
conducted physically or electronically. 
      In February of 2008, a new Superintendent was appointed for the Chicago Police 
Department. The individual chosen to lead the Department is a former Supervising Agent 
from the FBI who has suggested that among the new strategies he will adopt is one which 
is focused on the notion of ‘intelligence-based policing.’ Prior to and during the city’s 
budget hearings of 24 October 2009, the Superintendent referenced ‘intelligence-based 
policing’ as the basis for solutions to existing crime problems:   
We need to focus on intelligence-based policing. We are not in a time when we can 
just throw more officers out throughout the city; we have to put officers on the right 
spots, we have to make sure they are addressing the right gangs.  
   
      Shortly after assuming control of the Department, the new Superintendent ordered 
OCD personnel to refrain from making non-essential arrests and to focus on collecting 
‘intelligence’ related to the leadership among Chicago’s most active street gangs. Beyond 
this directive, there were no specific provisions on what constitutes intelligence or how 
materials or information collected by OCD personnel would be used, shared, or 
distributed. What is known is between the spring and fall of 2008, organizational changes 
intended to make the Department more effective have had no impact on homicides and 
the rate at which street level violence has escalated compared to previous years.  In 
Chicago, whether the practices and products of intelligence-led policing can make a 
difference on crime, especially violent crime, are unknown. It is important that changes 
which will to occur under the new police administration be separated from problems 
associated with inefficiencies that endure through an ineffective belief system, a cultural 
problem which underscores the need for maintaining the status quo (Chakravorti, 2003).  
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Many of the critical factors associated with intelligence-led policing may provide a 
method which serves to impact existing crime conditions while steering the Department 
away from traditional response driven belief systems.  
      The next chapter outlines the methodology used in this research while examining the 
rationale behind the on-going dynamics related to current changes in the OCD. The data 
provided from interviews will be categorized as the basis for reporting results. The 
purpose of this research, as currently perceived,  is to clarify the boundaries between the 
phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by accessing police 
supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing as a 
management tool intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to intelligence 
processes used to address crime. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter describes the methodology to be used to conduct this research and is 
outlined according to specific sections. The first section describes the research strategy 
and rational for the methodology selected. Section two describes sampling used in 
anticipation of interviews with participants in the study. Section three describes the 
procedures related to data collection and is followed by the final section which provides 
an overview of the research plan to be used in this study. 
     The research design for this project is based on case studies involving the use of 
intelligence products and processes in policing by Chicago’s Organized Crime Division 
(OCD).  
      In the extant police literature devoted to information gathering and sharing and the 
use of intelligence products and processes, as a phenomenon, the notion of intelligence-
led policing has generated considerable interest. The Chicago Police Department has 
recently been restructured with particular attention and reorganization given to the 
Organized Crime Division with the specific direction of the Department’s Superintendent 
to employ ‘intelligence-driven’ police methods. The OCD is directly involved with the 
investigation of gang crimes involving street level violence and with criminal narcotics 
activities that fund on-going criminal enterprises. As a crucial part of the strategies and  
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tactics used to address these issues, the OCD is dependent on current and accurate 
intelligence products to enhance their operational effectiveness.  
      As currently perceived, the purpose of this research is to clarify the boundaries 
between the phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by 
accessing police supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing 
as a management philosophy intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to 
intelligence processes used to address crime. 
      Intelligence is the product of information and analysis and has recently been 
considered as the basic tool for a management model that directs policing strategies 
rather than merely supporting policing tactics. This study investigates the contemporary 
phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and explores critical 
factors in the model of intelligence-led policing through an assessment of how these 
factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago Police 
Department’s Organized Crime Division.    
The Research Strategy 
      This research involves case studies which will be subjected to inductive qualitative 
analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured interviews and 
observation of police supervisors involved in decision-making tasks that require the use 
of intelligence products and processes. Interviews will be conducted with 12-17 
supervisors, as content experts, on the use of intelligence processes, from the three  
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unit sections of OCD (Gang Enforcement, Gang Investigations, and Narcotics). Critical 
factors are derived from literature review and will be modified during the process of in-
depth interviews and comparative, inductive analysis.  
The difficulty in this research centers on the meaning of intelligence (processes and 
product An emphasis will be made to provide insight into the experiences and 
motivations which drive intelligence related practices as well as to examine the perceived 
measure of success attributed to these practices in police work and the activities which 
result through the use of intelligence.  
 The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors 
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and 
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, 
particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related 
activities in a manner which differs from those required for a predictive or proactive 
response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their 
effectiveness.  The researcher intends to introduce insight on the practice of an 
Intelligence-led Policing strategy for the purpose of investigating whether supervisors 
perceive the critical factors of ILP as useful to current intelligence related police tasks. 
This research will incorporate semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD 
and insight on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing drawn from the extant literature and 
existing practices outside the CPD.  
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Research Methods 
This study is oriented in qualitative research. Qualitative research has been described 
as a naturalistic study conducted through prolonged contact with ‘field’ situations which 
typically reflect the everyday life and the explicit and implicit rules that govern that life 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The approach in this research is through case studies that 
represent the in-depth study of instances of a phenomenon in a natural context from the 
perspective of participants involved in the phenomenon (Gall, Gall, and Borg, 2003). Yin 
(1994) defines case studies as empirical (observable) inquiry that investigates a 
phenomenon in a natural setting when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its 
context are unclear. An overriding feature of qualitative case studies involves the flow of 
events, observations, data collection which continue to emerge during the research (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). This research, which investigates the use of intelligence in police 
work from within a Division of the Chicago Police Department, meets the criteria for 
case studies. Case studies are considered ‘naturalistic’ when they represent naturally 
occurring, ordinary events. In addition to the choice of method, a review of sociological 
and anthropological literature related to research methods was conducted (Geertz, 1973; 
Yin, 1994; Wenger, 1998; Gall et al 2003).   
The primary method for data collection in this research involves semi-structured 
interviews used to refine and develop an understanding of how respondents view the use 
of intelligence in police work as well as to examine existing practices involving sources, 
meanings, and analytics related to the use of intelligence used by police.  
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Interview questions using this method are initially semi-structured but allow for open-
form questions to be added in order to obtain additional information (Gall et al, 2003). 
This method is best suited for this research as more structured methods of interviews can 
preclude the opportunity of probing for deeper understanding of the matter under 
investigation (Miles and Huberman, 2004). The use of semi-structured interviews allow 
for responses to be classified according to the focus of the interview while the aspect of 
open-form provides for more sustained dialogue between the researcher and interview 
participants which leads to more contextual information and the possibility for more 
insight into the phenomenon being explored.  Semi-structured interviews will be 
conducted to collect data from key informants, i.e., supervisors, who have specialized 
knowledge of how intelligence in police work is developed and used. The questions 
developed for this interview are provided in Appendix III which represents an interview 
guide for the interview sessions. Specifically, this research investigates whether the 
model of Intelligence-led Policing will be perceived by OCD decision makers as an 
effective strategy to combat crime related problems beyond those of the existing 
practices. This research will focus on what, how, and when tasks related to the use of 
intelligence, as a phenomenon, are managed by supervisors within the OCD. Descriptions 
will be based on naturally occurring data provided through participant observation and 
interview of what is routine and ordinary in police tasks requiring intelligence products. 
The interconnectivity of subject categories and activities from this research will be drawn 
to study how they are layered together and relate to the complexity of the phenomenon of 
intelligence use in policing.   
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 Gall et al (2003) emphasize the important requirement of entry to properly identified 
sites and as well as the necessity to work with ‘gatekeepers’ who authorize permission to 
allow research interviews to take place. The Chicago Police Department is a quasi-
military organization divided into bureaus. The Organized Crime Division (OCD) is a 
subset of the Bureau of Investigative Services and is managed by a Chief, Deputy Chief, 
and three commanders who oversee the Gang, Narcotics, and Intelligence units. During 
the initial stages of this study, the researcher outlined the intention and requirements to 
interview to each of these respective personnel within the Command Staff and was 
encouraged to proceed. A series of Command changes took place following the granting 
of required permission during which all of the key personnel of the Command Staff of 
OCD was reassigned. The major Command changes effecting OCD occurred in October 
and were repeated in November. Although this has been problematic, it represents the 
challenge of readdressing the intention of this research to the new chain of command.    
      The notion of access in existing literature is often brief and skimmed over, in part 
because it is presumed; it is mentioned here as part of the anticipatory phase of the 
research development.  
Sampling 
     The sampling for this research is purposeful and represents management-supervisory 
personnel from within the Organized Crime Division (OCD) who have experience with 
the use of current intelligence products and results related to those products. These 
personnel are from three sections of the OCD; Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement. 
These personnel are directly impacted by any benefit derived from the use of intelligence  
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products. The OCD is comprised approximately three hundred personnel who are 
managed, at the decision making level, by seventeen (17) supervisors of the rank of 
lieutenant or above. Optimally, the researcher expects to conduct between ten (10) and 
fifteen (15) sets of interviews from this sample. When appropriate, the researcher may 
interview sergeants from OCD management because they work closely with decision 
makers in designing and implementing intelligence strategies. Sampling is based on 
selecting a portion of the population that is representative of the entire population under 
study and is comprised of individuals who represent the entire population in terms of 
specific characteristics (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Specifically, this research explores 
the concept of the meaning and use of the intelligence phenomenon in police work by the 
Organized Crime Division (OCD). The subjects for sampling in this study are purposive 
and based on reputational case selection as selected personnel possess special insight into 
how intelligence processes are managed within the specific setting of the OCD.  
     In this research, administrative, operational, and tactical supervisors of the 
Department’s Organized Crime Division are interviewed. Supervisors include sworn 
police personnel above the rank of sergeant who participate in administrative, 
operational, and tactical tasks. Exempt rank members i.e., the Chief, the Deputy Chief, 
and Commanders are involved in strategic decisions effecting the Division operations. 
Personnel of this rank are selected on their respective experience and demonstrated 
ability to lead in accordance with Department guidelines. The lieutenants and sergeants 
are responsible for the tactical execution of operations in accordance with the Division’s 
strategic vision. Personnel at this level of management succeed to their rank based on  
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standardized Department promotional testing and are assigned to the Organized Crime 
Division at the discretion of the exempt ranks. This sample provides a cross section of 
police engaged in intelligence work from a variety of perspectives. Exempt rank 
members, for example, have generally been involved in a number of positions throughout 
their careers and have a good sense of Department protocols and how to manage within 
the system while sergeants may have as little as five years on the Department, are less 
articulate in their explanations of strategic decisions and are more focused on tactical 
results. For this study, the subjects selected for interview are ‘observational choices.’ 
Observational choices contribute to theory in that the facts they present in interview are 
used to analyze patterns and relationships associated with the concept under study (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). This sampling allows for a broad range of perspectives and rich 
feedback about the use of intelligence by police. 
Data Collection 
     Data collection represents an on-going process that commences during the 
anticipatory design phase of quantitative research and continues beyond the initial 
interview phase; it is emergent and developing as data collected at one point can be used 
for other data activities (Gall, et al, 2003).  Data used in this research is provided  
from interviews with key personnel who have direct knowledge related to the use of 
intelligence in policing. The knowledge contributed from these sources is founded in 
their explicit and tacit experiences. Explicit experiences provide the general knowledge 
base related to individual backgrounds and contribute to the ‘how’ interviewees 
succeeded to their respective positions in the OCD.  Tacit experiences are specific to the  
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individual and provide personal perspectives, including subjective insight and intuition, 
and contribute to the subject’s perception of meaning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The 
formative data collected from interviews on the use of intelligence in policing contribute 
to thick descriptions, i.e. statements which recreate a situation (use of intelligence in 
policing), as much of its context as possible, while providing meaning or intentions 
inherent to the situation (Gall, et al, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Geertz, 1973).  
     Data collection will be conducted ‘on-site’ at the offices of the Organized Crime 
Division. Authorization for interviews will be part of the anticipatory phase in data 
collection and comes from the exempt rank personnel of the OCD. The physical site at 
which interviews will be conducted is the police facility housing the OCD offices; a 
multi-storied office building with secured access provided by on-duty officers and 
biometric locks to which the researcher must obtain permission for entry. Interviews will 
be conducted in meeting rooms or in supervisor’s offices; meeting rooms are preferable 
as they provide fewer possibilities for distraction. The interview calendar will be 
arranged according to supervisor schedules and take into account furloughs (vacation 
periods) and watch assignments (days or afternoons).    
 In addition to interviews, secondary sources of information will be used in this study. 
These sources include documents, direct observation, existing statistics, and physical 
artifacts. Documents include open source material from newspaper articles related to 
changes in Departmental organization and strategies and non-classified administrative 
policy documents. Documents are useful in making inferences about events (Yin, 1994; 
Stakes 1995). Direct observations provide first hand experience related to a working  
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environment and exhibited behaviors. The inspection of existing physical artifacts, 
including those of technology, used for the acquisition or development of intelligence 
provides insight into organizational practices.     
      Interviews will be tape recorded. Prior to interview, the subjects will be provided 
documentation related to issues of anonymity, confidentiality, and the manner in which 
recordings are maintained, stored, and eventually discarded. These measures are 
important and help to gain the confidence of the respondent in order to minimize any 
possible undesirable effects of having the interview recorded (Gall et al, 2003). Potential 
respondents will be provided with an informed consent document, a written outline  
which summarizes the aims of this research, how interviews will be conducted, the 
benefits and risks of participation, how results will be reported, and how confidentiality 
of the information provided in interviews will be maintained. Confidentiality will be 
maintained by using coded numbers rather than names for record identification. 
Identifiable references to other persons during interviews will be masked in documents 
produced from interviews. Because the decision to participate in this research is 
voluntary, potential respondents will be advised they have the option to withdraw from 
interview at any time.   
      Interview sessions are expected to last approximately forty minutes during which 
time questions from the interview guide will be covered. Tape recording speeds the 
interview process because it eliminates extensive note taking and may be studied in 
greater depth as tapes provide a complete verbal record which can not practically be 
obtained from note taking Gall et al, 2003). Tape recordings will subsequently be  
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transcribed fully to facilitate data analysis. Based on the researcher’s work related 
experience, the interviewer expects that forty minutes of recording will require 
approximately four hours of transcription. The amount of data collected per case will 
include that which is necessary to address questions raised in interview and sufficient 
enough to exhaust source information or saturate categories which emerge. 
      Existing observational research literature discusses the relationship between the 
observer and those observed and borrows the terms emic and etic from the field of 
anthropological studies (Pike, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Galls et al, 2004; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Each term relates to accounts of the researcher’s perspective and 
descriptions of data related to an observed group with emic descriptions accounting for 
actions, beliefs, or viewpoints of an individual group member (native) to whom an action 
has meaning while etic descriptions accounting for the viewpoints and beliefs of an 
outside observer who interprets meaning. In this study, the researcher enjoys a distinct 
relation from both perspectives in that he has participated as an actor within the group 
and has insight into the procedures and language used in the context of police culture. 
Concurrently, the researcher’s educational experiences provides an opportunity to 
observe the group as an ‘outsider’ with viewpoints and beliefs, based on an academic 
review of the relevant literature, as a criteria, related to the use of intelligence in policing 
which is applicable, in a more general sense, to the law enforcement community.        
Data Analysis 
      The structure of the interviews in these case studies will provide the basis for coding 
through the responses to each question as they indicate patterns in information. Patterns  
   
 
53  
provided through interview assist in developing themes that are either manifest 
(empirical) or latent, i.e., subject to later categorization related to the phenomenon of 
intelligence use in police work Themes for coding will be developed as patterns are 
uncovered, within and across data, which helps organize information and the 
interpretation of the phenomenon under study Information will be coded as developing 
themes are qualified by causal relationships. Consistency in judgment on the part of the 
researcher will be the basis for of thematic reliability. Where useful, some statistical 
analysis will be used to determine theme and coding validity 
      Data collected for this research will be analyzed using categorical protocols and 
presented in accordance to their fit as various police intelligence components. The 
essence of content analysis is the coding of documented evidence and nested messages 
into categories (Gall et al, 2003). Interviews are used to improve the conceptualization of 
police intelligence components by contributing to attribute lists and categories for each of 
the components and these components are coded as criteria for data analysis. This 
involves the organization of data into categories. A category is a construct which refers to 
certain phenomenon present within the context of a study while a construct is inferred 
from an observed phenomenon, e.g., co-operation (Gall et al, 2003). Categories are 
unique but can be subdivided according to the properties and dimensions found during 
analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994) use an analogy of categories to bins that contain 
many discrete events or recorded behaviors. The interrelationship of these bins helps 
construct a conceptual framework.  Coding involves the analytical processes through 
which data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory (Strauss and  
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Corbin, 1998). In this research, recorded responses to interviews will be analyzed 
deductively to obtain discrete, key themes that are relevant and specific to individual 
categories. The inspection and analysis of the content provided through interview will 
reveal messages within the content itself. Thematic code analysis will be used to inspect 
themes which emerge during analysis of interviews for the purpose of gauging the 
frequency of themes and similarities between users in use of themes.  
     Data to be analyzed will be structured using a pre-defined coding template developed 
in accordance with accepted guidelines (Miles and Huberman: 1994; Gall et al, 2004). 
Codes will be constructed from definitions related to intelligence use by police, its 
components, and critical factors or activities related to the components of the use of 
intelligence in policing. Critical factors include, for example, the use of analysis 
techniques associated with developing intelligence from information, sources of 
information, and technologies used to refine information from data. Categories will  
be determined deductively from expected responses of the police use of intelligence 
before data is applied.  Data collected from sources will then be examined inductively for 
evidence in order to assign the data to categories. Accordingly, relevant information from 
interviews or other sources, e.g., documents, will be allocated to a code. This process is 
repeated for each category assigned to the data. One question representing a segment of 
an interview might be coded as an instance involving multiple categories. For example, a 
response to a question on the value of intelligence in policing might reveal that the 
respondent is unclear on what constitutes intelligence, who administers intelligence 
activities, and is content to accept data that is routinely provided as intelligence by the  
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Department because she believes the cycle is unbreakable and has provided data that can 
be coded in several categories such as meaning, information sources, and management 
actions. Once data are coded they will be analyzed for properties or dimensions that 
indicate patterns such as when specific or similar responses occur. Additionally, analysis 
may indicate that the conclusion of one case can provide information which needs to be 
replicated in other cases leading to literal replication to ‘fill-in the blanks’ that helps 
explain the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found. For 
each individual case, the report should indicate how and why a particular behavior was, 
or was not, demonstrated. Across cases, reports will indicate the extent to which this 
replication logic was used and why, in such instances, case results could be predicted 
(Yin 2003). The researcher will use a second coder for coding purposes during a review 
of a sample pilot interview in order to check for consistency in interpretation and 
analysis.  It is expected that during this phase, additional categories may be uncovered 
while others may be revised.  
      As multiple sources related to the police use of intelligence will be examined in this 
study, data types may be compared for corroboration or ‘bracketing’ in the research 
findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The result of multiple instances of the same or 
very similar findings from different sources, especially while using different methods of 
analysis, lends itself to reliability (though not validity) of the study. This is a function of 
good data collection when it is verified and checked against other data. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) state that corroborating methods are sometimes referred to as  
 
   
 
56  
triangulation and explain that such results come from the practice of good analytical 
induction.         
      Concerns for validity and reliability are addressed by methods used in data collection 
and analysis. Validity related to the interview instrument will be accomplished by having 
two police supervisors who are not involved in interviews review the document. Under 
these conditions, validity means simply that data sought should represent what we expect 
them to represent.  Additionally, these supervisors may be asked to participate in pilot 
studies in order to access timing expectations or to add to and refine the interview 
instrument before it is administered. Construct validity will be obtained through cross 
checking the multiple sources of data previously discussed and by having key 
respondents review drafts of written findings. Explanations provided during data analysis 
are expected to contribute to the content validity of this study.        
 Reliability issues are concerned with the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
collected data and relates to the expectation that anyone investigating the data provided 
would find the same phenomenon existing in the same or similar settings. A study’s 
internal reliability is strengthened by consistency in the administration of the research 
protocol or methods and through robust documentation to support them (Yin, 1994).  
      In addition to the listed sources of data in this research, information from field notes 
made during interviews will be added to the descriptions. This can uncover similarities in 
phases, thematic relationships, isolated patterns of behavior and action, or generalization 
which contribute to formalized knowledge on the use of intelligence in police work.  
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 At the conclusion of the empirical phase of this dissertation, the concept of 
intelligence in police work will be refined in accordance to the data collected and 
analyzed from interviews and relevant documents. Additionally, data collected in  
interview related to the construct on the critical factors of intelligence-led policing will be 
examined. 
Research Plan 
      Table 3, presented at the end of this chapter, represents an outline of the research plan 
used in this study. This plan involves the interview of between eight and fourteen 
supervisory personnel from within the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime 
Division in order to provide exploratory support on the use the phenomenon of 
intelligence use in policing as well as assessment data. Additionally, the critical practices 
related to the use of intelligence in policing will be investigated. The selection of sample 
is purposeful and in order to capture an array of interpretations, observations, and 
practices in intelligence used by police while providing a degree of consistency for cross 
interview analysis. The single criteria involved in the selection of this sample is that 
supervisors have a minimum of three years experience in the use intelligence products 
used for policing or five or more years experience is tasks related to the processes 
associated with the use of intelligence in policing. Formal educational requirements for 
this group will generally require a minimum if a bachelor’s degree, in any discipline, 
because that stage of education is required for rank. Several of the prospective 
respondents have attended advanced training sessions which cover an array of 
administrative and tactical subjects related to police operations.  
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How this Research will be Accomplished 
      The first requirement for the initiation of this project involves permission of the co-
operating institution, i.e., the Chicago Police Department. Permission to conduct this 
research is required for two principle reasons. First, it is a requirement of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). Secondly, the Department, as an organization, requires a standard 
of due diligence which, as a concept, involves the activities in this research so as to 
comply with provisions for a certain standard of care, i.e., a degree of prudence to which 
this research will be bound. In this instance, it is reasonable to expect the Department be 
concerned with its own image as well as that of sworn personnel who may participate in 
this study.       
 In January of 2009, the researcher met with the current Chief of Organized Crime to 
present the concepts, as currently perceived, involved in this project as well as to discuss 
the feasibility and interest of his section for the proposed research. The researcher learned 
the OCD was particularly interested in developing their capacity for using intelligence 
processes but operational responsibilities and considerations had precluded their ability to 
pursue this interest in a timely manner. A brief description of this project was forwarded 
to the Department’s legal affairs division and subsequently to the Department’s research 
and development section.  In March of 2009, the research and development section 
requested a copy of the actual proposal as well as a copy of the IRB approval page.  
      This presents a minor dilemma or Catch-22 in the process as the IRB requires a letter 
of co-operation from the Department which, in turn, requires a copy of IRB approval 
prior to issuing a letter of co-operation. The researcher expects this problem to be  
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resolved administratively after discussing the situation with his Committee Chair. This 
issue is presented in this section as it illustrates a phase of the dissertation process which 
is crucial and must be addressed before the intended methodologies of research may be 
applied; it is a principle key to access for academic and the intended research population.      
      Silverman and Marvasti (2008), note that the point of qualitative research is to say a 
lot about a little. Qualitative research begins with thorough descriptions; in this instance, 
data that describe the use of intelligence process and products and their associative 
behaviors from the perspective of OCD practitioners themselves. One key example is the 
manner in which intelligence products are informally shared within an agency. 
Qualitative studies have emphasized that informal sharing of information, rather than 
information sharing through more formal structured channels, is a social behavior that 
indicates a lack of faith or purpose in current information exchange systems. Descriptions 
in qualitative research are intended to be ‘rich’ in detail and ‘thick’ in description to 
provide insight into the social and physical settings in which the generation and use of 
intelligence occurs as well to describe the social and individual factors which influence 
behaviors.  
      The use of semi-structured questions provides an opportunity for respondents to 
communicate, in their own words, and based on their own experience, answers to what, 
when, and how, activities related to intelligence gathering and sharing occurs.   
      Prospective respondents will be told in advance the expected duration of the interview 
sessions. A Pilot interview which lasted forty minutes indicated the session could be 
completed within one hour. Interviewees will be given the opportunity to review a  
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consent form which explains their participation is voluntary and confidential and that the 
interview will be digitally recorded. Participants must sign-off on the consent form prior 
to interview. The researcher will also maintain notes related to observations during the 
interview. 
Research Techniques 
      Completed interviews will be transferred to a secure computer under the exclusive 
control of the researcher. Once the transfer is completed, the original recording will be 
erased from the recording device. Each interview will be stored in a computer file  
identified by a random code generated by a computer program. A copy of the code-
identified interview will then be digitally stripped of all information related to the to the 
interviewee’s identity. This copy will be electronically sent to a transcribing service from 
which the researcher has a confidentiality agreement.  
      The researcher will use Qualrus™ software to store, code, retrieve, and analyze 
completed interviews. This software assists in organizing and identifying patterns within 
the coded data and observations. Data is coded according for properties or dimensions 
that indicate patterns or emergent themes. Information from secondary data sources, e.g., 
policy documents or existing statistics, will be combined with interview data and used 
with this software in support of the focus and triangulate on data of this assessment study.   
     The research plan and observational guide illustrated in Figure 3 is intended as an 
initial guide to this research for the purpose of proceeding in a structured fashion.  
Observations produce background data related to the setting in which interviews will take  
 
   
 
61  
place.  The guide includes the goals and, as currently perceived, the expected results of 
this study.   
Table 3: Research Plan and Observational Guide 
Aims and 
Objectives: (Note 
aims refer to the 
overall results this 
study intends to 
achieve while 
objectives include 
specific activities 
use to achieve the 
aim.) 
1. To obtain a practitioner’s insight on the construct of 
intelligence use in policing tasks by members of a population 
representing supervisor/decision makers of the Chicago 
Police Department’s Organized Crime Division. 
2. Determine what the practitioners are trying to accomplish 
and how they are doing it.  
3. Elicit the attributes of the components of intelligence as they 
relate to and are used in police tasks. 
4. Explore the definition of intelligence in policing as a 
construct. 
5. Examine the attributes of intelligence used in policing tasks 
as defined through this study. 
6. Explore the evidence presented through observation for 
indicators or themes related meaning and behavior involving 
intelligence related tasks in policing. 
7. Assess how the critical factors of Intelligence-led Policing 
are perceived by members of the Chicago Police 
Department’s Organized Crime Division (OCD). 
Unit of Analysis Based at the organizational level; individuals involved in the 
development and definition of the intelligence process employed 
by the OCD. 
Number of Cases Eleven (11) 
Type of Replication Literal: the same or similar results are expected from each 
interview (Yin 1991) 
Primary Data 
Collection 
Semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD who are 
experienced in the use of intelligence activities in policing. 
Triangulation Documents and data on intelligence practices of the OCD or in 
relevant literature on the use of intelligence policing.   
Connections Observe the relationship between the setting and personnel 
involved with intelligence work in policing to determine whether 
change is likely to occur.  
Expected Results 1. Examine the opportunity for refining the concept of 
intelligence as it applies to police work. 
2. Prepare a refined list of attributes for the components to be 
used in policing. 
3. Examine whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led 
Policing, as perceived by supervisors of the OCD can 
contribute to their objectives for strategic planning.   
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 An overriding objective of this study is to provide a tool which serves as the basis 
for continued research. The notion of intelligence in policing will be a critical concern for 
future law enforcement agencies; it is not a question as to if or when steps towards a 
robust and routinely used information management system, unique to police needs, and 
dedicated towards the development of intelligence work will be as common as squad 
cars.  
 Several companies are currently managing existing business software products to 
conform to police needs, especially in the field of analysis. IBM®, for example, is in the 
process of acquiring software companies whose products involve applications for 
predictive modeling. Such software is useful in business but can be refined for police 
uses in managing the huge amounts of data that law enforcement agencies collect.  
 In addition the private sector’s interest in developing analytic tools for police, several 
universities are involved in developing curriculum and applications centered on the needs 
for analysis and analytics in the public sector.  Dr. Dave Carter of Michigan State has 
designed a degree program for analytics for use in the public sector and been involved 
with initiatives to promote the use of analysis in police work. Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe of 
Temple was instrumental in assisting the New Jersey State Police move to an 
intelligence-led approach for all their work while continuing to champion the business 
model for Intelligence-led policing.  
 As fiscal restraints hinder hiring and contribute to lay-offs among police agencies, 
law enforcement is compelled to work smarter. Intelligence-led policing may prove to be 
a good place to start. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
RESEARCH  
 
      This chapter describes the research conducted and is organized in the following 
sections: a description of and rationale for the interviews and questions used in this multi-
case study, the coding methods employed, and the analysis of additional questions 
generated through the exploratory investigation involved in this research.   
     Qualitative research and analysis begins with descriptions (Patton, 1990, 2006; Yin, 
2004). The initial phase of this section focuses on descriptions while interpretations of 
these descriptions and observations appear later in this chapter.  
     This general case, supported by the case interviews, is provided with the general 
public interest in mind. The extant literature on Intelligence-led Policing provides a 
number of ‘how-to’ guides but does not address express viability as to whether the model 
is generalizeable for agencies which may wish to learn of or adopt the model. From a 
practical sense, this study has underlying national implications for police agencies as a 
‘starting point’ i.e., for considerations which must be addressed prior to committing to the 
changes that are required to adopt an Intelligence-led Policing model as a tool intended to 
anticipate and prevent crime at any jurisdictional level. Since 2001, many agencies have 
adopted variations of intelligence gathering-sharing models to augment the services 
related to national security with the assumption that local law enforcement would benefit  
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as a by-product of such endeavors. The issues related to such a notion will be addressed 
in the subsequent chapter.  
     For this research, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS)  
program was used to facilitate the use of qualitative data.  After reviewing several 
software applications available for this task, the researcher chose the Qualrus™ program 
to assist in managing the unstructured data from interviews which required analysis. As a 
qualitative research tool, the program falls into a category of products used for CAQDAS 
such as ATLAS™ and NVivo™. Each of these programs allows the researcher to collect 
and group qualitative data which may then be coded, categorized, linked, and tested for 
relationships.  
     Qualrus™ employs case-based reasoning which is centered on the premise that the 
coding of text segments can be facilitated by identifying comparable segments (those 
similar to the segment being coded) in order to adjust codes of the comparable text 
segments to indicate differences between them and the segment being coded. The 
practice of case-based reasoning is similar to , for example, when lawyers employ case 
law to apply reason about new cases based on similar cases from past court decisions.  
     The practice of coding a case study is an arduous task. Coding the data collected 
through case study interviews is a technique that aids in the identification of the concepts 
and will be discussed in greater detail in the Interview section of this chapter. Coding of 
text segments requires the constant and repeated review of the all data collected from 
each interview; it is a dynamic and fluid process.  Case- based reasoning requires code 
revisions so that codes are in agreement, i.e., so that they may be grouped in categories  
 65  
which relate to specific characteristics within coded text segments. This process is similar 
to pattern matching.  
     Permission to conduct interviews was received from the Chicago Police Department’s 
Legal Affairs Department on 29 October 2009. Upon receiving this authorization, 
potential interviewees were contacted via an e-mail list provided by personnel of the 
Department’s Organized Crime Division. Each respondent received the same solicitation 
(Appendix B). In all, seventeen supervisory personnel, the majority of who were of the 
rank of lieutenants and above (90%) were invited to participate in this study. In response 
to this solicitation, eleven respondents committed to interview. Interviews were arranged 
to accommodate the schedules of the respondents and were held at the respective offices 
of each respondent during November 2009. Access to the secured location where the 
interviews were to be held was pre-arranged between the respondents and the researcher.   
     Each interview began with the researcher providing potential respondents with 
Consent to Participate forms (Appendix C) that outlined the purpose of the interview, the 
steps which would be taken during interview, and informed each respondent that their 
participation was voluntary and confidential. The researcher provided a copy of the 
confidentiality agreement (Appendix D), signed by Superintendent Jody Weis, 
authorizing this research project. As a condition of proceeding with the interview, each 
respondent was required to sign and date the consent form given them. One hundred per 
cent of the respondents complied with the conditions of the form and consented to be 
interviewed for this research study.  
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The Pilot Study and Interview Protocol Adaptation 
     Prior to conducting the formal interviews that provided the data used for this 
project, the researcher conducted a Pilot Study with Organized Crime Division (OCD) 
supervisory personnel who were not intended for inclusion in the actual study.  The 
formative aspect of the Pilot Study allowed the researcher to develop a focused, more 
relevant line of questioning that assisted in the clarification of the project’s conceptual 
design.  For example, during the Pilot Study it became apparent that some of the 
language used in the interview questions required clarification for a common 
understanding between the respondent and the interviewer. When the interviewee was 
asked for an explanation of the role of ‘criminal intelligence’ among practices within the 
OCD, the response indicated the interviewee believed ‘criminal intelligence’ meant  
intelligence activities conducted by criminals, a practice more generally referred to as 
counter-intelligence.  
     During the Pilot Study, empirical observations demonstrated that terms such as 
‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ were commonly used interchangeably without a 
distinction while activities involving ‘analysis’ and ‘incident counting’ were perceived as 
merely different descriptions of the same process. In order to avoid this type of confusion 
during the actual interview sessions, the researcher modified the questioning protocol to 
provide concept definitions of terms prior asking questions which would include any 
specific term. These changes allowed the researcher to adapt the interview protocol to 
better suit the requirements of the interviewees so that they would be more comfortable  
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with the terms being discussed and less likely to feel they were being ‘tested’ on 
terminology with which they were unfamiliar.  
     As a result of the Pilot Case, the researcher gained additional empirical insight as to 
how the issues under study should be presented during the actual interview sessions. This 
insight, coupled with the continued review of the pertinent extant literature, contributed 
to the relevancy of interview protocol used in this study.  
Interviews 
     Eight of the focused interviews were conducted at various locations within a century 
old building that once served as a huge commercial office complex. The original 
occupants had relocated and the property was acquired by City which, in turn, made the 
property available for City agencies.  The remaining interviews were conducted at other 
police facilities from which the respondents conducted their respective duties.  
     The individual offices of the respondents at the main building were arranged at the 
core of the building so that none of the offices had any windows. Throughout the 
complex, walls were painted halfway up in an industrial light blue-grey color and then a 
pale cream from where the grey ended up to the ceiling. The floors were tiled throughout 
the office areas in a commercial grade light blue and off white vinyl composition tile 
arranged in a checkerboard pattern. Offices were furnished with modular desks, metal file 
cabinets in black, grey, or beige and a variety of mismatched desk chairs. It is apparent 
that overall, most of the furnishings that populate the building and offices of the main 
buildings where interviews were conducted are second-hand and worn; they were  
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‘contributed’ from other City agencies or departments whose budgets had allowed for 
new furnishings.  
     Offices were frequently ‘personalized’ by the respondents. In some cases, an 
interviewee’s office contained a television tuned to a local news channels.  Many offices 
displayed artifacts from other police agencies; one popular collection with many of the 
responding supervisors included headgear of both National and International police 
agencies. Often, these were mementos from agencies with which the respondent had 
worked or trained. Other trappings that adorned many of the offices included sports items 
reflecting a respondent’s allegiance to local teams with northsiders favoring the Cubs and 
southsiders favoring the Sox. Pictures on display in some of the offices were consistently 
of two types; familial, showing kids and vacation shots or professional, showing 
respondents, often at award presentations, with high ranking Department members from 
the current or past administrations. While the majority of those interviewed held college 
degrees and 23% of the respondents held graduate degrees, no diplomas were displayed 
in any of the respondent’s offices.    
     The interview protocol (Appendix A) used for this research was based on a focused 
interview approach during which a conversational manner is used while asking open 
ended questions to corroborate the practices of the respondents who are engaged in the 
use of intelligence to accomplish their respective police tasks. This research used a 
question-and-answer format to report on the responses from this multiple-case study by 
using the same question set to cover the case study from the perspective of individual  
 
 69  
respondents. This is done purposefully to fuse and integrate responses from all the 
interviews and arrange them around the topics presented by the interview protocol.     
     This initial question served a number of purposes. Without qualifying what is meant 
by the term ‘intelligence’ the respondents are open to provide insight on their perspective 
of the importance and, if applicable, the use of ‘intelligence’ in accomplishing police  
tasks. The interviewee’s perception is an important element of the interview as perception 
directs the respondent’s response.   
     The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors 
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and 
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, 
particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related 
activities in a manner which differs from their peers or those required for a predictive or 
proactive response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their 
effectiveness. Emergent consequences included those which were not anticipated.  
     Responses to the first question provided broad insight into how the supervisors 
interpret the concept of intelligence in police work. The term ‘intelligence’ can refer to 
either a process or a product and, in either instance, involves the management of 
information. For example, the development of intelligence through analysis is an 
important part of the Intelligence-led Policing model. The responses to the first question 
provide the starting point for an interpretation on whether the supervisors are comfortable 
with the use of the term ‘intelligence’ being used in conjunction with police work.  
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     The excerpts from interviews below state the main theme of individual responses to 
the interview protocol questions and are intentionally provided in this format for this 
section. This format allows the reader to make immediate cross-comparisons for each 
question posed.  A complete set of respondent answers is provided in Appendix E. 
Responses to the questions below are followed by a brief analysis of the response. An  
interrater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic was performed to 
determine consistency among codes and appears in Appendix F. 
Data Corpus 
     One issue of qualitative research which is a source of discussion concerns how much 
data should be coded (Saldana, 2009). One approach is to code everything, all recorded 
fieldwork, so as not to miss some nuance which may contribute to a better understanding 
and insight into the social meaning of the phenomenon under study. Others contend that 
only the most salient sections of the data require coding. This research will endeavor to 
code portions of the data which are of necessary and sufficient quality to address the 
research questions.  
     The first set of questions is explanatory and uses an analytical technique to establish 
pattern matches among the responses in order to build an explanation about the case.  A 
concept is an idea which develops from, and is applied to, a specific set of circumstances. 
The idea that intelligence can be used in policing may be established through interviews 
that directly address whether the term ‘intelligence’ is part of the police lexicon. The        
interviews provide empirical, experiential facts which represent phenomenon. Explaining 
the phenomenon of ‘intelligence in police work,’ requires the development of causal links  
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about what is happening (Yin 2009). These links will provide the basis for 
recommendations in the next chapter.  Pertinent responses will be grouped as themes 
identified throughout the interviews. Themes are developed from the context of the 
responses and can be identified by a use of common word repetition, comparative 
contrasts among and between statements which relate to common experience, elements of  
social control (hierarchies) and work related conditions, or through missing information 
that is lacking and which might otherwise provide more meaning to a response. All 
responses are provided in Appendix E.  
Intelligence as a Concept in Policing: Developed Themes 
      Respondents were asked about the role of intelligence in police work. Theme 1 
developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is part of what they did. 
I think police work is intelligence, I think if you're out there and you got to figure 
out who did what or you're investigating a crime, you got to base it on 
intelligence.  I mean even stopping a car is going to take a certain level of 
intelligence whether that comes from your training or whether it comes from what 
you did that night or who you talked to earlier, who you stopped earlier, I think 
police work and intelligence are one and the same.  
Source: 11062184 
 
Intelligence is used by us, here in gangs to set up to go after the gang members 
in the hierarchy of the gangs and go after what we perceived to be the number 
one priority in the city of Chicago, homicides and shootings.  Intelligence is 
what we gather off the street, it's what we gather from analysis, it's what we 
gather from informants, it's what we gather everything put together we discuss it 
and we come up with an action plan after that.   
Source: 11042566 
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      The above responses provide insight into an important issue which impacts the 
development of intelligence in police work; the perception that all police work, including 
data or information gathering, equates to intelligence. The data collected through cases of  
reported crime or through confidential sources, including surveillance, can contribute to 
‘information’ if it fits the specific interest of the individual doing the collection; 
otherwise it remains data which will not be used. Until information is analyzed, it 
remains information, not intelligence. 
     In order to illustrate this notion, let us assume you are going to see a movie but are 
undecided as to which movie to see. You open a Web browser which links you to a 
number of sites including finance, sports, news, and entertainment. Likely, you will select 
and click-on ‘entertainment.’ The other links are intentionally ignored at this time and 
represent data in which you have no interest at this time. The ‘entertainment’ link takes 
you to a variety of other links which provide information on movie reviews, locations, 
and times. Because this data is useful to you, it has become information. Nothing in this 
process, thus far, has involved or produced an intelligence product which would influence 
you to act upon which movie you may eventually choose as additional steps are required 
to complete that process.   
     Similarly, in Organized Crime, separate reported incidents of homicides would have to 
be filtered so that incidents involving domestic violence, which would be handled by a 
unit from the Detective Division, are separated from those involving gang related street 
violence that would represent data of ‘informational interest’ to the OCD.   
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 Theme 2 developed from respondents who inferred a better use of intelligence could 
only benefit the OCD, down the line… 
I perceive it for the future to be something that is going to be necessary.  
Generally, right now, intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-
fashioned style of police work is more prevalent. 
Source: 11028961 
 
Intelligence trickles down from the person who has the information to the people 
that need to get the information.  And it could be as basic as a roll call.  If you 
want to pass the information to the troops in the field and then they will have 
knowledge of what's going on… 
Source: 11058231 
 
The function of intelligence should be the mainstay of--on investigations task to the 
Organized Crime Division.  I believe the collection of raw intelligence and the  
ability to turn it into actionable intelligence in police work is lacking at this time.  
Source:  11105904 
 
Gathering information and analyzing it and then trying to come to some sort of an 
agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what may be the  
reality of what's occurring and then getting that.  Once you get that intelligence, 
just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you know, you 
collect it and analyze it all.      
Source: 12257484 
 
      The respondents recognize a need for intelligence to assist in their tasks but there is 
the perception that the present ability to use and develop intelligence in the OCD is not 
fully developed or possibly lacking. Each of the respondents indicate they are aware 
that the development of intelligence is a process which generates a product that might 
‘trickle down’ to users and that as part of the process it would be beneficial to take 
something ‘raw’ and convert it to something ‘actionable.’ The comment that 
‘intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-fashioned style of police work 
is more prevalent’ may infer that accepted practices in police work serve to inhibit the 
adoption of new approaches intended to develop an intelligence mechanism. This is  
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not to say that accepted practices serve as inherent inhibitors to new approaches, rather 
the fundamental principles of andragogy, i.e., adult learning, suggest adults are more 
comfortable with the initial way they learn tasks and must be motivated to learn new 
ways of doing old tasks in a manner which provides near-immediate results.  
 Theme 3 developed from respondents who inferred conceptually, intelligence as a 
function has value but where that value fits in the overall scheme of police work is 
currently unclear.     
You see the function of intelligence is to more efficiently focus the resources on the 
problem--in a problem--individuals and problem areas that would most benefit from 
the use of the resources.   
Source: 11087163       
 
        I believe that the function of intelligence in police work is critical.  I see it as a 
method to prevent and to solve crimes.  I also see it as a method of keeping the 
community and officers safe from any type of harm.  So, the function of 
intelligence in being able to gather it and what is raw intelligence that you need to  
put out there to the extreme of analyzing it and producing it into an analytical 
form is critical in police work.  
                                                                                                      Source: 11129230 
 
Intelligence in police work is a valuable assets, in order to continue to combat the 
different crimes that occurred within the city of Chicago within any municipality 
you want to need to continually gather intelligence and then follow up to ensure 
that you keep the crime level down.  
Source: 11148753 
 
Intelligence enables investigators and even patrol officers to develop relationships 
in obtaining information which can lead us to make significant arrests, to develop 
informants, to be more effective in their performance to their duties especially 
within police relationships lead investigators to get information they normally 
wouldn't be able to obtain by normal patrol activities, i.e. driving around, 
responding to calls, and keeping the public at a distance rather than utilizing their 
eyes and ears in the street are much more effective than the police officers.   
                                                                                                      Source: 11234773 
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      The responses in theme three tend to be circular in that the expressions presented 
can only be supported by repeating themselves in different forms. Responses that 
explain ‘intelligence in police work’ by providing examples rather than defining the 
terms indicates circular responses. Lack of a clear definition of the function of  
intelligence serves to confound an understanding of how the concept works in police 
tasks. The responses do provide insight as to why a functioning intelligence process 
may be important to police work.  
      Each of these responses identifies the benefit of an intelligence function as 
something to focus resources and develop methods for exchanging information. One 
comment infers OCD investigators can become ‘much more effective’ through the use 
of intelligence because they lack the ability to interact with the public in the same 
manner as patrolmen from whom information may be obtained. This statement avoids  
the function of intelligence in police work and speaks to separate roles on the 
Department.  
      The Qualrus application gauges reliability using Cohen’s Kappa coefficient to 
establish a measure of association and per cent of agreement between two or more codes 
on the same individual objects (responses). Codes used in the first question include ‘Intel 
Defined,’ ‘Intel Function,’ and ‘Intel Use;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.53, 84% indicating moderate 
agreement and high degree of association among the three terms and the question. 
 Theme 4 developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is used and applied as 
part of their regular work. 
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It's actually used effectively.  There are different types of intelligence that we use 
for different types of investigations.  I think we have the tools and the resources to 
use the intelligence that we have and I think that helps to successfully complete 
investigations.  
Source: 11028961 
 
Intelligence is that information that stirs you in a way to handle the problem, 
whether that's analysis is same last year at this time because it's a holiday; Latin 
Kings always shoot somebody, that is intelligence.  Intelligence can also be what 
we found out from a guy we did a search warrant on last night that they're going to  
 
 
do today, so could it be applied in the Organized Crime Division?  Absolutely!  
And that's how it's done here now and it can be applied.  I was in the Detective 
Division, we used intelligence there, maybe not as much as you do here, but 
intelligence there was interviews; where as here it's a combination of a lot of things.   
   Source: 11042566 
 
Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively than 
in the rest of the department.  We get intelligence and information from confidential 
clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks on problem 
area where that intelligence could be used specifically.  As opposed to patrol, that 
information doesn't get out as quickly.  We're kind of setup to disseminate 
information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from hierarchy to 
anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a result of 
retaliation… 
Source: 11087163 
 
From my experience, information is obtained based on that information; different 
steps have taken to follow up on that information in order to reach a desired end.  If 
it's information on a drug location, it's getting that information, following up on that 
information and then tried to take down that drug location.  If it's a gang offender, 
the information comes in and follows up on that information in order to remove that 
gang offender from the street.  So, it's applied on a regular basis--intelligence has 
always been applied on a regular basis.  
Source: 1148753 
 
One is that it helps direct our investigations.  We also use intelligence to identify 
who our investigations will be directed against.  We don't randomly start 
investigations at whoever comes along.  We use intelligence to find out who is the 
core of certain problems, who is running certain locations with criminal activity, 
you know, who runs the dope area, who's the boss.  In the Organized Crime  
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Division, we tend mostly to go after the higher level criminals, gang bangers, 
narcotics dealers, as well as the most violent once.  That's who we focus on.  You 
need intelligence to give you that information.  To A:  Know who to go after and B:  
How's your best way to start investigation to actually get into these people so you 
can arrest them.   
Source: 11247602 
 
   Each of the above responses in theme four indicates the respondent believes 
intelligence activities are important to their work and each provides an example of the use 
of intelligence. Each example is unique which infers there is no standardized practice for  
developing or classifying intelligence. Intelligence is referred to as ‘everything from 
(gang) hierarchies to anniversary dates’ or ‘interviews’ which serve as the basis for broad 
informational items. In the most basic form, intelligence is not developed until varied  
information sources can be associated. Throughout these responses, intelligence and 
information are used interchangeably.  
 Theme 5 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process 
is recognized but it has not been fully implemented. 
               It's one of the biggest tools that we, that our units drives up. I mean, we work on 
and of intelligence, we work of information, intelligence, and then we try to 
prioritize from the intelligence that we gathered which would be consistent in 
particular cases that we're working.  And then if that particular intelligence or 
information that we have doesn't pertain to the case that we're working on, we 
can't work because we don't have the manpower to prioritize then we'll get the 
intelligence or information onto the patrol and other units here.  
Source: 11058231 
 
 Generally, it's been my experience that raw intelligence is disseminated and it's 
done timely and it's not in a good fashion to respond to impending acts of 
violence. However, this raw intelligence is not collated or indexed.  
Source: 11105904 
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I believe that it's not only the collection of information from various sources, 
whether they be confidential informants, looking at past case reports, speaking to 
regular beat officer or tactical officers that work in that--in a certain area.  
Gathering information (and) analyzing it and then trying to come (up with some) 
sort of an agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what 
may be the reality of what's occurring and then getting that.  Once you get that 
intelligence, just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you 
know, you collect it and analyze it all.  
Source: 11257484 
 
     Respondents recognize that steps towards developing intelligence are in use within the 
OCD but also indicate additional steps may be required to develop the intelligence that is 
required from information sources.  Each of these respondents refers to the dissemination  
of intelligence and is concerned with developing a useful intelligence product. The 
inference is the OCD lacks a suitable process for developing uniform intelligence which 
could be distributed according to standard practices.   
 Theme 6 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process 
is necessary but is currently lacking. 
 I think it's imperative--I mean everybody uses intelligence especially when they're 
thinking about organized crime.  If you're looking into longer term investigations, 
we're looking at better targets, we have to use intelligence. 
              Source: 11062184 
 
 We won't be able to effectively operate unless we're able to speak to people, to 
develop information, to develop relationships with informants because informants 
can go on locations and see things and do things that police officers cannot do.  
Specifically, going to residences, going to businesses, you know, sampling 
narcotics, doing all the things, buying narcotics, all the things that, you know, an 
undercover police officer wouldn't be able to do.  
  Source: 11234773 
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 These responses emphasize the need for an intelligence process as an aid to 
investigation without trying to define how an intelligence process works in their units.  
This tenor in these responses infers a very real need for an intelligence process in OCD 
which is currently lacking. There is an emphasis on the types of investigations in which 
the OCD is involved, i.e., ‘longer term investigations’ and work which involves going 
‘undercover’ which underscore the need for developed intelligence for specialized work.  
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Intel Applied,’ and 
‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.46, 92% indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of 
association among the three terms and the question. 
 Themes 7 through 9 were developed from respondent’s perception as to whether or 
not there was a Department definition of intelligence in police work.    
There is a definition. However, I think there are several definitions.  One of that is 
employed by the Deployment Operations Center, which is actually classified 
under, I believe its 28 CFR Part 23.  There were some training bulletins issued.  
However like, do I think that there's one standardized definition that everyone  
follows right now, the answer is no.   
Source: 11105904 
 
 I know there's a general order that mentioned intelligence in them, but I think, 
basically, we use the term intelligence as like the common definition.   
              Source: 11247602 
 
 Is there a formal definition?  I believe there is.  I'm not actually aware of it, but I 
think, I believe there is.  
Source: 11234113 
 
     The above respondents believe there is a Department definition of ‘intelligence’ but 
are specifically uncertain of what it might be. This infers the respondents have not been  
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provided a standardized working definition for ‘intelligence.’  The respondents are 
correct in indicating the word intelligence is used in a number of Department policy 
documents but, in fact, the word is never defined. This can be problematic when 
addressing issues related to intelligence in policing. By contrast, if an officer believes he 
has probable cause to affect an arrest, he can refer to a codified set of definitions or 
statutes in support of an action. One response references 28CFR23 (Code of Federal 
Regulations) which provides federal guidelines to police engaged in intelligence 
collection. Many OCD supervisors know of intelligence processes and applications 
because of prior military experience with specialized units.  
 I am not of aware of definition by the Department of intelligence.  The people that 
know what they're doing on this department know what the hell intelligence 
means.  Other people think intelligence is sheet that they get to make their exams 
look better.  Intelligence to us is what's going to help us stop the things what we're 
working on.  So, yes, I think we all have our own opinion about what it is, but it's 
basically what it is.   
Source: 11042566 
 
 If there is, I'm not aware of it.  
  Source: 11062184 
 
 There's no formal definition.   
                                                                                               Source: 11087163 
 
     These respondents know of no Department definition of ‘intelligence.’ One of the 
unique qualities of successful officers and supervisors within the OCD is their ability to 
function within parameters that defy strict definitions. In contrast, academicians must rely 
on a common set of strict definitions as are part of the language to prove concepts. In this 
sense, an acceptable definition for ‘intelligence’ is important to assist to develop  
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processes which have real situational applications. Similarly, a Department definition of 
intelligence would likely prove useful. 
 There is a definition, I really don't know it.  I think when people think intelligence 
I think they also think like technology.  They kind of go hand-in-hand; I don't 
know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the Department has ever 
used it.  
Source: 11028961 
 
 That word is thrown on a lot--intelligence, you know, my definition of it is 
intelligence, you know, if you get the information through intelligence it's going 
to lead to activity because smarter police officers that are out there are more  
focused that have knowledge on what's going on.  Knowledge gives you power, 
it's going to give you the ability to--if you put knowledge and intelligence 
together, it's going to lead to activity--quality activity.  It's not going to be, you 
know, to go out locked up every mope on the street.  That's just great.  That's 
good, the definition. 
Source: 11058231 
 
 Okay, my recollection is that there may exist a document, a department policy for 
one unit and that's the Deployment Operations Center which the document spelled 
out the responsibility of being the central depository for intelligence.  And in that  
document, it defined intelligent and what it meant.  So, it was specific for that unit 
in a--whether or not everybody in the whole department was trained on that 
concept to carry that as a broad definition is another subject.   
Source: 11129230 
 
 I don't know the Department's definition, and if there is one, to be perfectly 
honest.   
                  Source: 11257484 
 
 It's always a part of the job, but it's just was not describe or carried out in that 
manner.  
Source: 11148753 
 
      The majority of respondents remained uncertain as to whether a Department 
definition of ‘intelligence’ existed. Several of the respondents infer that if such a  
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definition exists, it was never emphasized. The inference is that while these responses are 
less emphatic than the ‘No,’ a formalized Department definition of the term intelligence 
is not employed by members of the OCD. This suggests an intelligence process is 
lacking. Because ‘intelligence’ is regarded as ‘part of the job’ some variation in an 
approach to the use of intelligence exists but none is standardized. 
     Seventy two (72) percent of the respondents to the above question were either 
uncertain or denied there is a Department definition for the term intelligence.  Codes used  
in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Dept Defined,’ and ‘Governance;’ Kappa 
(κ) = 0.94, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association 
among the three terms and the responses to the question.  
 Theme 10 developed from respondent’s perception of what contributes to intelligence 
in policing. 
My experience is you can never ever get more intelligence than you get from the 
actual people on the street, that are going to be the ones doing it, seen it, no words 
can be done.  Interviews and human beings are the best intelligence in the world.  
I wish we could have the satellites… which I would push forward these little 
cameras in the sky that they use in the military.  But I think that some of the 
mistakes we've done is rely too much on that. 
Source: 11042566 
 
Just good old fashioned police work you stop the guys, just talking to guys, it's 
being out there on the street.  There's a certain level of computer work or we can 
look at stuff out on our other needs and figuring stuff out but I think most--the 
most powerful intelligence you're gonna get is the stuff you want out on street     
Source: 11062184 
 
...it's information that was obtained by the officers-in-charge and everybody and, 
generally, from CI, from self investigation and then narrowing that information 
down and then acting upon it.  
Source: 11148753 
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Going out there and interact with the community, talking to people, speaking to 
other officers, maybe from the tactical teams or from patrol division, developing 
informants.  When an arrest is made, every time an arrest is made, there's an 
opportunity to gather more intelligence to possibly develop an informant or 
possibly just to gather more information on a certain occasion or a certain target.  
Source 11234773 
 
Basically, our intelligence is obtained for the most part by human intelligence.  It 
always has been, but actually, in recent years, there's been a big push for officers 
and investigators assigned to the Organized Crime Division to develop more and 
more human intelligence sources.  A, you get more; you get information in 
intelligence faster.  B, you get, you could get it off of different people if you had 
multiple sources.  
Source: 11247602 
 
      The reference to ‘human intelligence’ or information from sources such as informants 
is used throughout these responses. It is worth noting the military has specialized units 
within their Intelligence Section which work on developing intelligence from multiple 
sources, e.g. SIGINT is intelligence derived from signal interception, OSINT from open 
source, and HUMINT from human intelligence are examples. ‘Human intelligence’ is a 
type of information which must be vetted before it develops into intelligence.  
      Practitioners in OCD are very experienced in the routine of collecting, vetting, and 
employing information collected on the street. This represents the first stages in 
developing an intelligence process.    
 Theme 11 developed from respondent’s perception that the use of specialized 
equipment contributes to intelligence tasks. 
Again, we have equipment technology that we use to further our investigations.  I 
would say that's how we contribute to intelligence for OCD.   
Source: 11028961 
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 The respondent infers technical equipment contributes to generating intelligence 
products within the OCD. Technologies employed in the intelligence process are tools 
which serve to facilitate the development of intelligence through a process. The use of 
technology as a practice to expedite in the collection of information can be useful but 
should not regarded as crucial to developing an intelligence product.  
 Theme 12 developed from respondent’s perception that training and development of 
investigative techniques used by personnel contributes to intelligence tasks. 
 We have trained and we have increased officers awareness in conducting 
debriefings of offenders as to what their knowledge in is and also historical 
information possessed by offenders or witnesses, whereby before that wasn't 
normally done.  The other thing that we are doing in Gang Enforcement Unit,  
we're trying to close an intelligence gap and one of the ways we did that, and this 
isn't direct correlation, just youth violence committed upon or by high school  
members that are affected by street gangs.  We have started weekly and daily 
tactic with school resource officers to determine what is occurring inside the 
school.   
       Source: 11105904 
 
 …smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge 
on what's going on.  Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability 
to--if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity--
quality activity.  
Source: 11058231 
 
Well, I think there's a lot of practices.  First of all, we definitely develop cases, 
especially drug cases, and we--out of those cases we develop information whether 
it's through wire-taps or traditional street conspiracy cases or whether it's through  
search warrants.  So there's information that are particular to each case that's 
being developed because you're actually targeting different gangs so you're 
targeting different intelligence for each different gang.  But, I think one of the 
practices that I think is critical is the debriefing of individuals when they're 
arrested.  I mean, the raw intelligence that we can gather from one individual and 
then, obviously, apply it through analysis and collaborated through other 
information is critical.   
Source: 11129230 
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Well me, myself, my detective, and a lot of my section, I kind of look for the 
strongest people from each district, here, and the Gang Enforcement Section.  I 
talk to them, probably, on a day-to-day basis and then I also, I have some key 
individuals, like strong individuals within the districts that I reach out to, 
regularly.  I try to weekly, but it's, because it's--Area 2's so vast in the amount of 
gang and the violence that occurs throughout the city.  It's just, it's virtually 
impossible, you know, to stay on top of a lot of stuff, but I, but I do have key 
people in each of the districts that I can, you know, count on as far as providing 
accurate information.   
Source: 11257484 
 
 The respondents above indicate experience and training are critical practices required 
to contribute to intelligence used by the OCD. The respondents also recognize that it is 
important to have ‘smarter police’ and ‘strong individuals’ who are likely self- 
 motivated by the interest to develop intelligence through a variety of techniques. The 
processes required for developing intelligence, including analysis, triangulation of 
sources used in debriefings, and abstract thinking are techniques more easily taught to 
those who want to learn them.  
      The majority of the responses to Question 4 involve direct officer contact with 
potential sources of information and techniques used in gathering information. There are 
no specifics regarding the storage and dissemination of such information. Codes used in 
the above question include ‘Intel Development,’ ‘Intel Defined,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa 
(κ) = 0.83, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association 
among the three terms and the responses to the question.  
 Theme 13 developed from respondent’s perception of the Superintendent’s statement 
that the Department needed to focus on ‘intelligence-driven policing.’ 
 Well, I think it's crucial, I mean, to be perfectly honest, I mean, in especially now  
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with resources and not only physical and personnel resources seem to be 
dwindling.  
Source: 11257484 
 
 I think he's realizing that, you know, that we do have a shortage of manpower and 
we have to work smarter.  We just can't, you know, and he said this before, that 
arrests are going to mark the crime down.  It's going to be arresting the right 
people.   
Source: 11058231 
 
 If I was the Superintendent, I would say the same thing.  You better be using 
intelligence-led policing because first of all, you can't go back to the old ways, 
where it's heavy handed.  And have people fear you, I mean, at some ways that 
would be nice, but intelligence will help you get around bad corners, so I believe 
that statement in intelligence-driven policing is because that's the wave of today 
and the future.   
Source: 11042566 
 
Where the intelligence is used on specifically to attack the, the biggest problems 
that the department has with the limited resources and to get that intelligence out  
and to be acted on effectively.  So, in the past that hasn't really been the way the 
Department operated.  
Source: 11087163 
 
      The respondents interpret the Superintendent’s comments in two ways both related to 
change; better use of resources and a need to be forward thinking and openness to new 
approaches. Each response is a reflection on the status of the conditions in the policing 
environment. The Chicago Police Department has reduced manpower levels from over 
12,000 to under 10,000 during the past few years. As the same number of officers is 
required to man routine patrol positions, fewer are available to be placed in specialized 
units like the OCD. Specialized units are required to make more efficient use of the  
resources they have as well as to seek innovative alternatives in policing in order to 
maintain their effectiveness.   
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Theme 14 developed from respondent’s perception that while the statement was the right 
thing to say the Department needs a concerted, realistic effort to move forward in the use 
of intelligence in policing. 
               I think that's the statement for the future.  I think it's something that 
needs to be put into place now amongst recruits that start; that can work your way 
through.  I think it's going to be important because our numbers are dwindling and 
if we don't have enough bodies out there, we are going to need other resources or 
ways to be more efficient to get what we need to get upon investigations. 
Source: 11028961 
 
 My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing 
our tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high 
rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence and 
shootings.   
Source: 11129230 
 
Well, I believe it speaks for itself that officers have to be smarter.  They have to 
have contacts within the community because that information can be acted on a 
timely fashion, much more so than being reactive.  An officer can be proactive  
rather than taking a report about a person doing a robbery or selling drugs.  An 
officer, if he has intelligence and he's developed informants and they're in contact 
with the community and say, “Well, this guy is going to sell drugs or this guy's 
going to do a robbery”, that officer can act before that action takes place.   
Source: 11234773 
 
 Yeah, I think it's a correct statement.  I think the Department does focus on 
intelligence-led policing.  I think it has for a few years, but it could always be 
pushed up to higher and higher levels and become more and more efficient.  I 
mean under Phil Cline, they started the Deployment Operations Center which is 
basically the first step in intelligence-led policing where it was the information 
gathering section for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted 
intelligence report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of 
less police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you can 
to make the Department more efficient.  
Source: 11247602 
  
     Responses that speak of the ‘future,’ ‘more technology,’ ‘if he has…,’ and ‘ramp it 
up’ infer the respondents have some notion of an ‘intelligence-driven policing’ but 
perceive more support is required to advance the concept. Each of these respondents  
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provides an interpretation of what is needed which indicates that ‘intelligence-driven 
policing,’ as a practice, has not been formally presented to them as supervisors.      
 Theme 15 developed from respondent’s perception the Superintendent’s statement is 
mere rhetoric; there’s no substance to it. . 
I would agree with it but it sounds like a catch phrase and sounds like a 
buzzword more than he believes in anything, you know.  
Source: 11062184 
 
The biggest aspect of--I'm talking about intelligence-driven policing--is it says 
that information has to be exchange back and forth and I'm not saying that 
happened in the manner that would show.  So, sometimes it seems a little 
hollow.  
  Source: 11148753  
 
     The respondents regard the use of the term ‘intelligence-driven police’ in a statement 
by the Superintendent as positional rather than substantive. Positional statements reflect 
on opinion as much as they do policy. A statement by a Chief Executive that the 
organization needs to focus on a particular path may mean that the organization has not 
begun on that path.  
     Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Weis Statement,’ and 
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.81, 96% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 16 developed from respondent’s perception on whether intelligence or 
information was more important in their decision making in police work. 
         I'm going to say it's a combination of both maybe leaning a little more towards 
information and how we derive that information.  However, at anytime you're going 
to act that information, you want to back it up with some type of tangible 
intelligence; meaning, you know, say for instance if you look at some of the utility 
checks, maybe some law enforcement databases that will help you assist in the  
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finding of that under.  So I think it would lean a little more towards information but 
intelligence is definitely important as well.   
Source: 11028961 
 
 I believe it's at both.  I got to say information is probably, you know, that's 
primarily what we work of because information is something that my people are on 
the street getting right now.  They call me they say X, Y and Z's are going to 
happen.  I don't care what some reports some guy ran on of the computer says, at 
that point, I know it's going to happen.  If it gets enhanced by what the computer 
says or the computer will spit out that you know last year when I used that thing 
earlier the Latin Kings always shoot somebody on this date.  Well, geez!  If 
somebody told me last night that they're going to shoot somebody today and I see a 
raw dated intelligence that we have in the last 5 years that happens on that day, 
yeah.  It enhances it.  
Source: 11042566 
 
I think a combination of both.  Some recent information that comes in that's coupled 
with the intelligence that you already have, I mean, now you get some validity to 
the information that you got and the intelligence that you have and then you can--it 
can pitch a hole in those structure to what you're doing in your particular 
investigations.   
Source: 11058231 
 
 I think both.  Sometimes I'll get some information and it might be, it's raw, well I'll 
call that raw intelligence without it being analyzed or collaborated.  So I think I 
kind of, depending on the situation, my reaction in decision making would be 
contingent on the situation.  Obviously, you know, timing--if you're under time 
constraints, you need to make a decision on it and the more time, the more 
obviously, you can analyze and collaborate.  In my experience, you know, it's just, 
based on your time and rotation of what you can do with it, whether if it's just raw 
information, then you go with it.  If it's, you've got time to analyze it and explain it  
and come out with an intelligence report on it, I mean, that's the way to go.  
Source: 11129230 
 
 Some of them are both, it starts off as information and you start acting on it and as 
you start acting on that information, that's your analysis and now it becomes 
intelligence and you move all along with that phase that it goes.  So, it's a little both, 
like it start up the information and it will form an analysis and then that analysis 
becomes intelligence.  
Source: 11148753 
 
 Well, I mean it's probably 50-50 at the supervisory level.  Very often, we are tasked 
with going to a location based on information from the community groups, 
politicians, different commanders, Hey, I have information they're selling drugs  
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here,” are political, they're not really intelligence-led.  Intelligence-led would be 
more appropriately defined as where someone from the street level tells us, “Hey, 
they're selling drugs here.  This is the guy who's doing it.  This is how he does it.  
This is where he lives; this is the kind of car he drives.  These are the hours of 
operation, something along those lines.   
Source: 11234773 
 
     The above question begins with a simple definition of intelligence as information that 
has been subjected to analysis. The definition allows the respondents to distinguish 
between these words which are commonly and erroneously interchanged as meaning the 
same thing.        
     Well over half of the responses immediately replied that information and intelligence 
contributed, in combination, to the answers they required for decisions.  The majority of 
these responses continued their answers by providing varied descriptions on how 
information contributed to their decisions without providing specifics as to analysis. One 
response explained that time constraints require information to be used more often than 
intelligence; this infers consideration of the fact that the analysis process takes time.  The 
use of a functional intelligence process mechanism, such as ILP, within the OCD would  
allow for intelligence and information to be used concurrently. Only one response, 
‘information…coupled with intelligence that you already have,’ suggests that existing 
intelligence may be used in conjunction with ‘recent information’ to provide answers for 
decision making.       
 Theme 17 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are 
driven by intelligence. 
 Intelligence without a doubt because like you said you can get the best information.  
You got to CI (confidential informant) that tells you, “I got 57 kilos in the garage 
and it's over here.”  You got to analyze, “Why the fuck would this guy know where  
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57 kilos are?”  You know what I mean.  So, yeah, you got to use--you got to 
analyze your own information.  I'm sorry.   
Source: 11062184 
 
   The respondent provides an example of ad hoc analysis of provided information in 
order to develop an intelligence product. The question ‘why’ begins the analytical 
process to introduce a number of variables related to the information on the location of an 
unusually large amount of contraband.  
 Theme 18 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are 
driven by information. 
 On a daily basis on information comes into play for immediate acts from street level 
informants, but the intelligence drives more our unit on, as a investigative unit for 
long term investigations to get to the top players in the gang, or for narcotics the top 
distributors of narcotics that are responsible for the bigger picture.  But that would 
be a more long term.  But that intelligence is extremely useful to get to the top.  
Source: 11087163 
 
My decisions and tactical decisions on where to deploy officers in relation to a gang 
conflict mostly comes from information.  The reason that we have to, most of it is 
based upon information is because we've got newer climate where it is sort of like a 
doctor that practices defense medicine.  The fear of being chastised for not  
 
 
following up on information, as ridiculous as it may be, did likelihood of you being 
chastised for not following up on it is great.  However the life, as far as launching 
investigations, complex investigations, that is usually based on intelligence and not 
a mere single piece of information.  
Source: 11105904 
 
 Well I think that the formula, information plus analysis equals intelligence, I think 
that makes sense because you could take all the information in the world, and I get a 
lot of information that's just not, has not been corroborated or even looked into 
when it's just garbage information.  So, if I were just, you know, cc that information 
as all my bosses do, they'd send me something and then they send it out to 
everybody in the world, and then we're supposed to believe that as gospel.  
Source: 11257484 
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      Information represents data that has been captured by a user because it is of interest to 
them. The respondents are specific on why information is important for answers to their 
decisions; they are similarly specific in assessing that information provides the basis for 
building intelligence. Two of the respondents indicate that ‘daily basis’ work and 
‘tactical’ decisions initiate the process of developing intelligence.  
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Decisions,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Intelligence 
Use;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.62, 90% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 19 developed from respondent’s perception that analysis in the OCD is limited 
and underused. Respondents were provided with a definition of analysis as a method for 
reducing complex information to simpler terms. Crime analysis was defined as a method 
of joining disparate information through association and relations.  
  I really don't think there's a high level of emphasis that's put on crime analysis 
within Organized Crime Division.  I think we're probably the closest thing there is 
to like the crime analysis but I--you know, we have specific information and outlets  
that we get that information from but crime analysis is not a high priority.  At least 
that's how I see it the Organized Crime Division.  
Source: 11028961 
 
 I mean it's useful.  It's kind of taken in context.  You can't streamline--you can't 
always streamline the intelligence that you get.  You can't look at every dope dealer 
with the red shoes and [0:03:26 incomprehensible] on a Tuesday and say, We got a 
trend here.  You know what I mean?  There's definitely--into the DOC [0:03:34 
incomprehensible] that's quite often where they just streamline it and they'd say, 
"Well, there's three different gang deals here.  You should loss me this gang cop."  
Wait a minute, you forgot that this gang is fighting each other for the same dope 
spot and Hooky here is fighting with Beau and he just grabbed her sister's ass and 
shot it.  You know what I mean, so you lose a lot if by streamlining it, you know. 
Source: 11062184 
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Crime analysis is extremely important but the problem is on a, on a lot quick level 
the analysis is slow coming in and a lot of times we have to put, put pins on the 
problems without correct analysis of what caused the problem.  
Source: 11087163 
 
 Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own intelligence, I 
mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team and each officer 
that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime Division does analyze their 
information as it pertains to their investigation in their cases.  That information and 
analysis does go to the bigger cause of the whole department at some point and also 
depending on the urgency of it.  If it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR 
(Intelligence Based Deployment Recommendation).   
Source: 11247602 
 
      The respondents use analysis to a degree but the process is described as incremental 
rather than flowing and is called for when situations warrant the use of analysis. 
Respondents indicate that without analysis, the wrong or incomplete decisions are can 
occur. Urgency related to some particular instance is mentioned as a reason to gather and 
begin the analysis of information because the OCD lack “per se our own intelligence.”   
 Theme 20 developed from the respondent’s perception that the ability to use more 
analytics would be beneficial. 
 Well, sure crime analysis will make it easier for us.  It would--we most certainly 
have to know being an organized crime where the next shooting is going to take 
place, where the next big dope deal might take place, where the next K meeting is 
going to take place.  That's all stuff that we need to know, so when you say complex 
information, I don't know what that means exactly but what I'm thinking, what 
you're saying complex information is a bunch of different information brought into 
the middle and deciphered.  So, yeah, I'm sure complex, little things add up as big 
things later on.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you 
have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do.  An example would 
be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, something 
comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and you looking 
million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's building to this 
around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already done, you know.   
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That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order to prevent 
something can happening.  And to elaborate a little bit further about the crime 
count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number sometimes 
may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of that total 
high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we are looking 
at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the line.  If we 
have a high number of homicides and where large percentage are domestics those 
are sometimes hard to prevent.  We have our domestic aspect and then we deal with 
it, but the ones we're really focus on are the ones that is going to cause more 
problem, those gang-related incidents.   
Source: 11148753 
 
    Both respondents agree that the use of an analytic feature would be beneficial to the 
OCD; the inference is this feature is currently lacking. The analytic portion of ILP is a 
key feature of the model which contributes how information is managed and used and is 
intended to supplement, not replace, existing practices.  
 Theme 21 developed from the respondent’s perception that they employ analysis 
regularly in our work and tasks they perform.  
 I think it's--we get a tremendous amount of analysts of what's going on, in 
particular, this information on what's going on and we've got to prioritize on how 
we deal with the analyzed information that we get.  You know, we've got to--
because we don't have--we got our own guys.  I got 76 guys on the street.  
Understand, we've got to prioritize what the intelligence that we're getting them and 
we got intelligence from patrol, we got intelligence from the back, from Leo's guys, 
we got informal meetings that we have and that's information shared.  We shared 
electronically.  We try to do better job of--if it's a high priority where it's not going 
to compromise any of our investigation and has to do with public safety.  We're 
going to electronically get that out immediately to the districts into the back and 
Deputy [00:05:48 Incomprehensible] when he was--because we were doing it, we 
weren't tracking it.   
Source: 11058231 
 
 The function of crime analysis in organized crime or at least in my, in our position 
it is to--is a valuable tool to determine what the unlawful specified activity, albeit 
gang is involved in so that we can develop a strategy to combat it.  Some gangs may 
be involved in just trafficking narcotics.  Some are involved in burglary, some are  
 
 
 95  
 
involved in robbery.  That is why we use crime analysis in that area to determine 
what they do.  
Source: 11105904 
 
 Well I think, I'll give you an example of how I'll use crime analysis.  If we see an 
area with a lot of shootings and we need to go and take a deeper look into it, we will 
start analyzing the crime in using all the, what I would call the indicators that may 
exist out there that can be the red flags you get--number of our narcotics arrest over 
a 30-day period, number of calls for service.  Other residual crimes involving 
narcotics, it can be after specific person caught, okay?  Man with a gun caught.  All 
the other information will give you a crime analysis.  That based on intelligence 
working those two together will give you an idea of what type of narcotics 
operation is set in that location, geographically.   
Source: 11129230 
 
A lot of these guys, even if there's nothing promised to them, you know, whether be 
a profit or something along those lines, they're still willing to talk about certain 
things.  Just because, “Hey, you know, I'm tired, you got me, what do you need to 
know?”  And they--they fill in a lot of blanks and a lot of those blanks we had heard 
about in the past.  So now, we have like two or three independent sources that are--
we're gathering this information and now it's strengthening, you know, of the 
intelligence and the crime analysis aspect of this stuff.   
Source: 11257484 
 
 Crime analysis is a key component of what we do, specifically, we are--one of our 
many tasks is to reduce violence, it's one of our primary tasks, to reduce violence.  
Mostly, gang members or people involved in violence, the percentages speak for 
themselves, are involved in other illicit activity.  Although, they're--they may not 
shoot somebody everyday, they sell dope everyday because that's their source of 
revenue and often--quite often times, the conflicts, which is the heart of the 
violence, you know, revolves around narcotics.  Therefore, we often focus our 
investigations in areas in an effort to reduce the violence.  It will take out some of 
the higher ranking drug dealers, and then conflict is eliminated.   
Source: 11234773 
 
      The above respondents provide examples of how analysis is used by detailing tasks 
and then relating separate individual processes that involve information exchanges. 
Information exchanges are critical to the analysis (reducing complex information to 
simpler terms) leading to intelligence but ‘crime analysis’ involves the ‘dot-connection’ 
phase of developing intelligence. Two responses refer to either ‘red flags’ or  
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corroboration of information through different sources as techniques useful to their crime 
analysis. These techniques are useful in testing the validity of information which may be 
used in conjunction with crime analysis to further the development of intelligence.            
Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Crime Analysis Function,’ and 
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree 
of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 
 Theme 22 through 24 were developed from the respondent’s perception on whether 
there tasks are driven in response to ‘counting crime,’ using analysis to determine trends 
or patterns, or some combination of both.  
 I use both.  I'll tell to you that crime counting, the reason why that is always 
important because numbers don't lie.  If you are going to show me a sheet with 20 
people shot at a 3-block radius, there's 20 people shot there.  Now, I go into the 
next statement, “Why did that happen?”  Counting is just a way to help you get an 
analysis, to me that's spotting the problem, now what do we do to find out what's 
causing it.  So, crime counting is always going to be used because that's what they 
hold you accountable for.  If you are commander of a district and they count that 
your numbers are up, well, they're going to hold that against you; so you are going 
to analyze what those numbers really mean and then figure it out why it's having 
another attack.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 Well, you know, I think I just mentioned all the various factors and I think they 
all--I think the relationships between all of them would mean more to me when I 
look at, you know, reporting the facts and the analysis of what's going on.  So, I 
think that I will look at the relationship between arrest, calls for service, 
shootings, looking at the time they're happening, the day they're happening, so I 
think it would be important to relate them all and how they, what's causing what 
to happen.  So there's a relational analysis that's being done.  
Source: 11129230 
 
 Yeah, obviously, the--we don't really rely too much on crime counting.  I think, 
you know, the bosses are very concerned with that.  We're not too concerned with  
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that too much.  What we're more concerned with as I've--several questions 
earlier like, "Hey, what's linking perhaps a spike in violence to a certain area?”" 
The lately certain commercial, you know, we had a several homicides recently in 
the last couple of weeks right on the same corner that what's happening and while 
we're finding out it's several different Latin gangs.  Both the victims were Latin 
Kings but one was a Latin Dragon and one was a Cobra it seems that.  But we 
know that a lot of these boundaries are, you know, intersecting over there, we're 
trying to get to the root cause as to, you know, what may have spurned that.  So 
you know, although our numbers, you know, we are always concerned with 
numbers in trying to keep the numbers down, we're--we're concerned with trying 
to look at a certain area, analyzing that area, see what the spike may be, seeing 
who the principal individuals that are involved with the whole thing and then 
trying to create some sort of a strategy to, you know, related to what's going on.  
Source: 11257484 
 
     Each of these respondents uses crime counting, to some degree, as an indicator of 
where analysis may be required. Crime counting relates to all reported crime that can be 
classified under Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) standards; codes provided for 
particular crime categories. The above respondents provide examples of how they might 
use analysis in relation to counted crime; each response is slightly different which infers 
there is no standard analytic procedure.   
 Theme 23 was developed from the respondent’s perception that analysis is more 
useful for determining associated crime trends than merely crime counting. 
I would say analysis would probably more useful, patterns, relationship or trends 
that exist because that--if you have that specific information, you could put 
yourself in a position to--to get in front of things.  Meaning, say you have a 
burglary pattern and you know--you know the pattern, maybe some of the 
relationship to some of the offenders and what time they are predictably heading, 
now you can put your surveillance teams or, you know, whatever together to be in 
those areas to try to work that area with that information in order to--to make an 
arrest so you can potentially clear the pattern.  You know, numbers--raw numbers 
related to events--numbers are just numbers.  If you're talking analysis, that would 
be more important.   
Source: 11028961 
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I think the analysis to raw numbers, you can look at in particular areas but you 
got to analyze that with the intelligence that you have in those particular conflicts 
in those particular areas.  Now, say like you send in officers [00:08:11 
Incomprehensible].  I mean, you can see that there's a lot of shootings going on in 
that particular area right now.  But, you know, that's our frame, but now you got 
to double a little further into who are the culprits that are causing it and you got to 
know the players from both sides and then disseminate that information because it 
might be a domestic.  
Source: 11058231 
 
Analysis is the most useful without a doubt.  Unfortunately, the Department often 
uses the raw numbers in particular from a weekend deployment based on the 
following week is from raw numbers and not from real analysis. 
Source: 11087163 
 
 Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you 
have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do.  An example 
would be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, 
something comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and 
you looking million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's 
building to this around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already 
done, you know.  That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order 
to prevent something can happening.  And to elaborate a little bit further about the 
crime count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number 
sometimes may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of 
that total high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we 
are looking at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the 
line.  If we have a high number of homicides and where large percentages are 
domestics those are sometimes hard to prevent.  We have our domestic aspect and 
then we deal with it, but the ones we're really focused on the ones that are going 
to cause more problem, those gang-related incidents.  
Source: 11148753 
 
I would say the analysis portion when it comes out, is more important to us 
because there's a lot of crimes that are committed that are not directly involved or 
not directly related to the mission of the Organized Crime Division.  You know, if 
it's a domestic related murder or something along that line, it's not something that 
we generally are involved in.  We're involved with gang and organized criminal 
activity and the murders and violence that stems from that type of activity.  So we 
would need the analyzed version so that we would know what caused the murder 
and also, what, where, and also if there's a propensity for more violence to follow 
because our job is stop that additional violence as fast as we can.  
Source: 11247602 
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   The above respondents have an understanding of why the analysis of raw numbers 
is important to decision making.  The terms ‘patterns, relationships, or trends’ ‘applied to 
raw numbers’ describes the products developed through analysis and demonstrates an 
appreciation for the value of analysis.  The expression ‘raw numbers’ is used repeatedly 
in these responses to describe the items on which the Department focuses as well as to 
contrast the need of the OCD for an analysis process.   
 Theme 24 was developed from the respondent’s perception that crime counting is 
important because it shows where the crime is occurring without analysis.  
 Yeah, you know what, I guess it would--before they would find the most useful  
is the all time pin boards.  It sounds crazy but it still could matter.  I know all they 
may have it on the DOC thing, too, but to see it on the wall with a little pin that 
says, “There's armed robbery here.  There's an armed robbery here that he uses 
color-coded with this is night time, this is day time.”  You know what I mean and 
that's probably more counting than analysis but that just visually.  
Source: 11062184 
 
 Crime counting, in my eyes, is you always measure what you get.  If you measure 
something, you're going to get that result.  Crime counting, as far as how we 
apply our resources, is not a basis that we use all the time.  We do use analysis 
because that's the only effective way to understand what's happening.  To be told 
that there's a hundred armed robberies that means nothing unless it's the same 
modus operandi, same description of offenders, same types of property that was 
taken, maybe even different associations.  That's what you need it to use.   
Source: 11105904 
 
 First, like calls for service is a resource that we use.  In many calls for a specific 
area, they are selling drugs, selling drugs, we have a crack hotline that people can 
call in anonymously, and that information is also collected.  Like homicides, if 
every batteries, we look at those numbers that determine if the root cause of that 
spiking violence are those numbers, is from a narcotics problem, like a conflict.  
We can assign investigators to go out to that location to try to initiate narcotics 
investigation.  
Source: 11234773 
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     Each of the above respondents refers to crime counting as useful as an indicator 
which may indicate trends. A major concern with crime counting is ‘unreported crime,’ 
i.e., criminal incidents which occur and are not reported to the police for a variety of 
reasons. Crime reporting is closely tied to ‘calls for service’ which represent calls made 
to the police for service. Often police initiatives are predicated on circumstances in which  
clusters of reported crime appear to be congregated in one vicinity or ‘hot spot.’ 
Resources committed to ‘hot spots’ often result in the elimination or reduction of crime in  
a designated area. Most often, this does not mean that crime has been eliminated but 
rather that it has been moved to another location. Without the ability to analyze crime that 
has merely been counted,  the practice of responding to ‘hot spots’ is reactive rather than 
preventive. A principle feature of ILP is it is intentionally designed to prevent crime.    
     Codes used in the above question include ‘Counting vs. Analysis,’ ‘Source,’ and ‘Intel 
Development;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.91, 98% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The high 
κ in this instance reflects on the fact the responses to Question 8 infer the practice of 
‘counting’ is accepted as a base standard for focusing in types of crime clusters but 
analysis is important for the type of tasks conducted in the OCD.  
 Theme 25 was developed from the respondent’s perception that criminal intelligence 
is used all the time in the OCD. Respondents were informed that criminal intelligence is 
developed from a variety of information sources.  
 
  
Alright, how criminal intelligence--criminal intelligence is what we live off of 
everyday that is what our job is in gangs.  Gangs are using intelligence gathered  
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from gang members, search warrants, arrests, anything we can, what we see in 
cameras, if we had cameras, whatever we can to gather intelligence for the 
Organized Crime Division, where we can say, "Okay, everyday this gang deals a 
lot of dope on this corner and/or having shootings around there, obviously, 
someone is trying to move in on their dope dealing." So, we know by the numbers 
of arrest in that area and by analyzing that, that's what probably is causing the 
problem and then we got to get on physical intelligence from people to say that, 
"Yeah, so and so just got out of the joint and he wants his spot back."  That's how 
we use it here.  That's only one way of many.  
Source: 11042566 
 
Criminal intelligence in the Organized Crime Division is used very effectively 
because as the information often has the chance to be vetted before someone acts 
on it.  It can often be a more long term or someone can develop a plan to use that 
information and then to verify that information as opposed to tactical street level 
analysis of information.  
Source:  11087163 
 
 Concerning criminal intelligence as a product, this unit and even though it's only 
around a year, has started to develop a number of different products.  Concerning 
the enforcement, just stop the proliferation of street gangs.  Some of these 
products that we developed are description of gang membership, rosters and 
hierarchies of which are then made and distributed to the district commanders.  
And other product that we developed is a Weekly School Report.  And that's 
based upon our interviews with all the high schools within an area and 
information is collated, not necessarily analyzed its raw information that is put 
forth, so everyone understands what is happening within the schools.  We also 
generate what is called the Weekly Gang Conflict Report, which is a report that's 
developed through multiple sources, not only through crime reporting.  Abstracts 
from different investigations that analyze motive but also street sources and 
information coming from confidential informants and what has spiked a gang 
conflict into the use of violence or if it's just a historical conflict with another 
street gang.  
Source: 11105904 
 
 Yeah, absolutely.  I mean, constantly it's a--of things are evaluated.  We do, our 
Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s 
to keep people, somewhat focused.  Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in 
many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s 
because that is a priority for us.  Now, not saying we're the only ones who are 
keeping files on it.  I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some  
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of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we 
also gather, you know, intelligence on also. 
Source: 11257484 
 
 Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we use it in 2 different ways.  We have 
various units in the Organized Crime Division.  Some are investigative units that 
conduct investigations more of a long-term nature and that would be units such as 
the gang investigations section and narcotics section.  But we also have another 
unit, the gang enforcement section which is more of a street level enforcement 
type unit directed at gang activity.  So, and that's actually, by design, because in 
my opinion, to effectively combat violence and combat gang and narcotics but 
you have to hit it at multiple levels.  You can't just focus on the top guys.  You 
can't just focus at the bottom guys.  You've got to focus on all.  We use the 
analyzed intelligence to help us direct maybe where a long-term investigation  
might take place.  But we also use the shorter version information sources where 
to direct the Gang Enforcement Section because they respond to immediate 
threats and they do very short term missions in areas that have high propensity for 
gang related or narcotics related violence.  
Source: 11247602 
 
 It's of use because it tells you, given within the file, it's who, it's where, it's when 
and it provides the link from the past to the future, so that as people come along 
they can see, they can follow along somebody that might be out there, what is 
their modus operandi?  What do they do?  How they are doing it?  So you have to 
build it and you have to maintain it, but you also have to make sure everybody's 
looking at it, to be aware what's there, so you can follow along as you go along.  
It's information--because you want to make sure you don't loss information, it was 
just--if all the intelligence is just with one person and that person moves on then 
anybody coming along behind they got to do now, start from scratch in order to 
rebuild that intelligence.  
Source:  11148753 
 
     Much of what is described in the above responses relates to types of files on 
information maintained at various locations which may be disseminated depending on 
various conditions. There are ‘Weekly School Report(s),’ ‘Weekly Gang Conflict 
Report(s),’ or ‘description(s) of gang membership, rosters and hierarchies’ which are 
shared. Such examples of ‘criminal intelligence’ are based on an interpretation of the unit 
preparing the information and represent broad examples of accepted information. The  
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information described has a shelf-life and can be dated as changes to that type of 
information occur frequently. Information sources are generally represented as vetted 
documents which may be referenced.  
 Theme 26 was developed from the respondent’s perception that Criminal intelligence, 
developed from information, is used on a limited basis in our work 
 I think there is a bit of it.  I don't think it's a huge emphasis but I think that it's on 
a case-by-case basis with each supervisor with each team as well.  So, my point 
being is that, you know, when I talked about like the burglary pattern and stuff  
like that--that's analytical information that you want to put together.  Criminal 
intelligence, you know, that's--I really wouldn't say that we use a lot of it but I 
mean I think analysis is probably more--more appropriate.   
Source: 11028961 
 
 We got many sources of information.  We got to keep a confidential informant 
files down at the District.  I mean, we've got paid informants as well as unpaid 
informants.  I mean, we've got information from witness interviews, from 
offender interviews.  And it’s just where they're stored.  Unfortunately, a lot of the 
information--the best information is stored in, you know, kept in one of these 
guys which stay in the back of their head.  It's from an interview with somebody 
in the back seat of the car.  Those are the guys that are going to provide the most 
information. You know and again, you got to weed it out because some of it is 
self-serving, like they're giving you information to benefit themselves but others  
are more truthful.  You've got to check the validity of it.   
Source: 11058231 
 
 Well, the way I would perceive it to be used is drug intelligence reports, for 
example.  How certain groups are, you know, they're trafficking, you know, their 
drugs at certain methods.  The numerous trends, like one of the things that I saw 
developing over time was the use of, you know, we won't have street corner 
conspiracy cases so now the drug dealers had to change their operations.  So, 
some of the drug dealer's starting to do phone services; you call them and they 
will drive up and say meet me at this corner and I'll deliver it.  So we need it to, 
you know, that intelligent would be good because when people talk about it, then 
we can get out that information on how that operation exist and how it works.  So 
you get different type in which you've seen is also trends.  Now, here might be a 
trend is people going back to the old system of selling dope out of their houses or 
at the garages instead of standing on the corner and selling dope.  So you know, 
drug intelligence reports are good.  Gang methods like I talked about what gangs 
do.  They torch cars for initiations.  They might be torching police vehicles or  
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policemen’s (personal) cars (depending) on their initiation or conducting 
shootings, or whatever it is. But that information's important to get out there not 
only because it tells you something about the gang and what a certain gang trend 
is in terms of initiation but it also gives an officer safety flavor to it, report to it.   
Source: 11129230 
 
 If an officer gets information that a target, John Smith, is selling drugs, he doesn't 
go off within the floor and ask every officer in the narcotics unit, [00:09:25 John's 
this,] or John Smith's selling drugs.  That information is developed by him as he 
about--as he, you know, he may do his own investigation, do surveillance.  He 
may say, “Okay, John Smith is a very high level drug dealer.”  That information 
could be passed on to a team that works that type of level of drug dealer as  
opposed to a street guy.  But the very import--it's best that we have to look at 
clearing house for information that comes in off the street, no we're not?   
Source: 11234773: 
 
      Many of these respondents indicate that the best criminal intelligence resides with the 
officers involved in cases. This is the argument for maintaining a process for developing 
intelligence from sources that can be available to a wider audience. In its current state, as 
criminal intelligence resides with individuals, if they are promoted, resign, are transferred 
or otherwise unavailable, the intelligence may be difficult to retrieve. ILP provides the  
process for analyzing and storing criminal intelligence products which are received on a 
current basis so others can determine if the products are useful to them in a timely 
fashion. Codes used in the above question include ‘Value,’ ‘Criminal Intelligence,’ and 
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Most 
respondents perceive the product of criminal intelligence developed from sources as 
something that is archived for distribution while others perceive information sources for 
developing current criminal intelligence on a more fluid, current, and changing basis.   
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 Theme 27 was developed from the respondent’s perception on how information 
sources are ultimately tied to the product of criminal intelligence. 
 Very important.  Lot of the cases that we do work which, you know, are long-term 
investigations are derived from these specific things and, you know, putting 
together, going after the worst of the worst, the most violent and use the 
surveillance, informants, debriefings and all of that towards--working towards an 
investigation.  So, within the Organized Crime Division it's a--it's probably 
critical.  
Source: 11028961 
 
Well, that's easy.  Informants give us information, we check and see if it's by 
debriefing other people, if it's perfect or real information, with most certainly, if 
they tell us this is going to happen and this car is going by you.  We can survey 
the area and see.  Get all works together, it's hand in hand you can't have 
intelligence, unless you put all that stuff together.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 The information sources are often used long term and often used very effectively 
to--can also be a sharing with other jurisdictions.  The information source can be 
as such that we can actually start an operation as long as we can vet it.  
Source: 11087163 
 
 Somehow, it's instrumental and you know, there's a lot of--where there's 
intelligence and, for instance, what's going on with the task force over at 
[location] We learned from prisons that our guy just got released from jail.  So,  
therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we got 
intelligence on him.  We know that there's going to be a spike in crime because 
prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to ten murders.  So, I mean 
that intelligence derived from The analyst and when you look at the map, you see 
a spike and had you not get the intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys 
here that track that person, particular person or target, you would not know why 
spike is there because he just got released.  
Source: 11105904 
 
 Everything we do is based on informants and surveillance, whether it be human or 
electronic surveillance such as wire taps and hand registers which is the tracking 
of phone calls or who people are calling, that's all intelligence, really when you 
break it down.  And that is what we use to build cases against people and also, we 
use it to make our decisions on what the step in our investigations are.  And then 
again, on a gang enforcement section which is more of a street level mission 
driven unit, we use information sources also so we know where to direct that 
manpower and where they can go to effectively stem violence.  We also use the  
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information sources in all the units to conduct search warrants and other 
activity of that nature.  
Source: 11247602 
 
     Information sources are varied and information may be obtained from case reports, 
interviews, surveillance, or exchanges between individuals working the same case.   
Each of the respondents describes the importance of connecting information sources to 
investigations but a process for connecting source information to an overall criminal 
intelligence file is not described.  
     The term ‘long term investigation’ is used to describe complex cases which may take 
a year or more to resolve. Most often these types of cases involved other agencies and 
most often those agencies are federal. It is not uncommon for federal partners to maintain 
criminal intelligence processes as they draw information from OCD officers. For 
example, the FBI uses a ‘Pin-Point’ data base which tracks informant handlers by area. If 
information is required, an agent can locate the handler who will contact his informant to  
possibly verify current information. A broader ILP system could allow for this type 
feature to be available to specialized CPD units.   
 Theme 28 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they currently lack a 
uniform intelligence process that can be applied to all cases on which they work. 
 They are completely unrelated without the information sources.  We would not be 
able to develop criminal intelligence work for the unit.  As an example though, 
information that comes in the unit based upon an activity by a gang is usually 
verified by a confidential informant or other sources and then it provides a basis 
for generating intelligence products.  
Source: 11058231 
 
 I'd say that's what drives your activity.  You know, confidential informants also 
know where the hot cars are gonna get dropped off or who's selling dope over 
here or who committed the murder.  Surveillance, even you follow that murderer  
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around and you forgot where he's going and he's gonna do it again and case 
works maybe, well, you can use some of the reports almost like the pin board or 
yes, say, “These guys are shooting back and forth.  I know these guys and then we 
better go and check out that corner.”  
Source: 11062184 
 
 …case by case analysis.  I mean, if information developed by a team through the 
course of investigation they get information that, it could lead to suburban drug 
deal or it could lead to a see a target outside, operating outside the United States.   
 
 
The supervisor, his duty is to then develop either an information report or put in a 
supplementary report.  That information is reported to our analyst here.  She 
would--she reviews all those reports and determines, "Oh, a target of interest was 
picked up on this investigation." That target was also of interest to a DA group, 
that information, we will now be forwarded.  
Source: 11234773 
 
    Each respondent identifies the use of information sources and relates how, under 
certain circumstances, that information may be tied to criminal intelligence, depending on 
the case. Confidential informants are mentioned as one information source which can be 
tied to others. One respondent refers to an analyst who reviews case and supplementary  
reports from a variety of sources to develop intelligence that is shared in specific 
instances.   
 Theme 29 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they require more 
experience and training in the use of associating information with criminal intelligence. 
 Well, you know, it varies to you know, again, it comes down to the experience 
and the supervision that each of the gang teams or narcotic scenes or the 
lieutenant who supervises them has, because you definitely need to connect the 
surveillance activity with the confidential information you have in debriefings to 
fit in all the pieces of the puzzle of any type of criminal activity or any 
intelligence that you want to put together.  So, I see them as pieces of the puzzle.  
You've got to put them together.  You've got to analyze if it's right.  I'll give you a 
very good example.  You know, years ago, I was part of the old intelligence 
section where we had an analytical group and all we did was analyze reports 
coming in from all the different intelligence squads, alright?  All the different  
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intelligence squads did not know what everybody was working on except the 
analytical group.  We were to sort out all the information and run numbers and do 
background checks on people and so forth.  And then we would sit down with the 
supervisor and tell him what we're seeing based on his surveillance and his case.  
And then if we see a connection with another case, we would tell him talk to this 
sergeant about your guy because there's a connection with his case and your case, 
alright?  So, it's more like a centralized analytical group, but I guess you've got to 
have somebody that has the experience to do that.  So trainings are really 
important to do that so I think that's probably work. There's a lack of training to 
make that.  So you rely on experience, okay?  
Source: 11129230 
 
 Update--is a good word--that information, it goes back to what the definition of 
your intelligence source of information.  It's all information put together is 
intelligence, it's what's going to keep you going now and in the future and so there 
is a direct link between all the information that's gathered and the all information 
that's filed and stored for all the work that this unit does.  To know what [00:11:51 
Jay-jay] did last year and the time that Jay-jay has gotten what area did they did 
frequent, it is all there so someone might come along, they're going to seek some 
during the time on the street but they also have a source of information.  A source 
of intelligence that they can go back and look that's going to help them to know 
that Jay-jay, he make frequent this area all the time but a lot of times, he goes on 
here for a certain times.  So, it's there, there is a direct link and they're connect.  
Source: 11148753 
 
 We can't keep a very running file around them.  We chart though, any kind of 
stuffs with contact cards, C.I. information, several that we've taken down.  That's- 
-some of the individuals have gotten into that individual source.  It's always kind 
of like girlfriends, cars, properties…I mean, constantly it's a--of things are 
evaluated.  We do, the Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report 
pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused.  Because a lot of 
times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you 
know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us.  Now, not saying we're the 
only ones who  are keeping files on it.  I mean, obviously, there are some certain 
individuals in some of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence 
occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.  
Source: 11257484 
 
      The respondents emphasize work done to maintain and review information for 
associations between sources which should be tied to criminal intelligence files. One of 
the respondents emphasizes experience while another suggests training might be an  
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appropriate way to teach the development of criminal intelligence based on source 
information. Each respondent indicates they the basis for understanding how criminal 
intelligence might be developed. One response infers it is likely that several groups keep 
the same or similar information. An ILP process would collect all source information  
from those groups for analysis and development of intelligence which could be shared by 
all.  Codes used in the above question include ‘Information Source,’ ‘Criminal 
Intelligence,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.40, 92% indicating fair agreement and a high 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Fair 
agreement is indicated based on the variety of ways information sources are handled by 
these respondents. 
     The above question addressed whether information sources were tied to criminal 
intelligence files in the OCD. The following question asks if there is a mechanism in 
place to draw associations or relations between the information collected through  
analysis. Associations may include, for example, people, vehicles, cell phones, or 
financial records related to a particular person of interest.  
 Theme 30 was developed from the respondent’s perception that personnel are in place 
to handle work related to the analysis of intelligence used to derive associations. 
 You know, like (an Officer) called me, a week and a half or two weeks ago, he 
said that there was a guy that was arrested, [00:11:49 name deleted] for two 
bombs over at 13th and Keeler that's supposed to be, you know, the bars bail was 
over there looking for him because he had some items with both before he was 
incarcerated and he wanted them to bail him out.  And if he wasn't there, then he 
told them to, told the people that we're there to make a phone call and get him out 
in 5 minutes.  He didn't show up so ten minutes later there's two people who were 
shot.  I had (our analyst) check on this person they got caught [00:12:15 
Incomprehensible] over there on a car chase with the police, you know, where is 
he at, what's going on with the guy.  She found out, you know, give me a file on  
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him and with all the information, the particulars, where he was currently at in the 
county.  I got that information and passed it to (an officer who is at) Area 4 and I 
said, “Whoever this guy--this guy may have some information on this conflict.  
So, that information goes back and forth and I might asked her to do things where 
I'm learning say at the meeting, or I'm learning at--from say some of our contacts 
in the federal government, DEA, from the DEA informers who say, “Looks like 
there's something going on over here because of A, B, or C” and then I'll go to the 
analyst and say, "Hey, is there any validity or can you work up on these people?"  
And she'll work up the people and it would be disseminated to the appropriate 
area--the team that works on it.  
Source: 11058231 
 
 Okay, let's do it one at a time.  Who does it?  I have five gang detectives working 
in five areas, okay.  They should be working on intelligence.  They do intelligence 
reports to me weekly.  There's a gang intelligence report for each area done by the 
gang detective, weekly.  It goes on all the shootings and homicides of anything in 
narcotics, big whacks (shootings), anything like that.  Intel that was brought off 
the street and he does report, so we have a weekly report no matter what.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 Okay, there is one person that I know of that does double duty between both 
sections, between 189 and 193.  That person reports it.  The intelligence-based for 
incidents just causes when a policeman is shot at or incidents like that.  They are 
just causes that come across.  Usually I could get it by email and it's pretty much  
shared throughout the Organized Crime Division but there's only one person that 
actually does that.  
Source: 11028961 
 
Our analyst here is [name deleted], she's very--she has contacts with almost every 
law enforcement agency operating in Illinois and actually with the federal 
agencies.  She is pretty much our clearing house.  We are--I'm not saying we 
operate an island because no one does.  We do share information with our outside 
agencies, but a lot and often times that information is kept close to the vest 
because of sensitivity.  You can't just forward it.  It's not like around robbery 
crew.  Narcotics is its own separate--because the information is so sensitive, you 
have the informants' identities, you have, you know, officers, infiltrating groups.  
That information can't really be shared.  
Source: 11234773 
 
     The respondents indicate analysis used to draw associations between individuals and 
information tying them other information which may yield intelligence is handled in at 
least two ways. In the first instance, several individuals, sometime involved with other  
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agencies, pool their collective information for possible associations. In the second, more 
prevalent instance, one person has the responsibilities for collecting information from 
divergent sources and analyzing it for possible associations. Both examples illustrate the 
use of analytics for a tactical purpose where answers are required quickly. In a broader 
strategic arrangement, criminal intelligence developed through ILP could provide ready 
access to associations already established as an on-going process.  
 Theme 31 was developed from the respondent’s perception that task of analysis is 
assigned to different personnel as needed. 
 I think every member of organized crime is responsible for at least a little bit of 
that.  We have the IBDRs, those Intelligence-based Deployment 
Recommendations and I give every single one of my guys do one those.  So, they 
get information like that this guy is gonna go shoot this guy or these guys are at 
war with this guy.  If it's hot information, it's e-mailed right away and it's 
disseminated right away to the districts and usually that decisions either by (our) 
Lieutenants or the Commander and if--and when anybody can call one of those,  
anybody from the lowest senior police officer can say, "I got good information.  
There's gonna be a shooting and let's disseminate it to everybody."   
Source: 11062184 
 
 It's done by each individual area by the team that connects to the area.  The 
storing is a problem where it's often not retrievable.  Sometimes that information 
is there but its old or it hasn't, there's no quick way to get your hands on it.  Our 
analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture by using 
databases that the officers started using or don't have the access to and sometimes 
putting everything together from another unit making an arrest that they are not 
aware of.  Connecting aliases where an individual doesn't have the time to make 
that kind of analysis or an analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often 
more effectively than the officers themselves.  
Source: 11087163 
 
 Right now from what I see, each individual officer does analysis and if they draw 
some part of analysis, they do and then from there they do a paper work which is 
forwarded up that chain of the unit looking, see if questions are asked if there's 
something else--it's seems something might be missed and from there, then it's  
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filed in a--by one of the administrative staff where it could be access by mostly 
everybody.  
Source: 11148753  
 
      The above responses indicate that groups of individuals are tasked with determining 
which associations exist based on available information. Importantly, each of the 
respondents demonstrates a reliance on someone to do analysis which underscores the 
need for analysis in the work being done. There is some indication that at least one 
analyst has access to database information which may not be available to investigators.   
 Theme 32 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they lack the capacity 
for in depth crime analysis. 
 I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central 
intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from 
narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division.  And 
since there's no central location or an intelligence collection manager to review 
the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.   
Source: 11105904 
 
 Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement.  Again, you know, strategic 
direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do you want 
your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical operations.  So, to 
reduce violence, we were more committed to making arrests, not gathering 
intelligence.  I think there's got to be a major shift in moving towards investing in 
people that can analyze, investing in technology that can make the collection of 
information a lot more easier and a lot easier to collect from everyone instead of 
just a few people.  You can collect it from--if you got one squad working on 
gangs you might get some reports.  But if you get a hundred people out in the 
same area working, you have the chances of collecting a hundred pieces of 
information but you have the right technology in place.  
Source: 11129230 
 
 Well, I'm--I oversee it I guess.  I'm pretty much, I don't--I don't have the luxury of 
having like analysts, quite frankly. Of my gang detectives and myself, and I 
would say some of my stronger sergeants, we're the ones that are primarily 
involved with this whole thing.   
Source: 11257484 
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Yeah, we do a lot of that with the associations and connections.  We do various 
data bases we have like with Penlink and there's also units that HIDTA helps us a 
lot in our investigations when we start, we do the things I mentioned earlier like 
Pen registers or getting phone numbers where we identified people and we could 
give them the information and they'll do the link analysis and show us how people 
are related and they'll come up with a spider web type graph and you could see 
who's related to who via who they're calling or who might have joined real estate 
ventures together, things like that that's off of an internet based sources and 
anything that they could throw in there to develop those connections.  As far as 
in-house, most of our stuff, unfortunately, it's stored on paper still in the Gang 
Investigations Section.  We've been striving, and I can get into it more later, but 
we've been striving to try to get a Gang Investigations Section database done 
where all of our gang investigation reports go into and it could be later data mined 
and mined for any kind of information on persons of interest.  On the other hand, 
we do send most of our GIS supplementary reports which are trying to do.  
Source: 11247602 
 
      Most respondents are optimistic about their future ability to use more analysis to 
develop the associations between existing criminal intelligence and information. 
Respondents indicate paper based reports are common while use of digital applications 
capable of linking information is restricted to specific software, e.g., Penlink, which is a  
law enforcement tool used to track phone records. One respondent uses another agency, 
HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas) to help with developing associations 
between persons of interest and other information.   
      Overall, the respondents are keenly aware of the value of associations which can be 
drawn by tying information sources and developing intelligence. As a tool, ILP make use 
of vetted criminal intelligence that can be used to develop associative links with persons, 
places, and things.  Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Source 
Evaluation,’ and ‘Cohesion;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement 
and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
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 The next section specifically addresses the notion of Intelligence-led Policing (ILP). 
Prior to presenting the questions in this section to the respondents, each was provided 
with a definition of Intelligence-led Policing as provided by Jerry Ratcliffe, a professor 
from Temple University who has done extensive world-wide research on police practices 
and is the author of the text Intelligence-led Policing (Appendix G) 
The Notion of Intelligence-led Policing used by the OCD: Developed Themes 
 Theme 33 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the concept of ILP 
would be useful; we use parts of it now, and it could save us on resources. 
 Yeah, I believe that it could be useful.  You know, obviously, the people that do 
the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned police work 
and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise.  But being able to pinpoint 
direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little more direction for the 
activities and associations by--come out with that information is--it could be quite 
a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that information and research yourself.   
Source: 11028961 
 
 Well, in one word, absolutely.  We do it now.  That is what we do.  We do 
intelligence-led policing.  We do not have the luxury to have unlimited resources  
manpower.  As you all know, you looked on TV.  So we have got to be smarter 
and more effective.  We got to surgically take people out, take areas out and the 
gangs out.  That's what we do, we have been doing it.  Reading this, obviously the 
person who wrote it has done it himself or he wouldn't be able to write this or he's 
a good person of seeing at work but that is exactly what we do on organized 
crime.  That's how we do it; we couldn't do it any other way.  
Source: 11042566 
 
Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some of 
this already...   We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized Crime 
Division, a main 21 list.  Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the city; gang 
bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-managerial position in 
a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-managerial position, an 
extremely vital character.  Okay, we also have a system called the Trap System 
which is Targeted Repeat Offender Apprehension and Prosecution System.  And 
that's basically a joint venture with the state's attorneys office where our top 11 
districts for public violence submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along 
like the lines of the top 10 or top 21.  And what that does is when no subjects' are  
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arrested, they notify states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that 
case and stays with it.  And that state's attorney is assigned to that area to make 
sure that that subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense.  He gets 
taken, he's prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.  But in short though, yes, I 
mean I believe the concept is useful to any Police Department.  You can't random-
-in this day in age and with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do 
random preventive patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime.  
You have to have at least a good portion of your police department directed at 
known targets and known conflicts.   
Source: 11247602 
 
 Absolutely;  I mean, this is basically targeting to the right people.  I mean, one of 
the great reductions of crime strategy is getting the right people off the street.  I 
mean, you go back historically in this unit, I mean, we tried to attack the right 
people, you know, they have to [00:14:56 watch] and trigger town up in the 5th 
District.  I mean, they got the right people and, you know, hence, crime reduced.  
Now, they're reduced and probably prevented a number of crimes and then you 
got the new breed [00:15:11 Incomprehensible] based conflict but you know the 
mark in them.  I mean, you target the right people.  You take the right people out 
of the equation.  You've got to prevent crime, you've got to prevent future crimes 
because, I mean, you know, they're just basically the urban serial killers.  
Source: 11058231 
 
 Absolutely; I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in 
connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would leverage 
all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using technology in 
using information, leveraging our human resources to be more strategically 
focused and obviously more efficient and obviously putting our officers at the 
right place at the right time at the right spot.   
Source: 11129230 
 
 Yeah, I think there's some place for that.  You know, I think everybody's, you 
know, set business model on-- the civil service type thing, everybody gets a little 
hinkty about that.  But I think there's something to be said for, it's like, you know, 
let's get some information, let's get some viable targets, you know, and let's see 
what we could do to take these people out and thus, you know, create a better 
atmosphere, better community.  And like I said, we've had some success, I think 
recently this year.  A lot of it wasn't really, you know, by GES, but a lot of it was 
through like let narcotics know this is what we got… 
Source: 11257484 
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     Importantly, each of the respondents interprets some value in the tenets of ILP as an 
aid to supplement their existing work. Most infer ILP would be most important in 
identifying the ‘right people’ or targets on which to focus the attention of an 
investigation.  The largest gangs in Chicago, the Latin Kings and Gangster Disciples, are  
comprised of tens of thousands of members; because of scarce resources available to the 
OCD, focusing on the right individuals for investigations is critical.     
 Theme 34 was developed from the respondent’s perception that an analytical 
approach can not provide the types of answers required for the OCD on any type of  
regular basis. 
 Again, I think it should be everybody.  I think it should be the beat cop should be 
able to use it and should be able to come up--I mean, I know some great guys who 
never got out of the blue uniform who would pull you over and say, "Hey, I got a 
guy that is saying this is going on or that's going on," or "I just saw somebody 
doing this over here.  You might wanna keep an eye on it." And it should go all 
the way up and really it should be about the information sharing is important as 
just the intelligence gathering.  You know, did you read the book "Moneyball?”  
It's about Billy Beane and the Athletics and it's basically he's the first baseball 
manager that starts to use all these stats and he's first to come up with the on-base 
percentage within the status sessions and he took a team that they didn't think was 
getting anywhere, all the way, you know, just short of the World Series but what 
you can't account for is the heart of the policeman, the guy that's out there.  You 
can put all the stats in.  You can put all the--you can flood them with intelligence 
but the guy is not gonna stop somebody.  The guy is not gonna talk to somebody.  
It's not gonna make a difference.   
Source: 11062184 
 
 I think that some of these crime analysis theories (are) the flavor of the day.  The 
bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with 
people.  I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests.  
Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions.  It's just a way to 
justify the planning for research.  What I mean, I'm a little bit old school, I still 
believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more effective than the 
total embracing of, you know, everything has been researched down to the last.  
The bottom line is you still have to go out there in police cars and stop cars, stop  
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people, interact with people, and that information's going to come from the 
street.  
Source: 11234773 
  
     These respondents feel the best information and intelligence is developed from what is 
learned on the street rather than from new concepts or policing models. In absolute terms, 
this observation is not without merit and should continue to be observed. An important 
point to emphasis is ILP, by definition, is not intended to replace anything that in use that 
currently works; it is intended to supplement existing practices. In this sense, ILP is 
different from other policing models such as Community Oriented Policing which is 
intended to permeate all aspects of policing and become ingrained in the culture of the 
department involved with the program.   
 Theme 35 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the concept of ILP 
should be applied on a Departmental scale rather than just among top decisions makers as 
a method to prevent, not merely react to crime. 
 Oh, heartily.  As noted by Ratcliffe, we do not have strategic management of 
information within.  It's whoever has that information, they do pass it on.  
However, it does not provide a coordinated approach to the problem.  Each time I 
send information help, if it goes to the district commander, there may be a gang 
conflict, they respond that information by putting resources and thereby trying to 
stop it, not eliminate it, as an example. 
 Source: 11105904 
 
I believe it is in terms of that issue over the Department and to this unit.  This is a 
more formalized description of what is already done and then moving towards a 
more formalized description it will actually probably find and ease some of the 
processes that are already in existence.  From what I know about detective--I 
think it would be useful not only for Detective Division but also for the patrol 
also.  So it would be used, I think, it would be used for the Department as a 
whole.  
Source: 11148753 
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     Overall, the respondents perceive the definition and concept of Intelligence-led 
Policing as something that would be beneficial to their work. Of interest among the 
respondents is the notion of using analysis to a greater extent and having a central archive  
on criminal intelligence which might be used by everyone. Respondent who were 
concerned about the effectiveness of the ILP model as a practical tool perceived it as a 
passing fad or would rather continue to work using traditional methods. Codes used in 
this question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.52, 95% 
indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms 
and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 36 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides both 
strategic and tactical objectives for the unit and whether supervisors have any discretion 
in the process. 
 Well, if I'm going to use like a case as an example, I've been fortunate enough to 
be a decision maker in strategic objectives because I've had some experience 
doing that before.  However, you know, it still goes up to process.  I mean, you 
still have the lieutenant, you still have the commander, you still have to run 
everything by them.  However, I've been fortunate enough where I've been able to 
be the decision maker and determine of strategic objectives on different things.  
Source: 11028961 
 
 I'll give them the message of what I want done and how to do it.  They, on a daily 
basis as we just with this last phone call, are going to make decisions on how to 
actually get it done.  I'll give them the objectives then they're going to do their 
strategic objectives on how to get it.   
Source: 11042566 
 
 As far as our unit--as far as our investigations go, the sergeants ultimately are 
controlling the investigation.  They're making the decisions.  Once a month we 
have a meeting with the sergeants and lieutenants and we tackle all the particular 
cases.  We got a particular case to work it out or there's particular conflict that  
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we're working on and I like to have a meeting because they're feeding what 
they're doing and they're proposing their strategies.  
Source: 11058231 
 
(Decision makers)  got to be careful about over information, you can't throw 
everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving you a 
30-page report and half of it is about neighbors.  Now, I don't even do give a 
(expletive deleted) about that.  Where is this guy?  What kind of--what gang is he  
in, who he shot at before and you never get anything.  I know all you get is 
an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, you know.    
Source: 11062184 
 
 So, I think the decision makers, even though I say it starts with the supervisors, 
but I think if you take a look at it really, the officers that are working in these 
cases, the intelligence officers, that's why they're called intelligence out there 
they're gathering their intelligence in the street level.  Fundamentally, really key 
into developing all these tactical intelligence which then allows the upper level 
person to look at it strategically plan what the goals, the overall goals of going 
after a particular gang.   
Source: 11129230 
 
 It'd be the Command Staff.  I mean it would be the Chief, myself as the Deputy 
Chief, and then, you know, Commanders and staff.  But as a department, 
obviously, it'll be the Superintendent and then his executive staff, which will be 
the deputy superintendents and the assistant superintendents.   
Source: 11247602 
 
   Because the structure of the Chicago Police Department is quasi-military it is not 
unusual that the responses to this questions are expressed in terms of span of control as 
determined by rank. The above respondents infer they have latitude in both strategic and 
tactical decisions but this latitude is clearly subject to approval along the chain of 
command which relies on subordinates to provide workable intelligence and information. 
 Theme 37 was developed from the respondent’s perception that decisions on strategic 
objectives are made by the highest ranking member involved with the case. 
 Right now the deputy superintendents are the decision makers on allowing each 
unit to have some latitude and there is still some tactical latitude but often the 
areas of deployment even for our unit are focused on what was initially put down  
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by deputy superintendent and it can be actually multiple deputy, 
superintendents and they're trying to protect the most critical areas of the city.  
Source: 11087163 
 
 The decision makers for establishing policies is the Senior Command Staff that 
has to determine the strategic objectives. The Senior Command Staff, which  
would guide us and I'm going to use the term management-based objectives.  
Once we know their objectives, then we as mid-level supervisors could establish 
the goals to meet those objectives.  The tactical decisions will solely rely at this 
level on.   
Source: 11105904 
 
 The overall decision makers right now for the most part, it sets at the commander 
level and above;  that's the formal decision makers.  Well, it's actually the 
Captain, the watch commanders and in some units you actually have sergeants, 
who are actually--that are--they has some aspect of being the decision maker also.   
Source: 11148753 
 
 I could make recommendations, you know, and whether or not they want it, they 
listen to those recommendations.  That's fine, you know, in most cases, they do, 
quite frankly 'cause they rely on people that are, you know, like I rely on people 
that are on the loose ground type of thing.  They are the ones that are closest to 
the stuff they can taste it and feel it, you know.  And so, I mean, I'm providing, 
you know, targets to like interviews in trying to along those lines and then, you 
know, gather enough information to people who are subordinates and stuff and 
filter this to other the people and say like, "Hey, this might be a little bit bigger 
than what we can do, but this is what we got, this is what phone numbers we have, 
this girlfriend's cars we got, here you go," you know, and we hear from them 
periodically back and forth from working...   
Source: 11257484 
 
  The above respondents specifically cite the chain of command structure within the 
Department as the basis for decision making. These responses indicate the presence of a 
strong organizational structure that is responsible for decision making. There is the 
inference that many of the respondents believe their input contributes to a formal decision 
making process but ultimately strategic decisions are determined by higher ranking 
officers.  
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 Theme 38 was developed from the respondent’s perception that strategic, 
sometimes tactical, decisions are influenced and indeed made by sources outside of the 
unit.  
  If at tactical level it's the Deputy Superintendent (or) the Chief of the OCD.  
Source: 11234773 
 
      This respondent inferred that tactical decisions are made at the highest levels of the 
OCD. This response is an exception to the other responses provided which infer decision 
making is based on the information or intelligence available to high ranking supervisors.  
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Coupling,’ ‘Decisions,’ and ‘ILP;’ Kappa 
(κ) = 0.85, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association 
among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 39 was developed from the respondent’s perception that decision makers 
would benefit from the tenets described in ILP. 
     Seventy-five (75) percent of the respondents answered ‘yes’ or ‘absolutely’ to this 
question inferring the use of an ILP model would be of use to the decision makers who 
they had previously identified. Their complete responses may be found in Appendix E.    
 Theme 40 was developed from the respondent’s perception that already Intelligence-
led Policing is already being conducted by members of the OCD. 
 I think we already have some work done.  We have the top 21 meeting.  We have, 
I mean we have written a number of avenues to share information. Oh, we have 
about different avenues to share information which is really, dramatically changed 
in the last--I have been here in the past 19 years, so it's been, it's changed 
dramatically as far as exchanging of information between agencies; but then, 
within our own agencies, within shared agencies, within the federal agencies, 
county, law enforcements.   
Source: 11234773 
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We do it now.  Like most certainly benefit, they do it now that is how they do 
their job.  That is why they're better than most.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 Absolutely, I think that's what this--we do this all the time.  
Source: 11058231 
 
      Each of the respondents recognize the values of the tenets described in the definition 
of ILP and each infers they employ at least some of the characteristics of ILP in their 
present work. These responses allude to information sharing which is critical to police 
work but shared information implies some lack of ownership in the exchange. The 
products developed from ILP are ‘owned’ by those who develop information into 
intelligence for decision makers to construct specific strategies.  
      Codes used in the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa 
(κ) = 0.57, 88% indicating moderate agreement and a strong degree of association among 
the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 41 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the use of the critical 
activities outlined in the definition of ILP such as the increased use of analytics and a 
focus on prolific offenders to direct strategies are important in decision making that direct 
strategies.  
      Eighty-three (83) percent of the respondents were in agreement that the critical 
factors as outlined in the definitions of ILP would benefit strategic direction and 
subsequent decisions. The previous question asked whether the tenets of ILP would 
benefit decision makers while this question addresses the use of ILP in forming directed 
strategies.   
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 Theme 42 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the critical activities 
presented by ILP should be used at all levels of the Department for aiding in decisions 
and not restricted to the exclusive use by high level decision makers to direct strategic 
objectives. 
       I think our objectives are really stated in a general form that we are given a 
certain task.  We are some--we're given still some leeway, you know, to develop  
strategies because somebody downtown can't tell me, “You have to have to get 
undercover buy in to this guy.”  They can't tell us that because they don't, you 
know, unless they're going to put some shit on it, go out there and try to do it 
because it's not going to work.  
Source: 11234773 
 
I think it should be intended for the use by decision makers as well as operational 
people because it depends on, you know, I mean, decision makers, I think it 
should be expanded a little bit 'cause when you're going a little bit lower than the 
guys who aren't making the big decisions, there's still people that are doing the 
investigations or missions on a little bit of a lower level, but they still need to 
know the intelligence and the information that make their missions or 
investigations successful as opposed to just like I read this to mean by decision 
makers, the people are going to decide where manpower's directed and things like 
that, where once the manpower's directed to a place, they should have more 
access to all that intelligence also.   
Source: 11247602 
 
     The ILP is specifically presented as a management tool to assist high level decision 
makers in forming effective strategic plans. The respondents above believe ILP could 
benefit decision makers at the operational level for tactical use.  
    Codes used for the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Resources;’ 
Kappa (κ) = 0.64, 88% indicating substantial agreement and a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
     The following questions are intended to solicit responses about the organizational 
culture of the Department and how it impacts the Organized Crime Division.  
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 Organizational behavior can determine whether the Department is willing to buy-in to 
innovational changes such as ILP or are content to remain with the status quo. This 
section investigates the respondent’s use of data management technology as well as the 
organizational support of technology intended to promote efficiency. Additionally, 
methods of information exchanges, formal and informal networking, suggestions for 
improving on existing information systems, and the roles of individuals involved in the 
process of developing intelligence are discussed.   
Organizational Intelligence Practices in the OCD; Developed Themes 
 Theme 43 was developed from the respondent’s perception that OCD members have 
or share a lot of useful technology.  
    We have a lot of technology solutions.  We have a lot of technology. You know, 
Excel, Microsoft, you know, law enforcement databases such as Accurint, 
LexisNexis but I don't really have access to it anymore, LEADS 2000 I had access 
to, FinCEN (Financial Information--Financial Information Network) .  So, yeah, 
organized crime as opposed to the Patrol Division or whatever, yeah, we have far 
superior access to it.   
Source: 11028961 
 
 I-CLEAR system, Crystal Reports, Accurint;  I mean, we utilized a number of--
right now, we're in the process of--and a lot of this is, you know, the Crystal 
(Reports) is the tracker activity, which I don't judge a team by their activity, I 
judge a team by their investigations.  I mean the quality of it.  
Source: 11042566 
 
 I've got to speak at this level.  I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation 
Center (DOC) that receives some of our intelligence products.  But currently, 
right now, aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the 
information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare 
reports for transmittal later on.  Some officers use commercially available 
products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings.  However, there is 
no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is 
important when it comes to feeding that information.  Is it a single source or is it 
coming from multiple sources.   
Source: 11058231 
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I think I-CLEAR is used.  We use a lot of state and federal databases.  We use our 
task forces that are in access to databases in their particular agency, whether it's 
DEA or the FBI or if it's IRS.  So they've got databases that we can use.  The only 
caveat I would make is sometimes that their confidential on ongoing cases, we 
cannot produce any intelligence often to cases are actually terminated.  We use  
also our Department's CPIC (Crime Prevention Information Center).  
Source: 11129230 
 
      There are references to a number of technologies in these responses which infers 
there is no universal process in the OCD for managing data through the use of 
technology. Using a variety of applications to manipulate common data can result in 
difficulties when the data must be retrieved by others who may not have the privilege 
required to access the same application.  Some of the software mentioned in the 
respondents is for presentations or reports, not specifically for data management; Crystal 
Reports© is a page assembler which requires accessing data fields from a database for 
reporting purposes. Both LEADS 2000 and I-CLEAR are law enforcement data marts 
which allow end users to retrieve ‘flat file’ data, which is data on a particular individual 
or event without any analysis. There are features in I-CLEAR that allow a user to connect 
a subject of interest with related files recorded under the same record number so if an 
individual is arrested with a second person, that person’s name can be retrieved within 
the same file. Other applications mentioned by these respondents are used to retrieve a 
subject’s financial or phone record information. Intelligence work would begin after this 
type of information had been retrieved. Use of other agency databases or files, including 
those which may be available from CPIC, places the user in a subordinate role which can 
restrict access to the information required because the date, information, or intelligence 
sought belongs to another group.  
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 Theme 44 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there is a need for 
more ‘useable’ technology at our level. 
Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains who DOC, who want--they 
are keeping it somewhere, God knows where.  But when some of the gang 
members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the  
narcotics side.  We send her all sorts of stuff but really it'd been--it's almost a 
problem of too much information.  Yeah, you can have every single GD on the 
computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or New 
Orleans, right.  
Source: 11062184 
 
 I've got to speak at this level.  I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation 
Center that receives some of our intelligence products.  But currently, right now, 
aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the 
information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare 
reports for transmittal later on.  Some officers use commercially available 
products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings.  However, there is 
no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is 
important when it comes to feeding that information.  Is it a single source or is it 
coming from multiple sources.  
Source: 11105094 
 
 Storing and receiving.  Well, email is used for a lot of transmitting but the storage 
and pulling out the information from information that has already been archived is 
the most difficult part because the technology is lacking.  There was good 
intelligence that was put in last year that is no longer in our fingertips.  
Source: 11087163 
 
      The question addresses technology but the first two responses above infer that the 
Deployment Operations Center (DOC) manage the intelligence processes, including the 
technology, to provide intelligence products to the OCD. This can be problematic as the 
first respondent indicates concerns on whether the products provided through the OCD 
address OCD concerns as well as whether the amount of data received from the DOC 
results in ‘information overload.’ In either case, there is an apparent disconnect between 
the types of intelligence products required by the OCD and those delivered by the DOC.  
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The second and third response infer the lack of technology that could make data 
collection, information indexing, and a broad form for dissemination of intelligence more 
efficient. The analytic phases of ILP are provides one method that could assist with these 
concerns.  
 Theme 45 was developed from the respondent’s perception that despite available 
technology, most work in accomplished in the form of paper reporting on status rather 
than on analytical summaries.    
            Right now, it's still a manual review, a manual store and a manual transfer of 
information.  The information comes in and it's reviewed on paper, it's transmitted 
on paper and stored on paper.  So, that's what we are--I think that's what we are 
right now. And this is probably more true while on the follow up question, I know 
we are in the process of looking at a technology-based system, that is one where 
we allow for a good review--to be able to review any information on a 
technological-based system and then also storing that information.   
Source: 11148753 
 
 I have a district gang book that I started as soon as I like, two years ago because 
when I took over as the gang Lieutenant from Area 2, there was nothing really--
the annual gang book when my predecessor, I'm like, “Let me see your gang 
book” and then there was nothing.  And I'm like, “Hey, you have got to be 
kidding me.”  And me, I'm like old school or something like that when I used to 
grab the old graph inside our section to get pictures and put stuff together, but 
I've, you know, you got to have at least something and it has to be modified.  You 
know, I would say quarterly, so that, that I started.  We just finished that now.  All 
my guys have a copy for every district in the area. We basically just have them in 
the Word Perfect.  
Source: 1125784 
     
     The responses above infer that despite available technology, files used for collection 
and review of data related to information is done through manual processes. Codes used 
in the above question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’ Kappa 
(κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association 
among the three terms and the responses to the question. This indicates the respondents  
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understand the benefit of technology in data management but commonly use different, 
unrelated methods or approaches to achieve their results. The strength of an ILP model 
would assist to focus OCD members on the same methods for the collection, retrieval, 
and dissemination of intelligence products. 
 Theme 46 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are specific 
technical applications which are of more benefit for required tasks.  
I think Accurint®.  I think they use--I mean they use because they try to track 
people.  So, they're tracking people and they're tracking their associates.  You 
know, these I-CLEAR tracking targets, tracking associates.  I mean, the key is, 
you know, whatever database that we have that we can track targets and their 
associates and then try to make connections and you might not be able to get 
target A, but in order to get target A, you might have to go down to one of its 
other wings, you get target B because he's going to give you target A.  So, you've 
got to look at the big picture that, you know, builds on the case, working up the 
chain to get the ultimate target that you want.   
Source: 11058231 
 
Technologies, we web mapping we can use that it shows again I talk to you 
earlier--I'm lucky that that is usually run for me and given to me but we can not 
forego the fact that if I had to do in my own I'd come in, I get on a computer I'd 
do the web mapping and see where all the shootings were.  I'd looked at last 
night's DOC analysis report of where all the homicides happened, where all the 
shootings happened and when I see certain area I know what gang is in that area 
because we had already met all the gangs on the computer.  We use all that and 
I'll say, “Wow!  These all happened in the GD area of the 7th District” and what 
factions in the GDs then I can say, Wow!  These were the guys that were fighting 
last week.  They must got back with each other and finished it off.  
Source:  11042566 
 
The tech--I mean, information-wise, I mean, Accurint® is something that we use 
that's now very important.  You know, I use a lot of the phone stuff I-CLEAR 
obviously has probably used that on a daily basis for just about everything, Mug 
shots, you name it, calls for service, you know, suspects searches, arrest photos, 
arrest identifiers, associates, gang associates from arrest, multiple--multiple.  It's 
basically our hub for what we do.  
Source: 11028961 
 
 
 129  
 
We use I-CLEAR Data Warehouse and because we're homicide and violent crime 
driven, almost everything is on the CLEAR system for all reports.  We do just ton 
stuff from all reports, you know.   
Source: 11062184 
 
We use I-CLEAR for most of my quick information but I use the spreadsheets 
Excel, in particular, cause I can show a quick analysis, gangs, violent incidence in 
an easy readable formats that somebody wants it right away immediately.  
Source: 11087163 
 
Word Perfect; Word just boom all are in there--it's the dude's name, nickname, 
last known address and IR number.  But, it's pretty extensive and it's done by, you 
know, gang and by what area which they operate.  Absolutely, to get any kind of 
further information, Accurint, graphs  You may use Accurint every so often, our 
gang detective has access to that and then I have a couple of my sergeants who 
have the LEADS 2000.  They utilize that a little bit too.  
Source: 11257484 
 
    The respondents cite more than one half dozen different software applications used to 
access or manage data source information. Several respondents mention the use of I-
CLEAR (Illinois Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System) which is 
a system that integrated an Illinois State Police design with Chicago Police records in 
1994 (http://www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=165). Because the system has 
been in existence for nearly twenty years, it is understandable that supervisors who were 
exposed to it early in their careers would still want to use it. It is of some interest to this 
researcher that only one respondent mentions the use of spatial GIS (Graphic Information 
Systems) technology as a data management tool as mapping is often a critical factor in 
seeking solutions to crime problems associated with specific areas. Accurint® is third 
party software used to track individuals through public records and requires a licensing 
fee.  Because respondents indicate they use different technologies for various reasons,  
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there is the inference that not all captured information is shared with other interested or 
authorized parties. The ILP model employs analysis personnel who may use any or all of 
the applications mentioned to produce intelligence products that would be available for 
wider consumption in the OCD.    
 Theme 47 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD often relies 
on the technology of other agencies to accomplish our intelligence tasks. 
One of the best things we have, actually, when you go back to intelligence and 
sources, is we have a system that basically, I think the Feds started it but we have 
it now, called, I believe it's called Pinpoint.  
Source: 11247602 
 
Something that, I mean, at that level, Upper level investigators have resources like 
pen registers, tracing, or wire taps.  They're handled here or at the Federal level.  
Source: 11234773 
 
I don't find any one particular thing more beneficial because as I come across 
with, as I find out about I try to utilize it more.  I used I-CLEAR quite a bit.  
LEADS I used some but not as often.  When I come across the spreadsheets or 
database, I like to see what's there to see and got to utilize it, see what's going to 
be beneficial, in the format that it is in.  Because one aspect of my training on 
databases like Access, Excel it's not a formal training it's more self learned.  So, I 
like to see how can I utilize that information: one, to store it; two, to transmit it 
and to review it and transmit it.   
Source: 11148753 
 
The a--do I find any particular form of data or information management 
technology more beneficial?  No.  You need example, I-CLEAR is data mining, 
which can give you information spread over a period of time.  However, it does 
not provide any linking ability that I'm aware of.  LEADS 2000 is strictly a data 
mining process.  The desktop tools that we use spreadsheets or any other 
databases are used for the development of an intelligence product to share, not 
necessarily for analytical needs.   
Source: 11105904 
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 Two respondents mention the use of applications which are supported at the federal 
level for their work. This occurs in long term investigations when OCD works with 
federal partners who have analysts and/or applications not generally available to the  
OCD. This infers these tools or skills are not currently available for the OCD’s exclusive 
use. Later responses admit no formalized technology exists for managing data and they 
are required to explore the use of desktop programs in order to fashion applications for 
their immediate needs.    
   Codes used in this question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’ 
Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 48 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses 
information management technologies mostly for report generation. 
For report generation by far…  
    Source: 11028961 
  
All of my staff use them for report generation, to regurgitate, you know, reports 
that they're calling from up above.  I read every report that comes through and I 
make notes on it and I got a file in my computer and all the information that 
comes in, I try to keep track of it, sure.   
Source: 11058231 
 
Report generation…  The analysis part probably comes from--we would use it 
more for the analyzing when you're actually going into the investigation and you 
need to put a definition on what's happening here, what's happening in there and 
all of that it's just report generation.  
Source: 11062184 
 
Unfortunately, we’re using more for report generation (than) for actual analysis 
because the analysis links aren't there.  They're giving me who, what, when and 
where and not a why.   
Source: 11087163 
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I could pretty much say that they are used only for report generation.  Unless an 
officer is directed to providing the analysis or snapshot or synopsis of 
information, then that is usually generated for report, too.   
Source: 11105904 
 
Right now, more so for report generation as things are develop as we go along 
there will be just as usual for both aspect but right now, it's more so for report 
generation.   
Source: 11148753 
 
Right now, the stuff we have is better for report generation.  Not as good for 
analysis.   
Source: 11247602 
  
   Sixty-four (64) percent of the respondents maintain the existing data management tools 
they use are intended for report generation and not analytics. This suggests the analytic 
phase of an ILP model is not available to them. The need for reporting is an essential part 
of the information exchange process but the products delivered through reporting, 
without the benefit of analytic scrutiny, are often quite generalized. A central function of 
ILP is to use analytics to reduce complex information to a simpler form.    
 Theme 49 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses 
available technologies for both report generation and analysis. 
I use it for analysis more so than anything else.   
Source: 11234773 
 
I used it for analysis but some people use it for report generation     I mean, there's 
report generation going up to the chain of command so they know what's going on 
but we're the ones who put the soldiers on the street, we put the cops on the dots, 
we analyze it and use it that way.  It's used for both.   
Source: 11042566 
 
I think both.  I mean, I think it will work both ways.    
Source: 11257484 
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I think it's more for analysis, quite frankly.  Well, I don't know.  I think there's an 
equal benefit here.  I mean we're putting stuff together but we're also utilizing it 
for analysis, both so--I--we utilize in both… 
Source: 11257484 
 
      Respondents who interpret existing data management as more useful for analysis or 
some hybrid which incorporates analysis and report generation are less emphatic in their 
responses than the group included in the previous theme (47). There is an inference that 
based on generated reports; analysis may be conducted at another level within the 
Department. 
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Info Use,’ ‘Data management,’ and 
‘Concept Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.67, 85% indicating substantial agreement with a strong 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The 
strength in agreement among the responses is indicated by responses in both themes (81 
%) which refer to reporting.   
 Theme 50 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides whether 
new or available technology would benefit the OCD to facilitate their tasks.  
            The Chief; but it's not widely, not every team has it, right.  I think, every team 
needs to have actually the same type of resources.  You know, it's like anything 
that cost money and-- You know it's just like Accurint cost money.  
Source: 11234773 
 
 It varies.  The bottom line is most things fall to the final decision, especially if it's 
going to cost money, to the chief in the Organized Crime Division.  In his 
absence, it will be the Deputy Chief.  But some things like ECSO training and 
things like that, we could just approve when they go through.  But for instance, 
the gang intelligence database that we would like completed, you know, that had 
to go all the way to the Chief and signed off by him 'cause it, you know, it has to 
be funded.  So, he's the funding source.  
Source: 11247602 
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That would come out of our front office, more than likely.  If I wanted somebody 
specifically trained, I would go through the front office to find out who the 
contact person would be.  But more than likely that stuff that, you know, we 
would get maybe a memo or, you know, we have five openings for LEADS 2000, 
submit a name and, you know, we'll put a name in there and see if they can go 
through.  If I wanted somebody for something specific, like for ECSO, Electronic 
Covert Surveillance Officer training, which is the work on wire taps and we are 
working on that type of investigation, those classes only come up twice a year, I 
would try to get my guys into it right away because a lot of our cases are driven 
towards that type of--type of investigations.  
Source: 11028961 
 
      The respondents focus is on training for existing technical applications, e.g. ESCO or 
LEADS 2000 which are task specific and may contribute to any existing data 
management system. These responses do not refer to new or available technology, for 
example, mapping solutions that might facilitate some of the OCD tasks. There is the 
inference that these respondents are familiar with processes requiring requests for 
training on existing technologies but less familiar with requests for new technology 
which might facilitate their work.  
 Theme 51 was developed from the respondent’s perception that in order to get what is 
needed in the way of technology often requires recourse rather than a direct approach or 
process. 
Budget; it’s all about money.  That's why we don't have--that's why we have 
Accurint® which is good for some things but we lost Reference USA® which is 
better for like phones and stuff.  We'd love to have both of them but it's, you 
know, money.    
Source: 11062184 
 
I should decide that.  I should decide what my people need to get their job done 
and I'm saying that in a way it's not to pick on anybody in our Department but 
some people might have a reason that somebody can get out on something or 
might be a financial reason but if you're telling me to get the job done, I should be 
able to tell which one you should use.    And that should my ability and maybe I  
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should have a budget for that, and I could decide which way should I go rather 
than have somebody sticking something down my throat that we can't use; Gang  
sites were restricted. It took a letter through the chain of command to the 
superintendent where a phone call to superintendent himself, to make it happen.   
Source: 11042566 
 
      The above respondents infer there may be a need for new or available technology to 
facilitate their tasks but organizational internal inhibitors make direct requests 
complicated. The first response indicates a key technology was lost because of budget 
restraints. Managers should always expect budget implications may be tied to any request 
for resources. Exploring grant or other funding options should be considered before 
making resource requests of the organization. The second response infers there may be 
times when interdepartmental groups provide technology solutions which are of little or 
no value to the end users in OCD. The reference to ‘restricted gang sites’ involves OCD 
computers being blocked from You Tube and other social networking Internet sites which 
are commonly used by gangs to communicate information. Requests to correct this 
condition were commonly turned down but the Information Services Division of the 
Department until the Superintendent intervened. The ILP model presents an independent 
analytics group which would have more flexibility in the choices and uses of new and 
available technology intended to facilitate the types of tasks required by the OCD.     
 Theme 52 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD must rely 
on approval for technology requirements they require from outside unit. 
 Unfortunately, we can request new or available technology but because of the 
bureaucracy at the department usually just one unit, the Informational Services 
Unit, seems to have a control of the actual acquisition of those--of those analysis 
tools.  
Source:  11087163 
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That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services 
Division that decides what technology can be available to us.  However, I will say 
that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to develop 
an intelligent product.  
Source: 11105904 
 
 Well, some of the technology would be at my level approving it, ECSO training 
usually.  Some of the other one I would have to go to another, from my bureau to 
another bureau like the Bureau of Administrative Services, which by department 
policy oversees all our technology.  Obviously, certain technology that they 
maybe confidential that they will not have control over which can be in-house, 
and what I would basically do is hire their consultants to conduct, you know, who 
would scope out the requirements of our database and then we'll have a consulted 
through Information and Services come over and build that database for us.   
Source: 11129230 
 
 Right now, that decision is probably more so of the Deputy Chief level.  As things 
become available, it he (who) contacts our Commander and lets him know this is 
available that we need this--by certain people, but I think that is--that the decision 
or the search and everything is up to Deputy Chief (or the) Deputy Chief level on 
the DOC.   
Source: 11148753 
 
      Each of the above respondents (36%) infer that requests for new or existing 
technology which may facilitate the tasks of the OCD must be approved by other groups 
outside the OCD. ILP could flatten this organizational dependency by providing tools 
required and shared for analysis as well as for the development of an accepted data 
management system.  
      Overall, approximately 20% of all responses to question 13d infer that budget, rather 
than need, is the overriding consideration as to whether new or available technology 
would be made available to facilitate the tasks of the OCD.   
      Codes used in this question include ‘Training Development,’ ‘Data Management,’ 
and ‘Coupling.’ Coupling refers to the relation of control when two or more groups work  
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together. Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 93% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question.  
 Theme 53 was developed from the respondent’s perception that requests for 
intelligence products are most effectively handled through formal channels. 
I know from the Patrol Division, at least, when they're looking for information or 
they need to request from us, they do that IDSSR, which is the Interdepartmental 
Support Service Request Form that we'll do--that they will send.  They will come 
to us.  We take an action on it and then, you know, we send it back or whatever 
our action is.   
Source: 11028961 
 
Well, the formal stuff, the CPIC stuff that comes over, the BlackBerry which is 
what they give you every single shooting in real time. Interviewer: CPIC that 
stands for... Respondent: I don't really know.  
Source: 11062184 
 
    Respondents provide examples of their interpretation of formal methods for handling 
requests regarding intelligence products. Both examples are specific either in response to 
requests of the OCD from the Patrol Division or incident driven in response to an event 
provided through the Crime Prevention Information Center (CPIC).   
 Theme 54 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for 
requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled through informal channels. 
We can give out 75 percent and sometimes it can help everybody working on it or 
some people would think you can give out nothing just because you're not 
supposed to.  
Source: 11042566 
 
It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss the 
current conflicts from each particular area.  It's a short meeting and it's not--you 
got either [00:28:08 Incomprehensible] or you did oversee it but then it's in put 
where I bring, you know, I try to tell my people to bring something to the table to 
share in a particular conflicts that are going on with the most particular areas and 
then bring targets that won't compromise any of our investigations and share that  
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information so we can get out.  And the Mobile Strike Force, they put together for 
their roll calls, they put together, you know, from this and from other information, 
you know, for their troops, they put together a quick PowerPoint that will show 
them the list of main targets and what's going on.  Those are--I think we get the 
best information and leaders got area meetings, there are maybe 21 meetings, you 
know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think that's one least productive 
meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think it's a waste.  
Source: 11058231 
 
Often informal;  sometimes just as informal as a phone call where my unit can, in 
myself or a supervisor sergeant, can access it or possibly just give them the 
information that they have right at their fingertips.  Informal request or formal 
requests are often slow and not, the dissemination through a formal chain of 
information is not...usually as not as efficient.  Often our informal network is 
probably the most used.  
Source:  11087163 
 
Most of the processes are informal and they are developed through the 
relationship of officers working because of the sensitivity of the information.  
However, in the leadership level, or a level where one is responsible or held 
responsible for the combating gang crime, there is no computerized network that I 
can go to and pull up additional intelligence from either gang investigations, 
narcotics, or even sometimes the 9th District Tactical Officers, unless I call over 
there and verbally ask them, "What do you have on this?" And even that, you get 
a verbal report you don't get any written reports.  
Source: 11105904 
 
For me, as far as gathering information, I find I like the informal.  We have 
((coughs)) excuse me, the monthly gang strategy meeting. Which is, you know, I 
try to get people advanced notes on it.  Sometimes, the better officers, sergeants, 
or lieutenants are able to attend but, you know, we have our own lives and stuff 
so, you know, I try to make like avail myself to or my gang detective or some of 
our sergeants to their schedules you know, so let's plan on your schedule, I'll get a 
cup of coffee and I'm here if you're nearing stuff up, so I can pick their brains if 
you will.  Now as far as getting information out there, I can do that on like you 
know, Thursday night, Friday morning I'm sending up my weekly gang report.  
Quarterly, I'm sending out to my newly revised, you know, gang books per each 
areas.  I send them electronically, you know, and if I found out that's not I don't 
throw out stuff there to people.   
Source: 11257484 
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     Although much of what is developed through a data management system related to 
intelligence may be considered restricted, informal exchanges seem to be an effective 
method to exchange information and the most current data in a timely fashion, according 
to the respondents.  Informal networks of communication are generally built on trust and 
experience among those who share and this notion is reinforced throughout these 
responses. It is unlikely that use of the ILP model would displace the importance of 
informal networking but it could provide a common and reliable method to strengthen 
informal exchanges as the same information would be available to authorized personnel 
through a standardized system.     
 Theme 55 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for 
requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled using both formal and 
informal processes. 
Mostly, the formal function of it would just come through the chain of command.  
That does happen periodically.  We'll get a request from, be it the Superintendent 
or Deputy Superintendent or other divisions or units in a Police Department 
asking for intelligence on a certain issue, about what we have on it, what's causing 
rash of shootings, and there's some informal requests also.  A Commander from a 
district might call the Commander of gang investigations or might call the 
Commander of gang enforcement and ask him for what they know about a certain 
incident or what's going on in a certain area.  So it's both.  
Source: 11247602 
 
They're both, they both have their own, you know.  Informal is obviously based 
on personal relationships where a specific District Commander who maybe a 
friend of mine or have friends here to hand me some help here.  We just try--we 
can definitely kind of--obviously you can go through official department 
channels.  It knows problems will be addressed.  However, sometimes, you could 
do it in a more timely fashion.    
Source: 11234773 
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Formal, you have both processes.  Formal is that--every report that's generated 
is passed up to chain requesting this information or whatever from whatever unit.  
The informal process act having some time on the job, you need to know different  
people and you know people in certain units.  You can call and said, “Hey, I need 
this and can you send it to me?  And that can work just as well.    
Source: 11148753 
 
      The respondents infer both informal and formal networks are used to manage requests 
for intelligence products but place the emphasis in their answers on informal exchanges.     
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Information 
Exchange,’ and ‘Data Management.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.66, 84% indicating substantial 
agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to 
the question.  
 Theme 56 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether formal or 
informal networking is most effective in getting access to information or intelligence 
products which may be necessary to accomplish their tasks.  
I'd say informal.  Yeah.  I guess it would depend more or less in what you're 
looking for.  I mean, what you're trying to get.  Formal, I mean, yeah, it gets done 
but, you know, it's easier informally, I think.   
Source: 11028961 
 
Informal networks are more useful to me. Formal are nice.  Formal I need it if you 
don't formal--you got to remember not everybody (who) scores twenty points gets 
ten rebounds per game. You know what I mean?  Informal stuff we can pass on to 
each other, you know what I mean.  The formal stuff there is some people I get 
three points a game from and I don't get a rebound.  They need to know everyday 
the formal process.  And if I'm away for a few days or something, thank God 
there is formal process because I'm picking up the report of what happened the 
last three days.  So you mostly certainly need a formal process and the better you 
make that, the stronger everybody is but the informal is the one that's going to 
take the guy from getting a B to an A.  
Source: 11042566 
 
To be honest, informal…  
Source: 11058231 
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Informal without a doubt…  
Source: 11062184 
 
Unfortunately, I have to say informal…  
Source: 11087163 
 
Yeah, I mean like I can make a phone call you know, and perhaps that's 
something happen for me. I like informal.   
Source: 11257484 
 
    Fifty-five (55) percent of the respondents state informal channels for communicating 
information are most useful. In the previous question, several respondents eluded their 
preference for informal methods of exchange on intelligence products because informal 
channels were based on experience and trust in those with whom the exchanges occurred. 
There is the inference no standardized, accepted method for the exchange of intelligence 
products exists and a reliance on trusted associations through an informal network is 
reasonable to expect.   
 Theme 57 was developed from the respondent’s perception that incident timing 
determines which type of channel, formal or informal, is pursued. 
I think informal networks are most useful when you need real-time information 
immediately.  I believe formal networks are more beneficial as if when you are 
developing long-term goals or strategies to combat, like gang crime.  
Source: 11105904 
 
Well, it depends.  You know, if I have a lot of time, I go formally and most cases 
that I get involved and if somebody wants something from me, I've got to do it 
informally.  
Source: 11129230 
 
I will have to say informal because you can get something right away without 
having go through all the red tape.  When you have to go through that formality it 
could be a week to a couple of month.  
Source: 11148753 
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Well, probably both.  I mean the formal function of it gets out to more people.  
I mean if you use the formal, if you consider that we send our intelligence and 
information to the DOC, which is a formal process, and then the DOC then sends 
it out to the whole Department, then it's very useful.  But the informal has its 
place also.  I mean for faster, quicker results a lot of times.  
Source: 11247602 
 
      These responses stress the need for timeliness to requests for information or 
intelligence products. In the dynamic police environment, timing in response to a request 
for information or intelligence can be critical.   
      Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Networking,’ and 
‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.52, 94% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Overall, responses to 
this question fell into two themes and were nearly evenly split between. Questions in the 
preceding section asked whether the respondent felt informal or formal channels of 
communication were useful to them and the responses included either ‘informal’ or some 
hybrid of formal and informal. None of the respondents replied formal channels were 
important to their information exchanges. This infers the respondents have no universally 
structured process for uniform formal information exchanges which the ILP model could 
provide as an information management process.  
 Themes 58 through 60 were developed from the respondent’s perception that 
organizational dependencies determine which tasks will be accomplished first.  
Yeah, yeah, I think it does. Yeah, it would--what we do, obviously, is a little 
different in OCD or at least in gangs is--is that, you know, we can direct our and 
pick and choose our own investigations.  However, directives come down all the 
time that, you know, we need to adhere to this.  We need to do this.  We need to 
do this and you're basically ordered to do that.   
Source: 11028961 
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I've got the flexibility but we're focus on getting violent targets that are 
causing the crime and trying to prevent them for doing further crimes by 
incarcerating them.  And also, by getting information from the information we're 
deriving, you know, if we stray from that, you know, if I see a team or 
somebody's going out making ten bag dope arrest in the corners, you know, is it 
for or are we doing it to get court time, for overtime or are we're doing it because 
we're trying to listen that information because it is happening in that particular.  I 
think we've all got to realize our roles that, you know, the superintendent has 
tasked us with each, you know, job.  
Source:  11058231 
 
As far as tactical decisions, I probably exercise almost all flexibility as in the 
deployment of forces to stop crime.  There are some organizational dependencies 
within the department and when I say that, if I'm speaking of, we do coordinate 
with the Mobile Strike Force and Tactical Response Unit and what areas we will 
be in.  However, we have different missions once we are in that area.  You know, 
mobile strike force does aerial and we continue to focus on the members of these 
street gangs.  I would say it's probably 50 percent reactive and then 50 percent 
proactive.  We deploy our forces almost daily and intelligence product, you know, 
there is a gang, you know these guys were fighting the night we've put our cars in 
that area as a proactive measure or if there is a string of shootings, we then go in 
there as a reactive measure to stop any retaliatory shootings.  
Source: 11105904 
 
Well, I think that's a strategic planning of the Department focusing on gangs and 
drugs.  It really lays out our strategic plan, okay?  And so the tactical decision 
making is pushed down to Control Division level of the commanders and the Area 
Deputy Chief [00:36:56 incomprehensible] and then we connect to what they 
need.  If they have a problem on a certain corner that's related to violence and 
drugs, then we will then work with them to develop our plans, our tactical 
operation with DOC.  So we are in constant collaboration with the Patrol Division 
in supporting what they need because they're ultimately facing these problems 
without the resource they really need to have to build cases towards these gang 
members.   
Source: 11129230 
 
Yeah, there is some--we're getting a lot of stuff, I mean in Area 2, you know.  
And I don't know if it's just me, great.  But we're responsible for the watch to 
school dismissals everyday of the week     Interviewer: School dismissals?    
Respondent: Two of them.    Interviewer: Okay.    Respondent: I have to tie up 
two teams Monday through Friday to watch that.  They have to be part of an Area 
2 initiative in the direction of [0:36:46 west Jackson] to make sure officers are 
working in certain areas with [00:36:50 Incomprehensible] primarily, the north 
end of the 4th District, 3rd District and the 6th District to generate activity there.   
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I have to be part of the surgical strike force mission on Friday nights and 
Saturday afternoons and Saturday nights where a designated team work in a 
District from a certain time frame to be part of a patrol unit force that generates 
activity in those certain areas.  I have to designate guys to work in the burglary 
mission recently.  Four of my guys to work at burglary mission in the 4th District.  
So I mean, I'm getting a lot of patrol that is dictating our course of action.   
Source: 11257484 
 
    The above respondents clearly have tactical responsibilities for the tasks to which 
they are assigned but these tasks are often provided to them by an outside authority and 
‘incident driven’ without regard to any larger perspective. ILP focuses on prolific 
offenders but can be tailored to focus on ‘incident causes’ with an intention to expand the 
situational awareness of a particular problem in order to prevent, rather than merely react, 
to conditions.      
 Theme 59 was developed from the respondent’s perception that OCD’s only 
dependencies are focused on their mission to curb street level violent crime and murders. 
Okay.  Well here.  Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer.  Real answer is, 
what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries?  Stolen cars? 
Narcotics?  Violent crime! Homicides and shooting, and if you want to be more 
succinct, homicides, so I know that.  I've been told that, I know what I need to do 
with my people.  If I get homicides down, that is going to be the answer.  So, what 
is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do everything we can to do 
that.  That's what we'll do.  If they change it, then we'll change how we do it.  But 
give me what you want done, what do you want done?  You want homicides 
down.  Good.  Thank you.  We're going to step back and we'll make that happen.  
Source: 11042566 
 
At the tactical level, we have almost, not that autonomy, but to an extent, we 
determine on how we do our job.  They tell us, very often time, where to go or 
who to target.  But how we do that, unless someone wanted to put their name on 
affidavit and search warrant, you know, that's not going to happen.  I mean, 
having had the [00:29:05 incomprehensible] come and say, "Yeah, I'll serve the 
warrant." You know, if he let us to say, you know--they'll based on the--they're--
they want all the time is they don't want to tell me how to build the car.  As far as, 
yeah, because it's undercover work and people, especially outside the Organized  
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Crime Division, they're not quite sure how that works and what the legalities 
and the process, the tactical decisions had to be made, they pretty much leave that 
up to us.   
Source: 11234773 
 
      These respondents infer that despite the rhetoric or authority driving their 
assignments, they have a solid grasp on what can or should be done, they represent the 
content experts upon whom others rely to get the job done, and their core competencies 
and skill sets afford them the best opportunity to complete what is required. The notion of 
ILP, in addition to other available resources, would complement this type of responses 
provided above by including an analysis of the reasons why certain activities take place 
so strategies to prevent those activities might be implemented as a preventative measure.  
 Theme 60 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD has general 
autonomy in deciding their own tasks. 
 No.  I think we're different since because we're self-generating--you come up 
with your own work product and as long as you're producing, that's what your 
bosses want to see.  I mean I call the shots on my team but it's because I have 
good bosses, too, and they're happy with the work we do     
Source: 11062184 
 
Who calls all the shots, that's actually the Commander but he is trusting enough 
that--if I make a decision and say, “We're going to go this way,” it's going to be a 
major issue because he knows the fact that I made the decision, but most of the it I 
keep him informed, let him know this is what we got, this is what I'm having them 
do and it will go from there.   
Source: 11148753 
 
Well, its, at my position now, I have a pretty lot of flexibility 'cause I would be a 
little bit higher up on, you know, the higher up you go, you sure can make more 
decisions, and the lower you go sometimes you've got to get your decisions 
approved.  I mean operationally, I would say, you know, the Chief sometimes has 
some say, directs us for certain things.   
Source: 11247602 
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Our deputy superintendent does call the shots but in organized crime, because 
of the long term investigations and often the quick--the quick violence acts that 
we might have to act on based on intelligence or information confidential 
informants our midlevel--midlevel supervisors can make the call.  Often, the 
lieutenant will make the call and it will be reported to later.    We're probably the 
most flexible in the department probably--probably nowhere in the Department is 
any body is flexible as an organized crime.  
Source: 11087163 
 
      Each of the above answers demonstrate the respondent’s conviction that their 
decisions and actions are in line with what their supervisors expect and they, in turn, rely 
heavily on the support of their subordinates on who they place a high degree of trust. 
Despite the described autonomy of these supervisors in handling the tactical aspects of 
their assignment, there is the inference their overall missions are directed to them by a 
higher authority. The higher authority decision makers would benefit from the ILP model 
which focuses on prolific offenders whose contribution to street level crime often 
provides the force driving behind a number of tasks in which members of the OCD are 
involved. ILP assists greatly in providing answers to ‘why’ certain criminal activities 
occur.         
     Codes used in the above question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Human Processes,’ 
and ‘Decisions.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.72, 90% indicating substantial agreement with a strong 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question 
 Theme 61 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who is responsible 
for ensuring intelligence work is being accomplished.  
            Good question; probably my administrative sergeants, for here in the office, my 
administrative sergeant.  Out in the areas would be the lieutenants would be 
ultimately responsible to make sure it's put on that way and then their sergeants  
would make sure what the lieutenants wanted done which is what I like done get  
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done.  Just say the chain of command.  
Source: 11042566 
 
The lieutenants and sergeants are mainly the frontline supervisors.  I mean, 
they're--you don't have to oversee, look over the shoulder because they know 
what's expected and they do a great job and have the knowledge of what was 
going on a particular area and they're focused on what they have to do.  
Source: 11058231 
  
 I would have to (say), for me in our level; I would go to the Commander of each 
of the sections.  
Source: 11129230 
 
 The supervisors and probably most of the commanders of each unit; you know, 
and that heads down to their lieutenants, usually the lieutenants and their 
commanders.   
Source: 11247602 
 
    The above responses infer no consistent chain or procedure for maintaining an 
intelligence process throughout the OCD. Members of different ranks who participated in 
this study often rely on subordinates to monitor intelligence processes as they relate to 
specific cases. This also indicates no formal method for developing or monitoring 
intelligence tasks is recognized by those interviewed.  
 Theme 62 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are internal 
checks and balances in place to ensure that intelligence tasks are being done. 
I think everybody got to be responsible.  If you're not responsible for doing your 
work especially in a unit like this then you shouldn't be here.  
Source: 11062184 
 
Because the--when I go to access a particular area or a gang that a particular unit--
or a particular team might be responsible for the most recent intelligence and if  
that intelligence isn't lacking or there are no reports filed, then I would know that 
the supervisor in that particular area is lacking and make sure…   
Source: 11087163 
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Unfortunately, the person responsible would be the first line supervisor and 
then it would go all the way up to the lieutenant and ultimately to the commander 
and up through to the Department.  However, since the Department has not 
formalized any program or standardized any reports on intelligence or make many 
strict definitions on what they will accept or what they won't accept, or even 
decide the difference between information, it normally falls on the individual 
officer who's out there doing the interviews.  He takes it as far as he wants or he 
ends it immediately.  
Source: 11105904 
 
I think we all are, from each Officer in a unit, making sure that something is being 
done, all up to the commander.  I think everybody is part of the unit, is part of 
that.  
Source:  11148753 
 
I guess, me from here, you know.  I kind of like try to pull it off together the best I 
can, you know.  And like I said, I couldn't do without some of my sergeants--
something they're the ones that do the yeoman's work, at least get the guys out 
there and engaged, keeping them focused. You know, and the, they've been very 
helpful.   
Source: 11257484 
 
Yeah, one guy handles here that helps out with the entire division, but primarily 
for of gangs and narcotics. And they also have an analyst to , you know.     And 
(one guy) is, actually he's working with the violence side of it and the gang--the 
gang hierarchies.  However, often times they hold information because their 
source around here is always narcotics, even the ones that are, the murders out 
there, the high level gang leaders that they also dope.  
Source: 11234773 
 
      The above responses infer a system based on self reporting in that one or more 
individuals, including some of the supervisors interviewed, provides information related 
to intelligence which may be pooled for consensus before it is vetted and considered 
useful.  This type of process may be used as needed but would be centered on specific 
cases and teams and the products developed would be restricted for their exclusive use. 
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 Codes used in this question include ‘Task,’ ‘Oversight,’ and ‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) = 
0.64, 97% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the 
three terms and the responses to the question. 
 Theme 63 was developed from the respondent’s input as to whether they had 
suggestions to improve on current intelligence practices within the OCD.  
One of the things that always seems to happen, at least for us, is there's always the 
last-minute report that needs to be done, that needs to be done yesterday.  I don't 
know if there's any type of scheduling that they can put together by dates where 
you'd be able to meet those reports, but it just seems to me that a lot of the reports 
that you have to complete are always a reaction to something that either happened 
out on the street or a question that was post to maybe the higher-ranking officer 
that couldn't be answered because he didn't have all the information.  Now it 
levels, it comes down to your level and you have to put all that together.   
Source: 11028961 
 
Well, I think perhaps maybe some sort of database, you know, cataloguing a lot of 
stuff, you know, where we can--where things could be permanently stored, you 
know, by district, whether be our--like maybe done on a daily basis, whatever 
GES report was done in that district for that day could be stored there and then 
maybe somehow cross-referenced to like location within that district.  I think that 
would be helpful.   
Source: 11257484 
 
The biggest issue and the biggest item I think that would be a boon to this 
organization in this division as well as probably other departments to get the gang 
intelligence database up and running and functional.   
Source: 11247602 
 
    Each of the above respondents interprets a need for a central repository which may be 
kept current and accurate and from which information is readily available. These 
responses infer that such a system does not currently exist.                                         
 Theme 64 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more analysis should 
be integrated with regular tasks on a more regular basis to be better informed. 
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Yeah and to do it better…Yeah, and scout ourselves and do better because the 
more you throw out the guys, “Okay, let's do this mission.  Let's do this mission 
because it's going to prevent this crime. Well, let's analyze as a team, as the  
managers, what's working and let's do it better as, you know, what could we do to 
do it better.   
Source: 11058231 
 
 Theme 66 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more training and the 
use of more or better technology should be encouraged for use in OCD work. 
We can always use additional resources, technological and otherwise.  We're 
always running around for, you know, we can't even get any YouTube or 
MySpace when you're talking about murder.  Yeah, we could always use--what's 
the Coplink® you're talking about, we don't have that. Right, and we use 
Reference USA®, yeah.  We can use that again and a more accessible LEADS 
2000 would be nice and we have two guys that are qualified because it's such a 
pain the ass.  
Source:  11062184 
 
That's definitely additional training, resources, and technology all three would be 
a benefit.  The technology is lacking with the retrieving the information and that's 
probably biggest glitch and our resource--our current resources are sometimes our 
informational services has provided us with are outdated and not easy to use on a 
level for the police officers.  We're definitely lacking the analytical end.  
Source: 11087163 
 
There's a lot of suggestions and recommendations.  One of this refers to training 
of individual officers.  They'll do what you ask them to do but however, they need 
to be trained on historical debriefings with gang members as opposed to just 
what's happening now and then and documenting that.  The paradox to that 
though is that once it's documented, it usually goes into a file and showed among 
those team members unless it's something that warrants bringing facts to the 
Deployment Operations Center.  The practices, there needs to be a database where 
the information is standardized to go into, and when I say standardized, specific 
fields that need to be addressed because garbage in is garbage out.   
Source: 11105904 
 
Yeah, I, you know, when I look at, I think there's got to be more strategic 
planning for intelligence, in general, for the whole division.  I mean more of the 
plans, strategic plans and it starts with where do we, what are we, what's our goals 
as a Division and how does each section play a part and what are the 
commonalities in terms of developing technology.  So, I think developing a  
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formal organizational function of intelligence team or unit that are build behind 
having the technology and the training as analyst, I think that's really critical that 
the Organized Crime Division can share all these information through all the three 
sections internally.  And if necessary, share it externally when needed, you know?  
But I think it's got to be done strategically and it's got to be done with some 
planning because in order for that to happen, we have to, you know, remember 
that we need to develop, you know, policy, look at it legally and look at some of 
the legal issues and some of the technology that has to be developed and has to be 
funded to be developed, too.  
Source: 11129230 
 
Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's 
possible to send somebody to.  I think it should always be there.  And it's going to 
move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as we go along 
also.  I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have our own computer 
support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to depend on Information 
Services because they are slow in responding to certain things, but I think we are 
also--misfortune that we are still limited in our technology capabilities by the 
location on which we are.  The capabilities of the equipment that they placed here, 
there is still a limitation on some of what the equipment can do. And part of that 
comes with my--there are aspects that the financial need can be meet but the 
overall financial need is one that have to come from a bigger source.   
Source: 11148753 
 
Training resources and (making) technology available in the field rather than 
(just) in the office; that to me is--is key.  
Source:  11234773 
 
      The above respondents emphasize the need for training on existing or new 
technologies which could help them with their tasks. Many of the respondents also 
emphasize the need for structured means of information collection, maintenance, and 
access which would make their duties more efficient. There is an inference in some of the 
responses that OCD would rather be less dependent on outside units which provide or 
direct their information and intelligence processes.   
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 Codes used in this question include ‘Improvement,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Tasks.’ 
Kappa (κ) = 1.00, 100% indicating perfect agreement with an extremely high degree of  
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The exceptionally 
high degree of agreement and association may be related to the fact that each of the 
respondents has ideas on how tasks can be managed more efficiently and each is more 
than willing to discuss their ideas. This researcher sees valid and important information in 
the respondent’s suggestions to question 13i and will infer this may the first time these 
respondent’s have been asked for this type of input.     
 Theme 67 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether they knew 
of any Department plans to improve the management of intelligence processes within the 
OCD.  
No, I'm not aware of anything.   
Source: 11028961 
I'm not.   
Source: 11062184 
No…    
Source: 11105904 
 
    The responses to the above question were brief and self explanatory.  
 
 Theme 68 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether requests to 
improve the management of intelligence processes have met with any success.  
Well, (the Commander) wants our computer people to put together a program that 
would put all of organize crime on the same page and what we've done, what we 
are getting done and to keep track of what we've done and what we're going to get 
done. They want it all and all of organized crime; every unit that is in organized 
crime (should be able) to be able to do it.   
Source: 11042566 
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We are constantly requesting new and improved tools as just as where Accurint® 
is one of our basic tools that we need to improve tools because they're lacking.  
Sometimes the information is old, faulty.    
Source: 11087163 
 
I know one thing we've worked on recently in the Department, as a whole, we're 
working on is trying to get a, is getting the Clear system available to the  
Blackberries.  There are a lot of supervisors and people on the street have in both 
the Organized Crime Divisions as well as the Patrol Divisions so you could 
actually maximize the ability to run names and get information on the street.  We 
have a lot of trouble with PDTs (Personal Data Terminals) over the years.  
 Source: 11247602 
 
      Personal Data Terminals (PDTs) are in-car computers which, more accurately, serve 
as modems and should eventually be replaced with actual in car wireless computers. The 
value of data received via any mobile device is useful for preliminary field inquiries and 
may serve as information that can contribute to intelligence based system. Two of the 
respondents infer existing or promised tools which contribute to data management and 
criminal intelligence are lacking or promised as forthcoming. There is the inference that a 
standardized model for data collection, analysis, retention, and access is lacking and 
despite requests for assistance in such matters from other units within the Department, 
positive responses are either slow or non existent.  
 Theme 69 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they often try and 
develop the products we need for intelligence work by ourselves; sometimes based on 
what we hear is available or know is used by others. 
There's a computer technology that's out there, as a matter of fact, we have 
officers that are working to build it and get it set up that it be able to utilize by the 
whole unit. Filemaker®, it's storing... It's for storage, for review and for 
transmitting.  Office information will be able to be placed on it and within this 
system that there will be able to view a little more easily than what it is now.  
Source: 11148753 
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I mean--I rather base our request for, you know, updated technology, training, 
they're building an investigator to be able to handle the entire investigation 
himself rather than having one too much outside resources.  So, I mean, training's 
first, specifically, the technology, definitely.  I mean, the Deputy is a very strong 
advocate for us as far as getting training equipments the best we can.  We 
probably have the best within the department we had probably, the best since we 
pay for ourselves.    
Source: 11234773 
 
Well, we were developing some databases for gang intelligence and collecting 
information from gang members.  We felt that that model can then apply to  
narcotics as well as the vice control section and can be, you know, general 
intelligence report and not only gangs, but narcotics and also organized crime 
activities such as gambling, prostitution, and stuff like that.  So, we were in the 
process of developing that.  
Source: 11129230 
 
      Two of these respondents infer the development or current or existing technologies 
may assist them in their tasks. Filemaker® is an inexpensive simplified database product, 
developed by Apple™ which manages fundamental data management without requiring 
the user to be familiar with any programming languages. It is likely the Department 
would benefit from a database system that is more robust although such systems might 
require specific training. Properly trained analysts employed with ILP know the best tools 
to use and how to best deploy them so they benefit the organization and not just a few 
users.     
      Codes used in this question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Improvement,’ and ‘ILP.’ 
Kappa (κ) = 0.95, 99% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The question posed 
by13j involved knowledge of any proposed plans to benefit the management of 
intelligence products within the OCD. While several ‘experiments’ are mentioned, no  
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single standardized method has been embraced by the OCD; alternative solutions will 
continue to be investigated.    
 Theme 70 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether the critical 
factors of ILP could contribute to the effectiveness of the OCD beyond the degree of 
effectiveness currently achieved from existing practices. 
We already employ intelligence work in what we do but if ILP provides a  
better method, it is probably something we could consider. Like I said earlier, and 
we are doing an intelligence-led policing but I have learn one thing on this job 
you can always do it better if there's a better outline or better way to do it.  I most 
certainly know that everyday you can do things better.  I believe that we will 
continually get better doing intelligence-led policing whether be in the analysis 
way or ways of gathering information.   
Source: 11042566 
 
Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, 
meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were 
looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section?  
Yeah, I definitely think it would be.  Sometimes, you know, that type of direction 
is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with 
an address or a location or whatever.  If you had somebody that have those--that 
information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you 
can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more 
effective.   
Source: 11028961 
 
Yeah, there's always a room for improvement.   
Source: 11058231 
 
Yeah, I guess it would help but I think it would help more just to explain and 
define what it is the coppers that are going to work for me.  Just that they're doing 
it all right.  These guys are already doing it.  They're already intelligence-based 
police work which I kind of said before.  That's just good police work.  Sure, it 
would be fine to say, “All right, well, take this column and this column and see 
how they match.”  But like I said, you got to use common sense and he gotta take 
that gut instinct.  You can't completely take away when the hair stand in the back 
of your neck when you pull over a car.  There's something there.  Maybe you 
don't even know what it is yet but--and probably it's intelligence based, you just 
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don't know what it is.  Its certain gut feeling you can't get rid off.  You just can't 
be analytical.  
Source:  11062184 
 
The intelligence-based policing would definitely, we use it to a great deal, but by 
bringing into the department it would-further what we do because our information 
from the entire Department, intelligence would be more effective if we had a 
system in place.   
Source: 11087163 
 
Absolutely; I think that, through the interview here today, we say that we're 
utilizing some of that already and I think that, you know, I think better  
cataloguing of some of these information and then, like you would tell earlier the 
querying would be easy, the ability to query on things would be helpful, but there, 
too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the district law enforcement level, too. 
And let's give them a part of this whole thing 'cause they're the, you know, boots 
on the ground type of guys.  
Source: 11257484 
 
Well, because, I mean, narcotics section is always been an investigative unit and 
the core, the core of our success is based on informants, which is to--and that to 
me is intelligence-led.  We are led by our informants in my investigations and by 
[00:32:32 undercover] operations where we infiltrate specific groups.  You know, 
and that starts at the street level.  It starts with the, you know, every single officer 
here has the ability to just to go on an undercover vehicle to go out there for five 
months and initiate the investigation.  Since narcotics is unique since that we--that 
we create our own investigations.  We’re not like handed investigation; we create 
our own and that to me is the core of intelligence-led policing.   
Source: 11234773 
 
      In summary, these responses continue to emphasize the notion that the Department as 
a whole and OCD in particular, employ Intelligence-led Policing. This is based on the 
fact that much of what is accomplished by the OCD involves information management 
that is focused on tactical resolutions involving specific cases; the process is sometime 
referred to as doing good police work. Several respondents note that anything that could 
improve on their ability to use analysis and manage information in a better fashion would  
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be helpful. There is an inference the majority o these respondents see ILP as a model 
intended to replace existing information practices in the OCD rather than as a tool 
intended to enhance current practices.    
 Theme 71 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the tenets of 
Intelligence-led Policing could contribute to the OCD’s efficiency beyond what is 
currently accomplished using existing practices. 
Yeah.  I think that it would be, number one, you know, it increase the tactical 
levels of our department in the execution of a strategic plan if they have that 
information.  It's leveraging your resources a lot more efficiently if you have, if  
you say, “Okay, you know, we got four people working where are you going to 
put them at?”  We put them in the area where more likely all the crime is 
happening and you give them the intelligence of what type of vehicles are  
involved or people involved.  You know, so you're leveraging all that for tactical 
use.  And then on the strategic level, I think, you know, it helps with strategic 
planning.   
Source: 11129230 
 
Yes.  I believe the concept of intelligence-led policing would greatly enhance the 
efforts of the Organized Crime Division and make it more effective based upon, 
you know the cliché, "Knowledge is power."  
Source:  11105904 
 
Anything that will improve--that wants to help along is going to put the role 
effectively.  There's nothing I can say.  One thing, in particular, I can say that 
would do it but I think as we go along as it was develop and this is one with 
strategy.  It would improve overall effectiveness as we go along as everybody 
tends to use to it.  If this is the basic strategy although, like I said, we essentially 
already do it but now we are going to formalize it, there might be some little, I 
don't call it missteps but it will be a process that we have to go though in order to 
make sure we fall within that formalized strategy.  
Source: 11148753 
 
Yeah.  I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for 
the most part of like anything.  We could always get better at it.  Yeah, it's the 
concept is a solid concept in my opinion.  Anytime that you (can be) forearmed, 
so to speak.  Anytime you have as much knowledge as you can about a particular 
decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better decision.   
Source: 11247602 
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      The above respondents infer the use ILP could improve the management of 
information and intelligence processes for the OCD. Whereas the previous respondents to 
this question emphasized intelligence in policing is already a practice, the above 
respondents have a clearer understanding that ILP model represents a process intended to 
enhance and otherwise build on what has already been developed.  
      Codes used in the previous question include ‘Value,’ ‘Preference,’ and ‘Concept 
Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.71, 91% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of 
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Respondents to this 
question see the value in the ILP concept through having a more manageable information 
and intelligence system although many confuse their overall perception of what 
constitutes intelligence with the distinctions provided in the ILP model.      
 Theme 72 was developed from the respondent’s perception that if ILP were 
introduced to the OCD and did not take from available resources, whether the critical 
factors of the model would be beneficial to the unit.   
Yeah, I'd like to have an analysis, like I said it's just every team.  Just to do the, 
not just the PowerPoint but more like, yeah, all the intelligence stuff like--I mean 
every time we need the backgrounds on these guys and stuff like that, I would 
want to have that, just to keep the rest of the guys on the street because if I can 
spend--the least time I can spend behind a computer, the better.  And my 
detectives, I'd rather have them on the streets working than filling out an IBDR 
but I understand that we have to that but it would be nice.    
Source: 11062184 
 
You want to participate on anything that's going to improve effectiveness.  
Sometimes even though it would be a drain you have to look at what's is going to 
be the advantages for the future and if this is going to be an advantage for us as  
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we go along into the future, most definitely we want to participate.  
Source: 11148753 
 
That would be great.  I mean, I would love to have a couple of analysts.  One girl 
I had was really good.  She hurt herself but she'll be coming back next year.  But, 
yeah that would be outstanding.  I mean, I'd participate as long as it's, like you 
said, it doesn't--it's not going to drain on available resources or my time or 
anything like that.   
Source: 11257484 
 
I'm not really sure what the question means exactly, but I would be happy to lend 
my participation in an initiative and try it and see if we can make it work and  
make the Department work better divisionally.   
Source: 11247602 
 
      Responses to this question were universally supportive of accepting and using the ILP 
model provided it did not tax their existing resources. Most responses were simply  
‘Absolutely’ or ‘Yes’ and the above responses are slightly more elaborate. Supervisors 
like the idea of having trained analysts available to do work which would otherwise place 
a drain on existing personnel. Most respondents perceive the application of the ILP model 
as something that would complement or add to their unit’s effectiveness.   
      Codes used in the previous question include ‘Preference,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Data 
Management.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 96% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong 
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. 
Respondents were strongly in agreement that given the opportunity to participate in the 
use of the ILP model, they would take advantage of the opportunity. 
 Each of the themes identified in this section could provide the basis for additional 
research on police practices. It is clear that many of the responses which contributed to 
these themes reflected on a variety of interpretations as to how intelligence processes are  
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managed within the OCD. This variety indicates there is little consensus with regard to 
methods used to manage intelligence while on the other hand there is sufficient consensus 
to indicate alternatives to assist the current intelligence practices.    
    The following chapter will address research findings and conclusion. Initially, the 
three research questions will be answered within the context of the case study. Other 
topics will include the refutability and generalizability of involved in this research, issues  
of  perception, language, and meaning as they apply to this research, unanticipated 
findings, and implications for future research on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
    
     This chapter presents an overview of the significant findings from this study. The 
initial section addresses the primary research questions of how the critical factors of 
intelligence-led policing contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for 
existing practices and whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing can 
contribute to organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that 
accounted for by existing practices. Additionally, other topics which resulted from this 
research provide a basis for future research and will be discussed.   
     This research has provided a strong foundation for answering the questions posed in 
Chapter One: 
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police 
efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current practices in the Organized 
Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department? 
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the 
attainment of organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond 
that accounted for by current practices of the Department?  
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing 
police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?  
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     The benefit from this research is intended to add insight to the generalizability of the 
Intelligence-led Policing strategy for scholars, practitioners, and decision makers 
interested in the use of intelligence in police work.  
Findings 
Limitations 
     The lack of detailed understanding of the relationships between intelligence and 
decision behavior remains an obstacle to a more refined impact analysis. Because some 
statistical methods may be applied to examine the issue of validity in coding schemes, a 
second limitation, predicated by available data, may be the anticipated problem of multi-
co linearity among responses. This is expected as respondents work in a quasi-military 
organizational environment in which shared meanings are common. Further, 
characteristics associated with decision making behavior do not operate independently 
and are more likely to be found together. The generalizability derived from this research 
may be used for topics of future reference, some of which will be discussed in this 
Chapter. Question numbers in the following section refer to the question protocol in 
Appendix A.  
Research Question 1 
     Responses in interview from this research infer there is the perception among the 
supervisors interviewed that the practices outlined in the tenets of Intelligence- led 
policing would benefit the members of the Organized Crime Division in terms of 
efficiency. Efficiency, for the purpose of this research, means the facility with which a 
task is conducted and completed without wasting time, effort, or resources.     
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I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have 
more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at  
things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section?  Yeah, 
I definitely think it would be.  Sometimes, you know, that type of direction 
is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come 
up with an address or a location or whatever.  If you had somebody that 
have those--that information, those skills that can look for those types of 
things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would 
definitely--it would definitely be more effective.   
Source: 11028961 
 
     Responses to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could contribute 
to efficiency in the Organized Crime Division are positively supported throughout this 
research (overall responses to: 12a κ =0.52, 95%, 12d κ =0.64, 88%, 13j κ=0.95, 99%, 
14 κ= 0.71, 91 %). A number of respondents indicated their impression that Intelligence-
led policing was already being practiced within the OCD; the consequences of this 
impression will be discussed in more depth later in this Chapter. None of the respondents 
dismissed the concept of ILP as unimportant to their work.  
Yeah, I believe that it could be useful.  You know, obviously, the people that 
do the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned 
police work and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise.  But being 
able to pinpoint direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little 
more direction for the activities and associations by--come out with that 
information is--it could be quite a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that 
information and research yourself. (Question 12a)  
Source: 11028961 
 
     Intelligence-led policing is defined as strategy for decision makers whereby 
intelligence is developed through analysis in order to focus resources on prolific 
offenders with an intention to prevent crime from occurring. The critical factors included  
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in the definition that was provided to the respondents reflect that Intelligence-led policing 
involves the use of analytical resources for the purpose of maintaining criminal  
intelligence files on specific targets in order to develop associations and links to criminal 
networks and activities. This process requires (1) the management of centralized archives 
to the extent that varieties of informational records can be archived, reviewed and 
analyzed, (2) trained analysts to develop intelligence, and (3) a method for regularly 
disseminating intelligence for decision makers. Several respondents inferred, as in the 
example below, that existing OCD processes would be more efficient if they were 
automated. 
I think better cataloguing of some of this information and then, like you 
would tell earlier the querying would be easy, the ability to query on things 
would be helpful, but there, too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the 
district law enforcement level, too.  And let's give them a part of this whole 
thing 'cause they're the, you know, (boots) on the ground type of guys. 
(Question 14) 
Source: 11257484   
  
     There is the inference that parts of the Intelligence-led policing model are in use 
by some supervisors within the OCD.  
Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some 
of this already...   We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized 
Crime Division, a main 21 list.  Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the 
city; gang bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-
managerial position in a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-
managerial position, an extremely vital character.  Okay, we also have a 
system called the Trap System which is Targeted Repeat Offender 
Apprehension and Prosecution System…that's basically a joint venture  
 
with the state's attorney’s office where our top 11 districts for public violence 
submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along like the lines of the top 
10 or top 21.  And what that does is when no subjects' are arrested, they notify 
states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that case and stays with it.   
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And that a state's attorney is assigned to that area to make sure that that 
subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets taken; he's 
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.  But in short though, yes, I mean I 
believe the concept is useful to any Police Department…in this day in age and 
with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do random preventive 
patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime.  You have to 
have at least a good portion of your police department directed at known 
targets and known conflicts. (Question 12a)  
Source: 11247602 
 
      In the above response there is the inference that data collection is accomplished on 
specific criminals for investigative purposes. Tracking the activities of high profile career 
criminals who are actively engaged in current criminal activities is one aspect of 
Intelligence-led policing and is useful in developing information for analysis. Dilemmas 
may easily arise in the arrangement described by this response and center on who ‘owns’ 
the information that is to be developed. Both the federal ’21 list’ and the State’s Attorney 
‘top 10’ lists are developed by agencies other than the Department’s OCD.   
     The individuals provided on the respective lists are included based on other agency 
analysis without benefit of the criminal intelligence files that would be useful to the 
OCD. Additionally, the OCD often develops information on the individuals which is 
forwarded to outside agencies but there is no formal feedback mechanism to indicate 
whether or how such information is used. For example, members of the OCD may 
develop and provide information that an individual on one of the lists has fled out of the 
country. When updated list appear from other agencies and the same individuals appear,  
there will be some question as to how information provided was managed or whether it 
was considered important. For specific internal use, beyond what is shared, intelligence  
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developed through the processes of Intelligence-led policing within the OCD would 
benefit that unit’s efficiency.    
Yes…to some extent we try to do that now through information sharing but 
the--a more formalized structure would be absolutely a benefit. (Question 
12c)  
Source: 11087163 
 
     As a supplement to existing practices, the use of the critical factors of Intelligence-led 
policing can contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current 
practices in the Organized Crime Division (12c κ =0.57, 88% ).     
Research Question 2 
     The organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department are summarized in the 
Department Mission Statement which reads:  
The Chicago Police Department, as part of, and empowered by, the 
community, is committed to protect the lives, property, and rights of all 
people, to maintain order, and to enforce the law impartially. We will provide 
quality police service in partnership with other members of the community. 
To fulfill our mission, we will strive to attain the highest degree of ethical 
behavior and professional conduct at all times. 
 
      The Mission Statement of the Chicago Police Department provides an overview of 
the core values which govern how the organization expects to operate. Intelligence-led 
policing can compliment these values by providing a guide that enhances the quality of 
police services offered to the community through raising the level of professionalism 
within the Department. Professionalism in this context refers to the skills and 
competencies expected of Department members engaged in the duties for which they are  
trained. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing require participants to be proficient with 
data management tools which will require officers to become involved in continuing  
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professional development, a process that  affords officers the opportunity for learning 
techniques and new skill sets beyond those learned through regular police training.  
Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement.  Again, you know, 
strategic direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do 
you want your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical 
operations.  So, to reduce violence, we were more committed to making 
arrests, not gathering intelligence.  I think there's got to be a major shift in 
moving towards investing in people that can analyze, investing in technology 
that can make the collection of information a lot more easier and a lot easier to 
collect from everyone instead of just a few people.  You can collect it from--if 
you got one squad working on gangs you might get some reports.  But if you 
get a hundred people out in the same area working, you have the chances of 
collecting a hundred pieces of information but you have the right technology in 
place. (Question 11)  
Source: 11129230 
   
     The notion of professional development is a concept that, in practice, would provide 
officers the means for training that may be required to advance the critical factors of 
Intelligence-led policing.  Training that facilitates the use of the critical factors of 
Intelligence-led policing could be provided in much the same way that professional 
development courses are offered to teachers who are interested in strengthening their 
skills beyond any level of previous training or education.  
Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's 
possible to send somebody to.  I think it should always be there.  And it's 
going to move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as 
we go along also.  I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have 
our own computer support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to 
depend on Information Services because they are slow in responding to 
certain things, but I think we are also--misfortune that we are still limited in 
our technology capabilities by the location on which we are. (Question 13j)  
Source: 11148753  
 
I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for the 
most part of like anything.  We could always get better at it.  Yeah, it's the 
concept is a solid concept in my opinion.  Anytime that you you’re ( 
forearmed), so to speak… anytime you have as much knowledge as you can  
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about a particular decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better 
decision.(Question 14)  
Source: 11247602 
    
     A common component of the Chicago Police Mission Statement, and the critical 
factors of Intelligence-led Policing, involves the notion of ‘maintaining order.’ As a 
concept, ‘order maintenance’ in society defines the purpose of having a police 
department; as a practice there is a distinction between the ‘order maintenance’ 
mentioned in the Chicago Police Mission Statement and the critical factors of 
Intelligence-led policing. The Chicago Statement makes no reference to crime prevention 
while the principle intention of Intelligence-led policing entails crime prevention as its 
goal.  
     Respondents throughout this study infer there is a need to train personnel in the 
techniques which contribute to the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing. This is a 
positive indication that tenets of Intelligence-led Policing would contribute to the 
attainment of the organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that 
accounted for by current practices of the Department.   
Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, 
meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people 
that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective 
to our section?  Yeah, I definitely think it would be.  Sometimes, you 
know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people 
down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or 
whatever.  If you had somebody that have those--that information, those 
skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can 
 connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more   
            effective. (Question 14)  
Source: 11028961 
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Research Question 3 
 
     The construct of current police practices within the OCD is grounded in investigative 
procedures which require a crime to have been committed before it can be investigated.  
     Initial crime reporting begins with the preliminary report, done by a patrol officer; a 
beat cop. Depending on the severity or the time of commission of the crime, if an arrest is 
not immediately affected, the report is forwarded to the Bureau of Investigative Services 
(BIS) for assignment to a detective. The detective does some rudimentary research to 
become familiar with the victim(s) and crime circumstances and possibly to ascertain 
whether the crime being reported is part of a trend related to similar instances. Based on 
the collection of evidence and witness or victim interviews, the detective may develop 
enough information to start building a case against an offender. If the information is 
insufficient, the case may be suspended, i.e., not pursued pending new leads, but the case 
is not ‘cleared.’ Cleared cases are those in which an arrest is made or otherwise closed for 
exceptional circumstances such as the victim’s decision not to pursue the case. In any 
case, if the circumstances of the crime involve narcotics, street violence involving guns, 
or homicide, the case information will also be provided to the Organized Crime Division.  
     Because the Organized Crime Division works exclusively with incidents of street level 
violence and narcotics, which are often related, the unit has a broader perspective on 
citywide crime and can focus additional resources on an investigation. The overall effect  
of their activity can and does impact a criminal type of activity (drugs, weapons sales, 
homicide) but the focus of the OCD endeavor is to resolve the issue at hand through 
arrest and move on to the next case. It should be noted that the current OCD teams are  
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very successful at what they do and currently lead all other city police units in arrests for 
the cases in which they are involved.        
     In contrast, Intelligence-led policing involves a focus on known prolific offenders, 
sometimes referred to as career criminals, who have demonstrated, based on past actions, 
their intention to perpetuate criminal activity. Although entire organizations, e.g. New 
Jersey State Police, have adopted the Intelligence-led policing model as a standard of 
practice, the model is intended to supplement, not replace, existing police practices. This 
is an important distinction when compared among other policing programs and supports 
that fact that Intelligence-led policing presents a different construct from practices 
currently employed by the OCD. 
     To illustrate this contrast, a number of policing models have been advanced to meet a 
perceived change in the role of policing in modern society. Most notable was the push for 
Community Oriented Policing (COP) over the past twenty years. The COP program was 
intended to be adopted as a philosophy that permeated every aspect of policing. Such is 
not the case with Intelligence-led policing which instead is provided as a management 
tool to augment existing police practices without reinventing the organization. The 
benefit of an Intelligence-led policing over existing practices centers on the contention 
that with the correct tools and methods there are instances when it is possible to interrupt 
criminal activities to the extent that the possibility for future crime is eliminated and 
thereby prevented.  
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Other Considerations 
Refutability and Generalizability 
     Karl Popper (1963) maintained that in addition to evidence in support of the scientific 
method (and research) being necessary and sufficient it must also be subject to the notion  
of refutability. Refutability contends that inductive inference limits, rather than aids, the 
creation of knowledge in that the scientific method establishes universal knowledge 
based on empirics which may be useful in order to corroborate findings among theories 
but should not alone be used to determine knowledge because the process is subject to 
falsification. Falsification is established when one exception to an accepted standard is 
discovered thereby changing the universality of the standard; a common illustration 
entails the discovery of the black swan. Often, in defense of inductive methods, Occam’s 
razor which maintains in complex matters, the simplest solution is likely to be more 
correct (than others) is employed.  
     This study emphasizes the roles of language, relations, and motivation in the 
postmodernism tradition and includes a rejection of the assumption that objectively, what 
is observed represents something which can be universally accepted. However, this 
research does effectively bring forth a wide range of phenomena based on a few simple 
postulates derived from a model of codified observations. The methodology can easily be 
used as the basis of further research. In this research, examples derived through  
interviews reveal there is a disconnect between the intention and use of intelligence, as 
defined by the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing which lend themselves to   
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policing tasks, and the actual processes, as they are understood and used by members of 
the OCD,  to develop intelligence products for use in policing tasks.    
Language and Meaning 
     The critical factors of Intelligence-led policing include a definition of intelligence. 
When the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its manuals on Intelligence-led policing  
(http://info.publicintelligence.net/IntelLedPolicing.pdf ) it was very specific in making 
distinctions between terms that would be used to describe the concept. ‘Intelligence,’ 
according to the DOJ, is ‘produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.’ 
Further, the DOJ manual explained that the process of analysis, while aided by some 
software, required trained individuals to synthesize information materials into a 
manageable, easily understandable form for presentation to decision makers. Other 
authors, notably Ratcliffe (2007), have contributed to the notion that success in 
developing useful products from the Intelligence-led model depend on a complete 
understanding of the terms. The principle reason for emphasizing what is meant by the 
development of ‘intelligence’ is to avoid confusing it with the development of 
information ‘information’ which is common in police work. Until information is 
subjected to analysis, it remains little more than data of interest. When analysis begins to 
tie associations among and between information, the intelligence process begins. In 
contrast, the definition for ‘intelligence’ by the Chicago Police is a more elusive. The  
term ‘intelligence’ is referenced in General Orders which serve as the policy directives 
for the Department, but the term ‘intelligence’ is never defined.  
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I don't know the Department's definition, (or) if there is one, to be perfectly 
honest. (Question 3)  
Source: 11257484 
 
If there is a definition, I really don't know it.  I think when people think 
intelligence I think they also think like technology.  They kind of go hand-in-
hand; I don't know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the 
Department has ever used it. (Question 3)  
Source: 11028961       
 
     In response to whether respondents were aware of a Department definition for 
‘intelligence,’ responses were uniformly in agreement as to whether a definition existed 
or, if there was a definition, whether it was used. (Q3. κ =0.94, 97%).      
     The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors 
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and 
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, 
particularly in crime prevention. 
     If supervisors understand and define intelligence related activities in a manner which 
differs from those required for a predictive or proactive response, emergent, rather than 
desired consequences are likely to impact their effectiveness. Emergent consequences 
arise from the failure to regard a sufficient number of variables prior to the 
implementation of a program; some of these variables may be unknown while others are 
ignored.  
     The Intelligence-led policing model provides well defined terms and direction as to 
the methods and steps required to provide intelligence products that can assist decision  
makers establish strategic plans. Current use of the same or similar terms used by the 
Chicago Police Department gives rise to a wide range of interpretations. 
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Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively 
than in the rest of the department.  We get intelligence and information from 
confidential clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks 
on problem area where that intelligence could be used specifically.  As opposed to 
patrol, that information doesn't get out as quickly.  We're kind of setup to 
disseminate information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from 
hierarchy to anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a 
result of retaliation. (Question 2)  
Source: 11087163 
  
     The above response addresses effectiveness in the use of intelligence by the OCD. The 
language combines the terms of intelligence and information together and states that such 
products are disseminated immediately. From a tactical perspective, this is method does 
work well in investigations. Once data is used in this fashion, it has a tendency to decay 
and without provisions for archiving, it may be lost entirely over time. The above 
example illustrates how the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing would contribute 
to the efficiency of current OCD practices but also provides the basis for future research 
on the use or limitations of language, meaning, and understanding that can result in  
disconnects between what is intended from a method of practice and what is delivered in 
practice.                
Disconnects in What is Expected from Intelligence  
     The perception of what constitutes intelligence or how it could be used is dependent 
on the direct experience or education of most supervisors rather than on any literal 
definition provided by the Department. Some of the supervisors interviewed have  
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military training that included work in the field of intelligence. Each of the supervisors 
interviewed is committed to the task of reducing street violence to the fullest extent 
possible given the resources at their disposal. Most work long and irregular hours and all 
are immersed in finding ways to improve the Division’s efficiency and effectiveness. 
This includes managing equipment and manpower resources involving work schedules 
which function on a 24/7/365 basis.  
     The supervisors themselves are accountable to others who are higher in the chain of 
command and serve as the decision makers who determine the overall strategies for the  
Department. Based on these strategic decisions, rank and file supervisors are tasked with 
the responsibilities produce, i.e., provide quantitative indicators in support of strategic 
decisions. Quantitative indicators of a successful strategy are generally measured by (1) 
arrests and (2) reductions in crime. The tactics used to achieve results are discretionary 
on the parts of tactical supervisors.  
Okay.  Well here.  Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer.  Real answer 
is, what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on?  Burglaries?  Stolen 
cars?  Narcotics?  Violent crime! Homicides and shootings and if you want to 
be more succinct, homicides; so I know that.  I've been told that, I know what 
I need to do with my people.  If I get homicides down, that is going to be the 
answer.  So, what is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do 
everything we can to do that.  That's what we'll do.  If they change it, then 
we'll change how we do it.  But give me what you want done, what do you 
want done?  You want homicides down.  Good.  Thank you.  We're going to 
step back and we'll make that happen. (Question 13g)  
Source: 11042566 
 
     The ability of the Organized Crime Division to successfully accomplish the tasks 
delegated to them has never been at issue. At issue is whether models such as  
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Intelligence-led policing can contribute to the units overall effectiveness by augmenting 
the effect of current practices.  If buy-in to a new approach or concept is to occur for an 
organization, it must begin from the top. In organizations, when the message from top 
management is clear, consistent, and persistent, members of the organization are able to 
form a better picture of what is expected of them.  
      In an article for the Chicago Magazine (2009) which focused on technology used in 
policing, the Chicago Police Superintendent stated he wanted to continue to push the 
concept of intelligence-led policing, using real-time information to guide police resources 
and be able to develop ‘intelligence that allows us to take action and move resources   
with the ultimate goal of being able to get ahead of the crime.’  Subsequently, in a CBS 
report, the Superintendent stated, “We've been harping on intelligence-led policing and 
the best source of information, I would think, is the actual victim who was shot” 
(cbs2chicago.com/local/police.jody.weis.2.1056999.html). Neither of these descriptions 
conforms to the definition, nor the purpose, of Intelligence-led policing. Disparities as to 
what constitutes Intelligence-led policing by a chief executive can send a mixed message 
to those who are expected to be engaged in the program. 
I would agree with it (the concept of ILP) but it sounds like a catch phrase 
and sounds like a buzzword more than he (The Superintendent) believes in 
anything, you know. (Question 5)  
Source: 11062184 
 
I think that some of this crime analysis theory is the flavor of the day.  The 
bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with 
people.  I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests.  
Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions.  It's just a 
way to justify the planning for research.  What I mean, I'm a little bit old 
school, I still believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more 
effective than the total embracing of, you know, everything has been  
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researched down to the last.  The bottom line is you still have to go out there 
in police cars and stop cars, stop people, interact with people, and that 
information's going to come from the street.(Question 12a)  
Source: 11234773 
 
      Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (2004) noted that among primitive populations, 
to be able to explain anything, one had to be able to understand everything. This 
statement applied to the abilities of primitive populations to cope within the limits of their  
knowledge and serves as the basis of myth. The notion is contrary to the scientific 
approach but is used at times by organizations to dismiss objections to weak or spurious 
planning. Organizational program designs may be weak as a result of what Herbert 
Simon (1998) described as bounded rationality, which maintains that organizational  
decisions are restricted by the information they possess. In both examples, members of 
organizations or cultures which advance incomplete programs are required to align their 
understanding of new programs in order to collaborate in program implementation. When 
this occurs, disconnects between intention and implementation pose a viable threat to the 
new program. 
      Intelligence-led policing was initially introduced to the Department by Phil Cline. 
The program centered on a Deployment Operations Center (DOC) to serve as the clearing 
house for specific reported crime related information. All reports of major crimes 
involving shooting victims and homicides which occurred in the city were forwarded to 
the DOC for review. Conceptually, Detectives assigned to the DOC were expected to 
review these cases, ascertain if patterns or common constancies existed, and compile 
reports based on their observations. The process was ad hoc; the majority of the reports 
generated were limited to only the initial information received, and the emphasis of the  
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DOC centered on providing as much information as possible to as wide an audience as 
possible.     
I think the Department does focus on intelligence-led policing.  I think it 
has for a few years, but it could always be pushed up to higher and higher 
levels and become more and more efficient.  I mean under Phil Cline, they 
started the Deployment Operations Center which is basically the first step 
in intelligence-led policing where it was the information gathering section 
for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted intelligence  
report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of less 
police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you 
can to make the Department more efficient. (Question 5)  
Source: 11247602  
 
      Members of the OCD contribute greatly to the information which the DOC receives. 
Because they represent a specialized plain clothes (not uniformed) group which travels 
through Chicago in unmarked vehicles of various descriptions; they would ordinarily not 
be recognized as police. Without detailing the particulars, it must be noted that much of 
their work is covert.  Based on their assignments, these officers provide regular reports to 
the DOC. Many of those interviewed had reservations about the value of the ‘intelligence’ 
they received in return.  
   It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss 
the current conflicts from each particular area.  It's a short meeting …those 
are--I think we get the best information and leaders at Area meetings, there are 
maybe 21 meetings, you know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think 
that's one least productive meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think 
it's a waste. (Question 13e)  
Source: 11058231 
 
Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains to DOC, who want…they 
are keeping it somewhere, God knows where.  But when some of the gang 
members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the  
narcotics side.  We send her all sorts of stuff but really it's been--it's almost a 
problem of too much information.  Yeah, you can have every single GD on  
the computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or  
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New Orleans, right?  (Question 13a)  
Source: 11062184  
 
 When a separation between the intention and the use of a program such as 
Intelligence-led policing begin, weaknesses attributable to disconnects can occur.  
Disconnects are apparent when two groups within the same organization work to 
complete the same tasks without either being aware of any benefit the other might 
provide towards accomplishing the common task. The possibility of disconnects may be 
reduced through strengthening the bonds of communications when tasks are focused on  
common goals. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing provide one method for 
strengthening communication bonds.  
      There is the inference in law enforcement that because a strategy is implemented 
which requires subscription to a particular plan that all involved are (1) privy to the tools 
required to execute the strategy and (2) have an understanding of what is to be 
accomplished through the strategy. The reasons for organizational disconnects that occur 
because one or both of these assumptions is missing is worth further study.      
The Issue of Ownership, Latency, and Entropy 
      In addition to the practices involved with the development of intelligence are 
concerns of ownership of information. Investigative procedures used to develop 
information are based on training and experience. During the investigative process, which 
involves the collection of evidence, including interviews, information is gathered for the 
unique purpose of establishing a case.  A case is intentionally developed to provide 
sufficient and necessary information and evidence which can be used to identify and seek  
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prosecution of the offender. The progress of an individual case is determined by an 
investigator who manages information according to how it is perceived as being related  
to the case. In this sense, the investigator demonstrates the initial phase of developing 
intelligence from data in that from all data available, the investigator parses what is of  
interest, vets sources, and disregards anything that remains. In doing so, the investigator 
becomes vested in all the case-related information, i.e., there is ownership.  
      The exchange of information that may become intelligence can involve several 
persons and multiple agencies along both horizontal and vertical organization hierarchies.  
Horizontally, information is passed to other detectives on a team within the Division or, 
in some cases, the OCD analyst. Under specific instances, for example if information 
indicates there is an immediate threat to life, a recommendation for action, involving 
several teams, is initiated and general information is be distributed to command staff 
outside of the OCD. The same information may be passed vertically to outside agencies 
when it involves active cases in which there is collaboration. As long as the OCD has 
sole control of the information, there is ownership.     
Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own 
intelligence, I mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team 
and each officer that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime 
Division does analyze their information as it pertains to their investigation in 
their cases.  That information and analysis does go to the bigger cause of the 
whole department at some point and also depending on the urgency of it.  If 
it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR (Intelligence Based Deployment 
Recommendation). (Question 7)  
Source: 11247602   
 
  When collaboration with other agencies along a vertical hierarchy occurs, information 
from the OCD becomes co-mingled with similar information obtained at the other level.  
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The use of information by different agencies can be for different purposes and is related 
to agency responsibilities. For example, local authorities seek information leading to 
arrests while federal agencies may want the same information to strengthen an existing 
case for prosecution at a later date.      
  In relying on ‘outside’ information, the notion of ownership becomes compromised to 
varying degrees. As mentioned earlier, the OCD often works in conjunction with other 
agencies representing federal or state interests. Because agencies often work to develop 
cases on the same individuals, OCD members are unlikely to be surprised by the  
individuals identified by outside agencies as ‘top ten’ targets. Most often, these 
individuals represent persons who were originally introduced to the outside agencies by 
the OCD. But the ‘same’ information can assume different forms because of two factors 
which consistently effect information and intelligence that is passed back and forth 
between agencies; those factors are latency and entropy.  
     Latency is a condition of delay between a time when information is gathered and 
when it is dispersed. Information is more current for OCD members who are actively 
engaged with street sources but the information may lose value during the time it takes to 
reach other agencies. Entropy is the often referred to as a state of ‘disorder’ in 
information but is more aptly represented as data which is ‘lost’ during the course of 
transmission between the sender and receiver. Effects of entropy are evident in 
information exchanges between analysts and end users, between agencies, and between 
departments within the same organization. The ability to establish a centralized  
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intelligence process deters the effects of both latency and entropy in that it can truly 
serves as a real time center.      
    I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central 
intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from  
narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division.  
And since there's no central location or intelligence collection manager to 
review the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking. 
(Question 11)  
Source: 11105904 
 
(Decision makers)  got to be careful about over-information, you can't throw 
everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving  
you a 30-page report and half of it is about neighbors.  Now, I don't even do 
give a (expletive deleted) about that.  Where is this guy?  What kind of--what 
gang is he in, who’s he shot at before and you never get anything.  I know all 
you get is an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, 
you know… (Question 12b) 
Source: 11062184  
 
      The effects of ownership of information are most evident in the results produced 
from actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence is that from which a specific 
tactical engagement results usually leading to arrests.  A longitudinal study in the 
ways the same information is used by different law enforcement agencies is worth 
further study. Implication on the future of policing, Intelligence-led programs, 
evidence-based policing would benefit from further research into the manner and 
methods used by police for managing and developing intelligence products in order to 
bring more standardization processes into play.       
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Implication on the Future of Policing, Intelligence-led Programs, and  
Further Research 
     This research has provided a microcosm on some of the concerns that will impact the 
future of policing as it strives to provide required services while faced with dwindling  
resources. At the time of this research, well over half of the Police Departments in the 
United  States have been forced to reduce the size of their departments because of 
budgetary restraints; for many departments this reduction has included layoffs. If this  
trend continues, future United States models for policing will require agencies to work in 
assistance or, in agreement, through instruments of mutual aid between departments.  
Under such agreements, geographically adjoining agencies combine resources to address 
mutual problems which might otherwise prove unmanageable if each agency were left to 
their own device. These types of regional arrangements are relatively new in the United 
States but are common in Europe, especially with Interpol. Most commonly, mutual 
assistance is provided in the form of information and intelligence exchanges.  
      Current problems involving in exchanging and maintaining information and 
intelligence revolve around interoperability. Several departments have their own methods 
for collecting and archiving information which can not be easily transferred to others.  
      For example, the United States Navy has, since 2003, been involved with project 
LinX, a law enforcement information exchange program intended to connect states to a 
common crime and incident database in order for the Navy to avail itself of information 
which it deems important. Each of the states involved in the project shares the common 
characteristic of having at least on shoreline border. There are technical skills required to  
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set and maintain this application and the purpose of collection is to aid the Navy in 
protecting U.S. Shores. Similar program designs intended to strengthen intelligence ties 
between local and regional law enforcement agencies should be vigorously explored.  
 To date, no one application is used universally by local and regional law enforcement 
agencies to share or maintain intelligence files. Certainly data is collected, but the steps  
required for developing intelligence rests with human analysis, not applications or 
software. Analysts often serve as an information buffer between strategists and tacticians 
and can provide an important input to both. Decision makers can articulate to analysts the  
focus of an intended strategy so that the value in meaning from the data collected can be 
established and passed to those who will implement programs.    
      In addition to the logistics involved in developing a strong Intelligence-led policing 
design for agencies, there are certain environmental dynamics which will dramatically 
affect the ways in which the Department will use the tools required for Intelligence-led 
policing in the near future. Chicago’s fiscal problems affect how many new officers will 
be hired for the next police classes (2011-12). Current estimates indicate 450 officers will 
be eligible to retire during this time while plans for new hires provide for approximately 
200 positions. Although this may appear as a losing proposition in terms of attrition,  
many of the new hires will represent a generation, the ‘Y Generation,’ that is generally 
adept at, and familiar with, communication devices, media devices, and digital 
technologies; this dynamic could positively impact the future of programs like 
Intelligence-led policing. The ability to manage and understand the use of technology  
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prior to being introduced to the tenets of programs can enhance progress in the 
development of intelligence centers.  
Unanticipated Findings 
      The interviews conducted for this research focused first on the research questions as 
to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could serve to make the duties 
of Chicago’s Organized Crime Division more efficient. The Intelligence-led policing 
model emphasizes the use of analytics to transform information to actionable intelligence. 
Actionable intelligence is information that has been distilled through the process of 
analysis and serves as the basis for making decisions on how resources will be used. In 
addition to structured responses, additional issues related to the development of useful 
intelligence products within the OCD came to light.   
Technology and the Development of Intelligence  
      Although the use of technology was addressed at the conclusion of the interviews, 
many of the respondents introduced the topic during their responses to questions related 
to the concept of intelligence. This infers respondents perceived a strong bond between 
the notion of intelligence and technology.  
My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing our 
tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high 
rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence 
and shooting. (Question 5)  
Source: 11129230 
   
I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like 
technology… (Question 3)  
Source: 11028961 
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 Technology is a tool. In an age of ubiquitous computing, the tools most used by 
society are devices which provide instant access to information that helps manage our 
affairs. Technology tools can be represented as hardware, e.g., computers, cellular  
devices including GPS equipment, cameras, etc., or software including database 
applications, tracking applications, or camera analytics. Many of the tools available in  
today’s technology arsenal can help manage decisions but the tools themselves do not 
make decisions. 
The Importance of Analysis 
     Decision makers required to review large amounts of information within finite time 
frames need assistance in sense-making to avoid being overloaded. Such assistance is 
provided through the use of analysts. Several respondents indicated the importance in 
using an analyst.    
Our analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture 
by using databases that the officers started using or don't have the access 
to and sometimes putting everything together from another unit making 
an arrest that they are not aware of.  Connecting aliases where an 
individual doesn't have the time to make that kind of analysis or an  
analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often more effectively than 
the officers themselves (Question 10)  
Source: 11087163 
 
So, therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we 
got intelligence on him.  We know that there's going to be a spike in 
crime because prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to 
ten murders.  So, I mean that intelligence derived from the analyst and 
when you look at the map, you see a spike and had you not (gotten) the 
intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys here that track that 
person, particular person or target, you would not know why the spike is 
there, because he just got released. (Question 10)  
Source: 11105904  
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I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in 
connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would 
leverage all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using  
technology in using information, leveraging our human resources to be 
more strategically focused and obviously more efficient and obviously  
putting our officers at the right place at the right time at the right spot. 
(Question 12a)  
Source: 11129230 
 
      In response to the changing needs in government agencies for the need of 
qualified analysts, several academic institutions are providing advanced degrees 
in analytics and research based instruction centered on the development of police  
intelligence processes. Michigan State’s Dr. David Carter offers graduate 
programs specifically designed for training in police intelligence. Several 
institutions provide similar courses which focus on the use of analysis to develop 
intelligence products.  
The Importance of Training as a Resource to Develop Intelligence 
     When asked what resources could improve the intelligence processes used by the 
OCD responses centered on improving or obtaining additional software, training, and  
teamwork among investigators (Q13i. κ =1,00 100%). The inference was that additional 
software and training of investigators could aid in the implementation of Intelligence-led 
policing. None of the responses indicated that trained analysts, civilian or sworn, might 
be recruited from within the ranks of the Department or from universities to assist in 
implementing the use of Intelligence-led policing.     
      Intelligence-led policing is one method for law enforcement to focus on critical 
tasks necessary to deal with crime issues. Technologies that provided assistance with 
geographical information systems, databases, or social network designs can assist the  
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managers who use Intelligence-led policing but technology should not be interpreted as 
the solution to the complex and difficult process of making hard decisions.      
   Respondents were specific as to which technologies were used but less clear on 
which technologies could be used to manage the information or data which was 
retrieved. Trained analysts are often familiar with the types of technology required to 
enhance meaning from information. For example, products such as CopLink® or i2® 
are software applications that accept data from a variety of sources and multiple  
jurisdictions to link associations among suspects.  To aid decision makers more 
attention should be given to the use of trained analysts, techniques of critical thinking,  
statistical testing for significance, and mission specific experience. Mission specific 
experience involves the competencies of individuals as content experts when dealing 
with a specific crime related problems.  
Other Considerations    
      Respondents were aware that technology played into developing intelligence products 
but felt disenfranchised from the decision process in selecting which products were  
available or could be most useful to them in their tasks. As a result, a variety of software 
applications available are restricted to specific users while others are underused because 
investigators lack training and are compelled to rely on the data interpretation of other  
agencies. 
That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services 
Division that decides what technology can be available to us.  However, I will 
say that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to 
develop an intelligent product. (Question 13d)  
Source: 11105904 
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Conclusion 
     Since the events of September 11th 2001, local law enforcement has been asked to 
assume additional responsibilities for which they not prepared; responsibilities which 
involved information sharing and exchanges that tied to expanded regional or federal  
interests. Since that time, there has been an accelerated attempt to join information 
sources along guidelines presented through federal agencies. Local law enforcement  
became aware of the wide variety of tools and programs which could be used to serve 
their own interests. Intelligence-led policing may serve as one of those tools. 
      This research determined to a high degree the respondent’s believe there is value in 
the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing (Q14. κ =0.71, 91%). Additionally, if  
provided so that the program could be implemented without draining existing resources, 
respondents were similarly in agreement that it would a provide benefit to the duties 
required in their tasks ( Q15. κ =0.82, 96% ). The respondents were equally in agreement 
that there were no immediate plans to enhance existing intelligence processes within the 
OCD (Q13j. κ =0.95, 99%). 
 Changes in the law enforcement have always been slow and often in reaction to 
changes in the environment in which they serve. The experiences related through 
interviews in this study demonstrate the Chicago Police and the OCD are aware that  
changes are necessary in order to maximize resources and to function more efficiently; an 
important step in realizing why change is necessary. Implications from this study indicate 
the OCD, a unit called upon to implement Department strategies, realize new approaches  
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intended to enhance, not replace, current practices, are welcome. Intelligence-led policing 
is one such approach and if the critical factors involved can be fully integrated with 
existing investigative procedures, the abilities of the Department’s OCD will be enhanced 
beyond the level of detecting and interceding in street level violence to the point at which 
crime prevention becomes a realistic and attainable goal.  
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